Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/5–2248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
niact

London, May 22, 1948.

2225. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas. At Bevin’s request, I met with him this morning, in Michael Wright’s presence, for a long discussion of Palestine. Many points covered in the conversation will be reported to you later. At the moment, however, there are several aspects of the problem of immediate significance.

1. (a) Bevin urges, with complete sincerity, that we give support to the British resolution pending in the Security Council calling for a cease-fire among the hostile forces. If accepted, he means that all hostilities shall cease, and that the Jewish and Arab forces, respectively, will be permitted to move within those portions of Palestine which are clearly Arab or Jewish as the case may be, to the extent that they do not come in conflict with opposing forces.

He believes this is the most realistic and hopeful approach, and that any suggestion involving evacuation or a standstill would certainly be rejected by both sides.

He does not suggest that we accept the British resolution necessarily, as it is presently drafted without modification, but that we support it with such amendments or changes as may fall within its general meaning.

(b) He believes that before Article 39 of the Charter is invoked and before sanctions are applied, the two hostile groups should be given an opportunity to accept or reject the cease-fire proposal, and if they accept it, to determine under the auspices of the mediator what peaceful settlement can be arranged.

(c) Moreover, he believes that invoking Article 39 probably will mean ultimate Soviet interference in Palestine and in the Middle East.

2. He hopes that at least until after having had an opportunity to review the situation, we will not precipitately lift the embargo on arms. The British are under great pressure to permit the free flow of arms into the Arab states. They have so far successfully resisted this pressure which is mounting every day. They will continue to resist, if we do not remove our embargo. If, on the other hand, we do lift it, it will be impossible for the British to maintain theirs. Thus a situation far more serious than the present one, encompassing a much wider area probably would be created.

3. Bevin says that having relinquished the mandate, and having been divested of direct responsibilities under it, he, personally, though this has not been cleared with the Cabinet, is prepared to examine the position from a fresh vantage point.

4. At the Scarborough meeting of the Labor Party heavy influences were brought to bear upon him to speak of Palestine. These influences he repelled, because he was fearful that in defending the government’s position, he might make some statement which might intensify the tension between our two governments on this question and might cast a cloud on Anglo-American relations generally. If, however, we insist on invoking Article 39 of the Charter and lift the embargo, it will be impossible for him to refrain from answering questions in the House of Commons which he knows, under these circumstances, will be put to him. In responding, he will naturally have to defend the government’s position and will find it impossible to avoid making statements which may be misunderstood at home and may have the effect which he was fearful any comments at Scarborough might have produced.

5. Berger¹ has just returned from the Scarborough Labor Party conference and tells me that although nothing was said openly during the meeting, his personal associations, covering a wide range of party membership, indicated concern and disquiet about our relations with the British in Palestine and the Middle East.

6. From my personal knowledge, reinforced by what Bevin and Berger tell me, I feel that we should try to relax the pressure on the British by accommodating them on the two questions which Bevin has raised namely, the substance of the British resolution and the embargo on arms and by otherwise refraining from taking action, until at least there has been an opportunity to make a careful and joint appraisal of our respective positions. This appraisal on the British side will be given us immediately.

7. Since dictating the above, Bevin has just extended an invitation to me to meet with himself, the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Chiefs of Staff, and Minister of Commonwealth Relations early next week for the purpose of discussing the broad political and extensive strategic relations implicit in the Palestinian situation.

Douglas

1. Samuel D. Berger, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.