501.BB Palestine/5–948: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
615. The following is explanation of text of an arrangement for possible provisional regime based on Chapter XII of the Charter as transmitted in USUN 614.1
General outlines of text were worked out in informal conference yesterday with Hopkins and Ignatieff (Canada) with brief participation of Trafford Smith (UK). Text discussed this morning with Beeley and Trafford Smith and Hopkins. Subject minor questions Beeley indicated he would telegraph text immediately to London presumably with indication it is satisfactory if it is decided to proceed on basis Chapter XII of Charter.
Basic considerations:
- 1.
- To meet principal lines of objection as well as suggestions raised in debate in first committee on our working paper. New text represents compromise between British “empirical” approach and widespread demand in GA for firmer, less equivocal legal basis for action.
- 2.
- To provide sound legal basis under charter for provisional emergency regime in Palestine.
- 3.
- Reduction to minimum of responsibilities for administering authority. There is widespread agreement that some minimum responsibilities should be assumed but they should be on strong legal basis.
- 4.
- Combined idea of minimum arrangements parties can agree upon with role of UN as mediator building upon cooperation and agreement of parties.
- 5.
- Suspension of operation of GA resolution of 29 November 1947 but as part of positive proposal with sound legal basis in Charter. The idea is to avoid complexities of 29 November resolution without discarding it entirely, providing affirmative substitute as interim provisional regime and overcoming the argument that existing de facto partition is identical with compliance with November 29 resolution.
- 6.
- Providing a link with the Truce Commission of the SC and assisting in correlating and unifying Palestine efforts of various UN organs.
- 7.
- Affording legal foundation for any desired subsequent action by US and other states in support of UN solution without prior commitment to send armed forces while avoiding interfering with realistic developments along the lines, for example, of Abdullah proposal.
- 8.
- Taking advantage of actual subcommittee situation resulting from willingness of members of committee one to consider Creech Jones approach supported by Canadians; since Canadians now working with US and British on new ideas tactical situation would facilitate bringing proposal into subcommittee and getting favorable consideration.
- 9.
- Reduces to minimum idea of UN making empty gestures and developing futile paper schemes involving obligations which cannot be discharged; obligations in present approach can be discharged. On the other hand, we would avoid letting UN get into position of virtual bankruptcy re Palestine and also avoid US, after strong leadership, getting into position of washing hands.
Comments on text.
Preamble is designed to point out charter authority and to stress emergency and temporary nature of proposal. Parenthetical reference to situation of Jerusalem in second paragraph of preamble included to cover possibility of taking account of some special trusteeship or other regime for Jerusalem.
I. First paragraph following preamble is considered implicit suspension of resolution of November 29. This paragraph is intended to reserve the ultimate political solution and should be read together with II re suspension November 29 resolution. This paragraph alone, however, is implicit suspension.
Article 1 retains our previous concept of UN as administering authority and seems preferable to named group of powers. We doubt possibility in time available of making agreement on the powers to be named (see additional comments below).
Article 2 is designed to avoid filling details in this agreement by providing residual authority for TC to develop functions if agreement between the two parties is expanded.
Article 3 follows original US working paper on method of appointing high commissioner.
Article 4 embodies the concept which lies at the heart of the Creech Jones approach. The second sentence is taken from the British draft based upon that approach. Emphasis is here put upon thought that high commissioner will function chiefly through Jews and Arabs with a minimum of direct legislative or executive power.
Article 5 is based on Article 84 of Charter and contemplates use only of locally recruited police and volunteer forces. While this would discard idea of international force whether contributed by states or composed [Page 951] of volunteers recruited among member states this article should be considered in light of additional comments below.
Article 6 frankly faces fact that high commissioner could not cope with large scale hostilities. This article ties in the SCTC and indicates that the business of truce and the containment of full scale organized conflict between Jews and Arabs remains primarily a question for the SC.
Article 7 closely reproduces another cardinal point in the British suggestions following the Creech Jones approach, namely stress on mediatory functions and the realistic concept that progress towards ultimate solution depends upon agreement of parties.
Article 8 regarding defraying of expenses should probably be supplemented by some appropriate provision possibly making use of UN working capital fund to meet preliminary expenses of high commissioner.
Article 9 is designed further to integrate all actions of UN bodies and to assure continuing authority of the special municipal commissioner if he is appointed, in accordance with the recommendation of the GA of 6 May 1948. If he is not appointed, this article would be eliminated and high commissioner would presumably exercise his functions.
Article 10 with regard to protection of holy places, etc. might be supplemented by provisions for special regime in Jerusalem if such action is decided upon.
Article 11 ties in the general suggestions made by the US representative in first committee on April 20, takes account of current activities of International Red Cross and also takes account of British idea and emphasis in subcommittee on necessity for such practical steps, for example, as securing cooperation of both groups with WHO assistance re epidemics.
Article 12 on termination takes account of Jewish and Arab objections to indefinite duration of trusteeship as outlined in our original working paper. If parties reach agreement, the agreed regime should immediately supplant UN regime as soon as high commissioner notifies the TC. Suggested date of January 1, 1950 would give GA further opportunity to consider matter in its 1949 regular session if no agreement reached by parties before that date.
II was included on basis of strong belief of Canadians and British that it would be virtually unavoidable. In order to avoid confusion we agree that this issue might as well be frankly faced. Since in first committee such a resolution would probably be voted on paragraph by paragraph by simple majority, members would have an opportunity [Page 952] to abstain or vote against this particular paragraph while subsequently voting for resolution as a whole. At the same time, the question of suspension would be merely part of positive affirmative proposal and would not emerge strongly as separate issue which would otherwise almost certainly be the case.
III is intended to afford justification for any supporting action which we might later decide was desirable. It is further designed to eliminate plausible legal foundation for fishing in troubled waters by Russians or others.
Additional comments.
Referring to above comments on Articles 1 and 5 the trusteeship concept as developed in this draft obviously appeals to Beeley as providing strong legal basis for minimizing risk (a) of Russian interference (on theory that it would make illegal proclamation and recognition of Jewish or Arab state); and (b) that conflict could not be confined to Palestine if Abdullah plan gets out of hand. While reiterating British position against use of British forces inside Palestine, Beeley himself [seems?] to have made up his own mind that UK should be prepared, if necessary, should either or both (a) and (b) above materialize, to participate in embargo, naval patrols, or any other action which seemed suitable and desirable without, however, involving any prior commitment to take such action. While speaking personally Beeley feels that our present concept might appeal to London for reasons indicated.
Beeley seems to feel that while our original working paper goes too far in the direction of implementation by force, the present draft may not go quite far enough. For this reason and perhaps for others he is inclined to feel that a group of states rather than the UN itself should be the administering authority.
In discussing alternatives with British and Canadians at conclusion of informal meeting this morning, we tentatively suggested possibility of including an article which would establish a board composed of representatives of France, UK and US (possibly others) authorized to advise and assist the high commissioner in the discharge of his duties. We also discussed as another alternative the idea of giving either the high commissioner or the TC authority to seek outside assistance if necessary.
General estimate—recommendations.
Our estimate of general situation is that we could pass such a proposal as this by a two-thirds vote. If such a proposal is to be introduced we could probably get another delegation to propose it, but feel on balance it would be preferable for us to do so for reasons stated below [Page 953] although we can see some advantage if Canadians would jointly or separately introduce proposal if assured of UK and US support. If proposal along these lines is not introduced, we must take account of likelihood of some other delegation introducing a less satisfactory resolution involving propositions it would be embarrassing either to support or oppose. Further, we estimate that Russian bloc will be content to let situation drift and avoid all action by GA in the belief that resulting factual situation will be to their liking.
In our opinion introduction of resolution such as we propose would be acceptable to Arabs and might be a strong factor in inducing Jews to accept truce.
We feel that US would be in a very weak and vulnerable position in terms of American public opinion and general prestige in the UN if we come forward with no definite suggestion before GA adjourns. We have consistently insisted that our trusteeship working paper was not a proposal and we are, therefore, in the position of having called the special session without having made any specific proposal to it for meeting the situation. Other delegations are constantly coming to us offering to help and asking our guidance and leadership.
If we make no specific proposal for GA action before May 15 and if Arab armies move in, we believe opinion generally will be convinced that we have instigated or are supporting Arab action against the Jewish state. Also, if we fail to introduce specific proposal and press hard for its adoption, and also if we rest on our oars at this point and de facto situation develops in Palestine along Abdullah lines, the two facts taken together will make US vulnerable to accusations either of incredible naivete or power-politics machinations.
If Russians in SC charge Arab states with aggression legal arguments about invitation from Palestinian Arabs would not meet public demand. One possibility we see to meet such a contingency would be for SC to attempt to stabilize situation by ordering parties not to move their forces across lines laid down in GA resolution of November 29, which lines would for this purpose be taken as demarcating cease fire basis. If JA could then work out agreement on such a basis position of US and UN might be less vulnerable. Such a procedure in the SC could more appropriately be followed if proposed UN provisional regime based on Chapter XII had been adopted.
Thus, formal proposal of such plan in our opinion would enhance likelihood of concluding truce now or subsequent to May 15; would not commit US to placing armed forces in Palestine; would strengthen the UN and the US position in the organization and in general would meet in advance more contingencies and afford a sounder basis for possible future action than any other course.