867N.01/3–2648
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| The Undersecretary | |
| Mr. Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine | |
| Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency for Palestine |
Mr. Shertok called on the Secretary at the latter’s request. He was accompanied by Mr. Epstein. The Secretary explained to these gentlemen that his purpose in asking them to come in was to find out from them the attitude of the Jewish Agency and the Palestine groups which it represented toward an attempt to bring representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee together in an effort to work out a cessation of hostilities and a truce.
Mr. Shertok asked for a more precise definition of the difference between the two expressions, and the Secretary pointed out that the normal concept was a cease fire order by both parties concurrent with a truce or immediately followed by negotiations for one. Mr. Shertok stated that the position of the Jewish Agency had been made clear in a formal statement and that the people of Palestine would not agree to a “truce” while “foreign troops were in Palestine and infiltration of reinforcements continued”. By foreign troops he explained he did not mean the Mandatory Power but Arabs in substantial numbers (which he estimated at about 6,000) who had come into the country from Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. He mentioned particularly that these bodies of armed men were organized, equipped with arms, and in uniform, and that the British had done little or nothing to oppose them or eject them. He referred specifically to a group of several hundred Iraqi troops encamped at the location of the water supply of Jerusalem and in a position to seize it.
The Secretary pointed out that we were making earnest efforts to find a way of stopping the bloodshed and, through conciliation, to find some solution to the difficulties which remained unsolved and appeared almost insoluble in the light of the belligerent attitude taken by both of the parties involved. Picking up the statement of Mr. Shertok about the foreign troops in Palestine, the Secretary asked how they could be identified and whether they could be located. Mr. Shertok [Page 762] replied that he did not know whether they could all be located, but that he felt in Palestine there were substantial numbers which could be identified. After further discussion along this line, Mr. Shertok was asked the direct question as to whether the Jewish Agency would agree to a truce if one of the terms provided for the withdrawal of such armed bands from Palestine. Mr. Shertok stated that this would not be enough, as the period of truce would be used by the Arabs to build up their forces through infiltration, to run in additional arms, and otherwise to improve their position, since the truce would assure them of a period of time during which they would not be attacked by the Haganah. He said that failure to require the withdrawal of the armed bands and prevent further border violation by infiltration or otherwise would be regarded by the Jewish communities in Palestine as a “complete capitulation to the Arabs”. Long discussion brought out the fact that Messrs. Shertok and Epstein would recommend and they felt that the Jewish Agency would agree to the cessation of hostilities and accept a truce which provided:
- (1)
- For complete cessation of hostilities by each party and the strict prohibition of acts of terrorism, etcetera;
- (2)
- That all “identifiable bodies of armed men” from neighboring states should be withdrawn from Palestine territory;
- (3)
- That strict border patrol be instituted as a protection against any further infiltration; and
- (4)
- That the rights of the Jewish Agency be “reserved” and its position be not “prejudiced” by this truce.
During the discussion Mr. Shertok emphasized that the Jewish Agency had been for some months perfecting its program for the takeover of the administrative functions on May 15 on the termination of the British Mandate. He explained that the British had reiterated again their purpose to lay down the mandate on the 15th of May and have their troops out by August 1, reserving in the meantime the military authority until the latter date, especially in certain areas. Mr. Shertok said frankly that the Jewish Agency would expect to continue during the truce its preparations for taking over the Jewish areas “allocated to them under the United Nations’ Partition Program”.
The Secretary questioned Mr. Shertok closely on the matter of the ability of the Palestine settlement to defend itself, and Mr. Shertok said that they were prepared to fight indefinitely, and that while they were “in desperate need of arms, including artillery, tanks and armored vehicles”, they would fight and felt that they could do so successfully. When he was asked whether they were counting on foreign assistance if the Arabs began to get the upper hand, he said that he felt there would be Jewish volunteers coming in from all over the world and that this might cause international complications, as might “volunteered assistance from certain powers”. He thought such a situation [Page 763] might cause the United Nations to use an “international force” to restore peace, and he felt that it would be far costlier than to do it now.
Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Shertok was asked whether he felt that there was any solution to the problem. After some thought he said that he did not feel that there was any which did not involve the use of “an international police force” which was, as he put it, as non-existent today as it was in November of 1947. He said that the Jewish Agency must insist on adequate immigration and that the Arabs, in his opinion, would oppose any increase over the present 1,500 a month. Mr. Epstein said that this was obviously inadequate and that in all of their efforts in the past to find a common ground with the Arabs they have ultimately broken on this point.
It was apparent that neither Mr. Shertok nor Mr. Epstein felt that the truce would solve anything basic, and they displayed considerable doubt that the trusteeship would help the situation. In fact, Mr. Shertok stated that it was wholly unacceptable to the Jewish Agency and that it would be “intolerable” if the British should remain as the operating trustee. He said that relations had deteriorated very rapidly over the past year and that the British part in the trusteeship was “unacceptable”. Just before leaving Mr. Shertok made a strong plea for placing Jerusalem under an international trusteeship in order to keep it from falling into the hands of the Arabs. He said that the British had been turning it over little by little to the Arab tribal sheiks and that this was an appalling-fact after 30 years of freedom from Moslem control. He said that the Jewish Agency would be prepared if necessary to deal with the question of Jerusalem separate from that of the rest of the Palestine question if there could be assurance that Jerusalem would be maintained as an internationalized holy city and not permitted to fall back into the hands of the Arabs.
In connection with his comments about the city of Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok said that a representative of the United Nations in Jerusalem had suggested that the Scandinavian token forces presently in Germany might be used as an international police force in Jerusalem and would be most acceptable to the Jewish Agency. The proposal apparently originated with a Norwegian officer. The Secretary asked Mr. Shertok if he had any indication that any of the Scandinavian countries might agree to such a proposal, or whether it had been taken up through the United Nations or otherwise. Mr. Shertok replied that he did not know but felt that the idea had merit and was well worth exploring.
He was bitter about the British position throughout and said that the Arab League was the agent through which the British worked in the Middle East and that it was intolerable that the British should put the Arab League over the Palestinians in a trusteeship or otherwise.
[Page 764]Mr. Epstein is returning to Palestine in about two weeks, and said lie would make himself available to the Department upon his return for any information they might desire.