Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

851.00/11–1848

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Paris,] November 18, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Henry Queuille, Prime Minister of France
	Secretary Marshall
	Ambassador Caffery
	Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, United States Delegation1

Summary

a. mr. queuille

(1) Mr. Queuille expressed belief that the back of the present strike movement was broken, even though such difficulties as current longshoremen’s strike yet must be overcome.

(2) French Government has started and is continuing to purge Communists guilty of strike sabotage or of inciting sabotage from positions of responsibility which they may hold in nationalized industries.

(3) Recent strike movement constitutes significant defeat for Communist CGT whose orders and directives are being increasingly disregarded not only by French workers but also by CGT membership.

(4) Notwithstanding predictions that de Gaulle would control new Council of Republic, recent information makes Government majority very likely in new Council.

(5) More worried about Government majority in National Assembly. Large majority on clearly drawn Communist issues but much slimmer and more brittle majority when Government has to tackle run-of-the-mill business.

(6) Queuille realizes his responsibility to rehabilitate France’s economy and will introduce in first days of December bills reforming fiscal system and balancing the budget. Measures will be taken so that these bills will be voted by January 1, 1949.

(7) One of Queuille’s greatest difficulties is France’s military budget, as to establish these credits intelligently it is necessary to know definite responsibilities of French Army in case of war. He strongly favored over-all planning for defense of West and asked for Franco-American staff talks as well as conversations with U.S. Government on subject.

b. secretary marshall

(1) I explained technical difficulties pertaining to budgetary authorizations contrasted to budgetary appropriations.

(2) I stressed importance of fulfillment of Queuille’s program to help me before Congress when asking for ECA appropriations for last quarter this fiscal year and next year.

(3) I pointed out striking similarity between basic American war strategy and current one in which Western Europe was given priority. Notwithstanding success of war-time precedent, I am still faced with similar opposition advocating more substantial help for Far East, especially China.

(4) Referring to France’s military problem, I urged that French concentrate on development of ground forces, pointing out prohibitive costs of modern-day Air Forces and Navies. Furthermore, U.S. and U.K. provide strong sea and air arms, while American ground forces sorely limited and would need time to be built up in case of war.

(5) I explained effort now being made to put into condition military equipment from the last war, gravely damaged by weather, due to lack of funds for adequate care and storage. Some funds, however, have been obtained, which have permitted larger shipments to Greece and China as well as equipment of three French divisions in Germany. Now there remains problem of equipping French forces in France.

c. mr. queuille

Mr. Queuille declared that he agreed with my reasoning and that he would do his best so that as much as possible of France’s military appropriations for 1949 (about 300 billion francs) will be devoted to development of French ground forces.

Details

Prime Minister Queuille prefaced his summary of the present French situation by a brief outline of the history of Communist influence since the Liberation. He recalled that immediately thereafter Communist control of France was nearly complete. They had taken over local governments in a majority of localities either by fair means or foul. Thanks to this dominating position at the grass roots they had been able to influence elections. Mr. Queuille pointed out that the Provisional Assembly and the Constituent Assemblies had been for a long while completely under the Communist spell. Numerous in these bodies but without a majority they had controlled them as the other parties dared not oppose them. He pointed out that it had been the great achievement of Prime Minister Ramadier, now Minister of National Defense in his Government, to have broken openly with the Communists and expelled them from the Government in May, 1947. Since that time France has been governed by a series of coalition governments, all excluding the Communists, of which his own was the last in this series.

Mr. Queuille explained that of course it was obvious that it was to the Communists’ direct advantage to prevent France’s economic rehabilitation and therefore oppose the Marshall Plan. He pointed out that while this opposition at the start of the recent strike wave had still been equivocal with Thorez, Secretary General of the Communist Party, still declaring that the Communists were not fundamentally opposed to American aid, this pretense had soon been abandoned after the strikes developed. According to Mr. Queuille this was the first unquestionably political major strike wave in French history. It was also the first time that any French trade unions had gone to the extreme of ordering that the various security services and devices of the mines be abandoned.

The Prime Minister told me that of course this open challenge had to be accepted by the French Government, and that he was consequently encouraged by the fact that it had been possible for governmental forces to occupy all France’s coal mining districts with a minimum of blood shed. He pointed out that this was of the greatest importance as worker casualties automatically tend to solidify the workers unity and class consciousness.

Mr. Queuille also said that there were reasons for satisfaction in that notwithstanding all the pressure and efforts of the Communist CGT, its strike orders had been not only disregarded by a significant percentage of French miners, but also by a worth while percentage of the CGT’s membership itself. He recognized that the French Government’s troubles were not over and that now it would have to face such problems as the longshoremen’s strike which the CGT is now exerting itself to render effective. He expressed the belief, however, that the back of the strike movement had been broken.

The Prime Minister declared that the French Government was resolved now to purge subversive Communist elements from any positions of responsibility which they might still enjoy. Thus he pointed out that the two Communist members of the SNCF (The French Nationalized railroads) had been fired as well as all members of the various boards of the several nationalized industries who had either been guilty of sabotage or had incited workers to sabotage. He said that this purge action would be conducted down to the level of delegates who had participated directly or indirectly in sabotage operations. He concluded by expressing his conviction that the recent strike movement had been a severe defeat for the CGT and pointed to the fact that this organizations call for a twenty-four hour general strike in Paris last Saturday (Nov. 13) had only been effective, and this only in part, in the transportation system of the French Capital.

Mr. Queuille went on to say that he realized full well that France’s friends in America were worried for a number of reasons: the solidity of the French Government, the stability of the French Government’s Parliamentary majority, the attacks against the Government, not only of the subversive Communist elements but also by Gen. de Gaulle’s RPF, the French Government’s ability to promote and effect a fiscal and financial reform, etc. The Prime Minister did not attempt overly to minimize the political dangers to which the French Government was exposed. He pointed out, however, that the first sensational comments which followed the election of the new Council of the Republic and which depicted de Gaulle as in control of that assembly, were not justified. He stated that based on the last information available to the Government, the new Council would include the following members of the governmental coalition: 80 Left Rally, 15 or 16 MPR’s, 60 Socialists. He pointed out that their total came to just about half of the Council’s membership and that, with a handful of independents, the Government majority would be rather secure. He thought that Gen. de Gaulle’s action in implying at his press conference of November 17, that there would be no RPF candidate for the Presidency of the Council, was evidence that even de Gaulle recognized that he could not control that body.

Mr. Queuille then stated that paradoxically enough he believed that the French Government’s principal political problem would be its majority in the National Assembly. He pointed out that in this body the Government could count on two different majorities: a very broad majority on clearly-drawn Communist issues, such as was demonstrated two days ago by the Assembly’s reactions to Minister of the Interior Moch’s very strong anti-Communist speech; another much slimmer and more brittle majority when the Government had to tackle its less sensational run-of-the-mill business.

The Prime Minister told me that immediately after the vote of confidence which he would ask for on Nov. 19—and obtain, he felt sure—he would face the Assembly with its responsibilities. During the first few days of December he would introduce bills into Parliament for the rehabilitation of France’s economy, reforming France’s fiscal system, and for a balanced budget. He mentioned that in order to facilitate his task he would mention this program and ask for definite commitments on the part of the Assembly when posing the question of confidence on Nov. 19 after the Communist debate. It was further asserted that these various bills would come to a vote before January 1, 1949. Mr. Queuille even said that he would go so far as to cause the Assembly’s rules and regulations to be changed so that nothing could interfere with the Assembly’s action on schdule. These changes would modify the procedure according to which any bill recognized as urgent by the Assembly automatically takes precedence over business which may be at hand.

Referring to France’s budgetary problems, the Prime Minister declared that one of the greatest difficulties which he had to face was France’s military budget. He pointed out how difficult it was to establish these credits before the definite responsibilities and assignment of the French army in case of war had been defined. He strongly favored overall planning for the defense of the West which might provide the answers to the questions he just raised. Mr. Queuille also asked for Franco-American staff conversations as well as for talks with the U.S. Government on this subject.

I then proceeded to explain some of the difficulties which I had faced and would have to face before the various Committees of Congress due to our peculiar system of budgetary authorizations as contrasted to budgetary appropriations. I told the French Prime Minister that I would very soon have to deal with Congress concerning ECA appropriations for the last quarter of this fiscal year as well as for the next fiscal year ending June 30, 1950. I pointed out the striking similarity between world problems which faced us during the war and those with which we are now confronted. Notwithstanding our success in bringing the war to a rather sudden close in both hemispheres as a result of our decision to give priority to Western Europe, our present day similar decision is meeting with opposition from various quarters advocating more substantial help to China. Consequently we need the assistance of France and of Western Europe as a whole to help prove that this overall strategy is efficacious and yielding results.

I also stressed the obvious importance of solid and concrete achievements in France to “strengthen my case” when I went before Congress. I mentioned that the implementation of the program which he had outlined (purge of Communists, economic rehabilitation, the fiscal reform, a balanced budget, etc.) would be most useful. I also mentioned that should it be possible for France to implement the Franco-Italian Customs Union this would be beneficial as it would be proof that the general aims and policies of the sixteen Powers were being translated into actual fact.

Answering the French Prime Minister’s military questions, I urged that for many reasons the French Government should concentrate on the development of her ground forces. I pointed out the prohibitive costs of modern day air forces and navies and that within the Western Union supported by Canada and the United States there were not only our great strength in the air and on the sea but also Britain’s fairly strong navy and air force. I mentioned our dearth of manpower in the American ground forces and said that in the case of an emergency it would be a year or perhaps even a year and a half before such American troops could be sent to France in substantial numbers. For all these reasons I pointed out that France should not waste her limited means by attempting to build up her navy and air strength, and that on the contrary these means should be devoted primarily to the development of her ground forces, badly needed by the Western Union as a whole. In concluding, I told Mr. Queuille that I knew full well the bitter opposition that he would have to face from his air and navy Staffs but that I felt it was of the greatest importance that he steel himself and insist on the overall policy which I had outlined.

I told the French Prime Minister of our difficulties in connection with materiel and equipment left from the recent war. From 1945 on we had had no credits to care for or store this military equipment and that consequently it had largely remained in open air dumps. Another difficulty had resulted from the fact that this materiel had been picked over several times with a view to making shipments to Greece, Turkey and to China. I added that modest credits had been voted for this fiscal year but had been spent during the first three months thereof (with the consent of the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee) with good results; that not only had it been possible to complete shipments to Greece and make larger shipments to China, but it had also been possible to equip France’s three divisions in Germany. Now we are faced with the problem of what we can do for French forces in France.

Mr. Queuille expressed appreciation for these views which he said would be of great assistance to him, and that he would bear them in mind in establishing France’s military budget for the coming year. According to him these military expenditures would total about 300 billion francs and he would do his utmost to see that as much thereof as possible would be devoted to the development of France’s ground forces.

1. Mr. Knight, Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul at Paris, was also a member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, meeting at Paris.