Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Head of the British Naval Mission in the United States (Moore) to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)¹

top secret

[Washington, September 1, 1948.]

Memorandum for the United States Secretary of National Defence From the Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom²

Now that our own production programme is well launched and we are in a position to make use of information received and make an increasing contribution to the common effort, I should like to propose that the existing arrangements for collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic energy matters should be extended to include an exchange of information on atomic weapons.

2. I make this proposal in the sincere belief that United States and British strategic interests and national defence policies are fundamentally identical, and that a frank exchange of information on this vital matter would be to our common interest. In particular, I believe that:—

(a) Our National Defence policies are directed to the prevention of war, and that the best way to do this is for both of us to be strong. The atomic weapon is the greatest single source of military strength in the world at present, and it is in the interests of the security of the United States, as well as that of the United Kingdom that both countries should develop it to the maximum of their ability, and with all possible speed. The closer we can work together on its development, therefore, the greater will be our combined strength.

(b) The atomic weapon which the United States already have and the United Kingdom will have in the not too distant future, is likely to be the greatest single factor in deciding the outcome of any future world conflict. It must, therefore, play a vital part in all United States and British strategic thinking; in the framing of defence policy, in the shaping of strategical and tactical plans, in the planning of the war potential, in the design of equipment, in the training of the men who will use it, and in planning the protection of those who may have to withstand the weight of its attack from the enemy. If we fail to prevent war and are to make the best use of the weapon in war, it is vital that we should share our knowledge of it and concert our thinking on every aspect of its development.

(c) In a future world conflict United States and British forces will find themselves fighting side by side and the principle of standardization has already been accepted in other fields. It is common sense that it should be extended to cover the most vital field of all so that the design of the United States and British equipment and the technique of United States and British production and tactics can proceed as far as possible in step.

(d) As the United Kingdom programme develops we feel sure that the contribution we can make will not be inconsiderable.

3. I hope that you will agree that full exchange of information on the military uses of atomic energy is of fundamental importance to both our countries. I realise however that such a policy, however desirable, may be difficult to implement quickly. I have therefore had prepared a list of topics to cover at this stage only that information which would be of great and immediate assistance to our own programme. I shall be glad to know whether you would be prepared to support my suggestion that an exchange of information on these topics should be authorised, if I were to arrange for it to be put forward in the Combined Policy Committee in the near future. It would of course be understood that any information which we might receive under those arrangements would be subject to special standards of security which would be agreed between us.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff attach immense importance to this exchange and believe that the United States Chiefs of Staff would see the force of the arguments set out in paragraph 2 above.

Appendix

List of Topics on Which an Interchange of Information With the United States is Proposed

i. areas of collaboration which would be of great and immediate assistance to our programme for the design and manufacture of atomic bombs

(1) The metallurgy and methods of fabrication of plutonium with particular reference to its use in bombs.

(2) Proximity fuses, with special reference to their vulnerability to external interference.

(3) Arming and safety devices in the aircraft in order to permit carriage of U.S. bombs in British aircraft and vice versa, if this was ever necessary.

ii. areas of collaboration which would be of great and immediate assistance to our production and operational programmes

(4) Conditions of peacetime storage for H.E. components and data on replacement rates.

(5) Storage conditions for components at an operational base.

(6) Methods of inspection and transportation.

(7) The assembly of the weapon at an operational base and the methods of training personnel.

iii. area of collaboration that would be of great assistance in the long term design of aircraft

(8) The general features of future weapons as affecting the long term design of aircraft.

iv. areas of collaboration that would be of immediate assistance in planning the protection of personnel in the fighting and civil defence services

(9) The effects of gamma and beta radiation and the measures required to protect personnel.

(10) The effects of thermal radiation and the measures required to protect personnel.

(11) The effects of radioactive dusts and the measures required to protect personnel.

(12) The degree of contamination of ground to be expected from atomic bombs burst in the air at different heights.

(13) The degree of contamination by fission products to be expected from the “base surge” from a water burst.

1. Adm. Sir Henry Moore presented this memorandum to Secretary Forrestal during a conversation on September 2. The source text was transmitted by the British Embassy to the Department of State. It was dated stamped by the office of the Under Secretary on September 7 and bears the initials of the Secretary and the Under Secretary.
2. Rt. Hon. Albert V. Alexander.