Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 2

811.20/8–548

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] August 5, 1948.

At the NSC meeting today Mr. Souers will read the attached statement concerning Mr. Forrestal’s recent memorandum asking for certain basic policy estimates affecting national defense.¹

The following are my views on this subject:

1. I have told Mr. Souers that while I understand the need for the best attempts we can make at estimates of this sort, I think we should be on guard against exaggerating the value of such estimates in solving the problems Mr. Forrestal has in mind. To support this statement I have pointed out:

(a) The world situation is now extremely fluid. No one can make predictions with any certainty. The possibilities are widely varying ones; the developments could move at any time in one of several widely varying directions.

(b) The world situation is not something which exists independently of our defense policy and to which we need only react. It will be deeply influenced by the measures which we ourselves take. Our adversaries are extremely flexible in their policies and will adjust themselves rapidly and effectively to whatever we may do. Our policies must therefore be viewed not only as a means of reacting to a given situation, but as a means of influencing a situation as well.

(c) In most cases where Mr. Forrestal’s memo implies that we are faced with choices, the answer is not ‘“either/or” but “both”. We cannot possibly say that we should be prepared for a war either in 1950 or in 1952 or any other date; that we intend to achieve our objectives either by military means or by non-military means; etc. These things are hopelessly intertwined. The decisions are really only decisions of emphasis and priority, which must be determined from day to day in the light of rapidly shifting situations.

2. There has already been sent to Mr. Forrestal by letter of June 25, 1948, as PPS/33 (copy attached) a paper which gives the best answers we can give to one portion of Mr. Forrestal’s questions.² We have had no reaction to this. So far it has gone to the NSC only for information. Mr. Forrestal might be asked whether he would have any objection to its being laid before the NSC for consideration and possible approval or modification.

3. I am at present working on a study of U.S. objectives with respect to the Soviet Union.³ This study is almost completed and I can finish it any time I can get a few uninterrupted hours for this purpose. It will, I think, answer a large part of paragraph 2 of Mr. Souers’ requirements. I think it might be suggested to the NSC that no further action be taken on Mr. Souers’ paragraph (2) until this study has been completed and laid before the Council.

George F. Kennan

[Annex]

Brief on NSC 20

Draft

The problem posed by Mr. Forrestal appears to call for the preparation of three inter-related studies:

1. A current estimate of the existing or foreseeable threats to our national security, with particular reference to the USSR, including the probable nature and timing of these threats.

2. A statement of the objectives which this nation should pursue in the foreseeable future in order to safeguard its national security and to counter the existing or anticipated threats to that security.

3. A program of specific measures which, in the light of our existing commitments and capabilities, should and can be planned at this time to promote the achievement of our current national security objectives, with particular reference to those which should be included in our planning for the fiscal year 1950.

The Department of State is believed to be the appropriate Agency to prepare the first two studies on threats and objectives, and has in fact already prepared a paper entitled “Factors affecting the nature of the United States defense arrangements in the light of Soviet policies”.⁴ This paper, broadened to include an estimate of probable Soviet non-military activities, might serve as the estimate of the threats. I understand that the Department of State is also engaged in the preparation of a paper on our objectives with respect to Russia. It is, therefore, recommended that the Council agree that the Department of State will prepare the first two studies enumerated above.

The third study on a program, however, will require the assistance of the other Departments and Agencies on the Council since this program will include military measures and must be planned in the light of our domestic resources. Development of this program, however, should be deferred until after the Council has adopted, and the President has approved, the first two studies on threats and objectives. Based upon these studies, it is believed that the NSC Staff might furnish an appropriate vehicle for coordinating the preparation of the third study on a specific program. It is, therefore, further recommended that the Council agree to direct the NSC Staff to prepare the third study after completion of the first two studies.

1. NSC 20, July 12, 1948, p. 589.
2. The letter to Forrestal of June 25 is not printed. PPS/33 is printed as NSC 20/2, August 25, 1948, p. 615.
3. For the summary of conclusions of the study under reference, NSC 20/1, August 18, 1948, see p. 609.
4. NSC 20/2, August 25, 1948, p. 615.