The enclosed memorandum on the above subject from the Secretary of Defense,
together with its attached letter to the President, is circulated herewith
for the information of the National Security Council and for preliminary
consideration at its next meeting of the suggestion by the Secretary of
Defense that the Department of State draft an initial comprehensive
statement of the character outlined in the enclosure.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the National Security
Council
Washington, July 10,
1948.
Subject: Appraisal of the Degree and Character of
Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation
The preparation of budget estimates for Fiscal Year 1950 is one of the
most important tasks before the National Military Establishment during
the next ninety days. The size and character of these estimates will
largely determine the nature of our military strength until July 1,
1950. Moreover, because of the time factor involved in any military
build-up, such estimates will also materially affect our capabilities in
the years immediately thereafter.
Decisions concerning the optimum military budget under all the
circumstances must be responsive to many factors which are not entirely
within the purview of the National Military Establishment and with
respect to which the Military Establishment requires firm guidance.
Since the entire reason for the maintenance of military forces in this
country is the safeguarding of our national security, their size,
character, and composition should turn upon a careful analysis of
existing and potential dangers to our security and upon decisions as; to
the methods by which such dangers can best be met within the
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limitations of our resources.
Sound military planning presupposes determinations by the appropriate
Governmental authorities as to the ways in which, and the times at
which, the security of the United States may be endangered. Moreover,
since these various dangers may be of both a military and a non-military
character, decisions must then be reached as to the respective roles
which military strength and other activities directed toward our
national security—foreign aid, for example—should each play in an
over-all security program designed to forestall these dangers. These
decisions must clearly reflect our national objectives, and must take
into account such collateral factors as the psychological effects of
varying degrees of military strength, both upon potential forces and
upon friends, and of existing or probable international commitments.
Having made these basic decisions as to our objectives and as to the role
of military strength in achieving them, we can then proceed to consider
the share of our national resources which must be allocated to support
military activities and, within the limit of such resources, the kind of
military establishment best adapted to furthering these objectives. If
the dangers are great, immediate and of a military character, this fact
should be clearly reflected in our military budget and our military
strength adapted accordingly. If the risks are small, if they are
distant rather than immediate, or if they are primarily of a
non-military character, military estimates should be adjusted to accord
with this situation. Not only the general size of the military budget,
but also the particular purposes toward which it is directed, should be
responsive to these conditions. They may materially affect decisions as
to whether we should concentrate all funds available for military
purposes on the strengthening of our own forces or should allocate a
portion thereof for the equipping of the forces of our probable Allies.
For example, if time permits, it might prove more economical, or
strategically sounder, to devote a certain percentage of such funds to
the armament of forces of the Western Union countries rather than to
employ the same amounts to create additional divisions of our own. While
a decision in this regard would naturally involve political as well as
military considerations, such a decision cannot be made without the
appraisal of risks and the determination of objectives to which I have
referred. The same considerations will influence the relative emphasis
which is to be placed in our military budget on the creation of regular
divisions in being, as opposed to a longer range program for the
strengthening of our civilian components; the amount to be set aside for
the augmentation of our war reserve; the rate at which we stockpile
materials; the importance of instituting negotiations for military bases
overseas, and even the location of such bases; the desirability and
urgency of joint military planning with other nations;
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the direction to be followed in our
research and development programs; and many other similar factors.
Moreover, with the heavy and continuing impact of scientific progress on
the art of warfare, it is important to reach some conclusions as to
whether we should primarily shape our forces for the kind of war which
might be fought tomorrow or for the possibly very different form of
conflict which might occur if hostilities should break out some five or
ten years hence.
I think it is desirable to bring the foregoing generalizations into the
context of the immediate present. I assume that within the next decade,
no country other than Russia, and no likely combination of countries
which did not include Russia or expect her active support, would be
likely to undertake a war directed against the United States. It does
not follow, of course, that some country, or combination of countries,
will not miscalculate the risks and, by taking some aggressive action or
precipitating some local conflict, create a situation in which the
United States might be required to use military force to protect its own
security or to prevent a breakdown in world order. It therefore becomes
important to appraise, as best we can, the likelihood of some of the
following developments: An aggressive war by Russia; a conflict
precipitated by some miscalculation on the part of Russia or one of her
satellites; Communist expansion through power diplomacy, through the
creation of internal dissension and civil strife, or through political
terrorism and propaganda; the outbreak of a major war as a result of
some eruption in one of the “tinder-box” areas of the world. Until these
risks are appraised and their nature defined, and until a determination
has been made as to the best methods of removing or meeting them, no
logical decisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources
which should be devoted to military purposes, nor as to the character of
forces which the military establishment should seek to foster and
support, both here and in friendly countries.
In view of the foregoing considerations, I believe that it is imperative
that a comprehensive statement of national policy be prepared,
particularly as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement
specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives, and outline the
measures to be followed in achieving them. For the reasons I have given,
such a statement is needed to guide the National Military Establishment
in determining the level and character of armament which it should seek
and, I believe, to assist the President in determining the proportion of
our resources which should be dedicated to military purposes. I also
believe that it is fundamental to decisions concerning the size of, and
relative emphasis in, our national budget.
The preparation of such a statement is, in my opinion, clearly a function
of the National Security Council since this work requires, to use the
language of the National Security Act, “the integration of
[Page 592]
domestic, foreign and military
policies relating to the national security” so that advice and guidance
may be given to the President and the several military services. Because
many of the basic issues involved concern matters which are within the
province of the Department of State, I suggest that the Department of
State be asked to draft an initial statement of this character which
could be used as a basis for discussion in the Council1 and which could be altered or modified to reflect military
considerations and other relevant facts which come within the cognizance
of the National Security Resources Board. The National Military
Establishment will supply the Department of State with any information
of a military character and any military evaluations which may be
required in the preparation of such a draft.
I view this project as one of overriding importance and urgency, and
therefore believe it should be given the highest priority. I attach a
copy of a letter which I have this day written to the President on this
subject.
[Subannex]
The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the President
Washington, July 10,
1948.
Dear Mr. President: I am convinced that the
formulation of a sound military program and intelligent decisions
concerning the size and character of our future Armed Forces depend upon
a prior determination of our basic national objectives, and of the roles
which military strength and other non-military activities should play in
furthering these objectives. Similarly, I believe that the preparation
of realistic budget estimates and final decisions concerning the size of
the national budget, and its relative emphasis on different projects,
should be founded on such an evaluation. Specific programs of the
National
[Page 593]
Military
Establishment and other departments can only be justified as they are
related to such fundamental considerations.
For the foregoing reasons, I am forwarding the attached memorandum to the
National Security Council requesting the preparation of a statement
which specifies and evaluates the risks of the future, states our
objectives, and outlines the measures to be followed in achieving: them.
I believe such a statement is indispensable to the National Military
Establishment in determining the level and character of forces which it
should maintain. This statement would also, in my opinion, greatly
assist you in the ultimate decision which you must make as to the
proportion of our resources which must be dedicated to military
purposes. Because a large majority of the basic issues involved concern
matters which are within the province of the Department of State, I have
recommended that the State Department be asked to prepare a first draft
of such a statement.
I bring this matter to your attention because I believe that this project
is one in which you will be interested and which should be given the
highest possible priority.
