International Trade Files: Lot 57D284, Box
105
Memorandum by Mr. William
Clayton to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Douglas)
secret
[Washington,] February 11, 1948.
At the Conference now going on in Habana to develop a Charter for an
International Trade Organization, the United States Delegation has been
attempting to secure most-favored-nation treatment and the other benefits of
the Charter for the occupied areas. This attempt has run into very strong
opposition from the United Kingdom, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and
China. The Czechs have indicated that they could not accept a Charter with
the occupied areas in it, and the United Kingdom and France have suggested
that the problem of the treatment of the occupied areas should be left to a
later date, France indicating that the question might appropriately be taken
up at the Tripartite discussions in London. The legal competence of the
Habana Conference to consider the problem has also been brought into
question.
I have spoken with Lord Inverchapel and a representative of the French
Embassy here, indicating in strong terms the importance of obtaining
most-favored-nation treatment for the occupied areas by bringing them within
the Charter and urging that their governments support our position at
Habana. Our Embassy in Paris has also taken the matter up with the French
Foreign Office. Despite these various representations, there has thus far
been no change in the British and French position at Habana, It now appears
that about the maximum we can get at this time with regard to the ITO Charter is a commitment to determine the
relation of the occupied areas to the ITO
after it is set up, probably in 1949 or possibly 1950, and a resolution by
the Conference to the effect that trade relations between the occupied areas
and the other members of the ITO should be
conducted in accordance with the principles of the Charter and that the
determination of the relation of the occupied areas to the ITO shall be made at the first meeting of the
ITO. We may have to settle for something
even less than this.
There is another way, however, in which we might accomplish our objective of
getting m-f-n treatment for the occupied areas. Toward the end of this month
the contracting parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), recently concluded at Geneva,
will convene at Habana to consider problems arising out of the Agreement.
This Agreement contains provisions regarding most-favored-nation and general
nondiscriminatory treatment similar to those already in the ITO Charter. If these provisions could be
applied to the occupied areas, it would substantially accomplish the purpose
intended by the original United States proposal at the ITO Conference, would
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help promote the purposes of the European Recovery
Program, and would facilitate the reintegration of Germany into the European
and world economy.
The attached paper, prepared as a preliminary position paper for the
forthcoming GATT meeting, contains a
proposal for bringing the occupied areas within GATT and obtaining m-f-n treatment for them. If this proposal
or something similar is to be put across at the GATT meeting and be meaningful, it is essential that the
British and French change their present attitude and support our
position.
It is therefore requested that you take this matter up, either formally or
informally as you see fit, with the British and French at the Tripartite
discussions in London in an effort to obtain their support for our view.
Since the GATT meeting will open shortly
after the beginning of the Tripartite discussions and will probably be
completed within a week or so, it will be necessary for you to take the
question up at the earliest opportunity after the opening of the London
discussions if your efforts are to be of any avail for the GATT meeting.
[Attachment]
Preliminary Draft Position Paper
secret
[Washington,] February 9, 1948.
GATT
and Treatment of Occupied Areas
problem
What should be done to ensure that the benefits of GATT, including most-favored-nation
treatment, are extended to the occupied areas of western Germany and
Japan?
recommendations
The recommendations that follow are tentative and preliminary in
character and subject to modification in the light of the results of the
current discussions on the occupied areas problem at the ITO Conference at Habana.
- 1.
- At the meeting of the contracting parties of GATT at Habana a protocol or other
form of contractual commitment should be entered into, whereby the
occupied areas would obtain the assurance of general
nondiscriminatory, m-f-n treatment from other countries in return
for like treatment on their part. This commitment should be of the
following character:
- (a)
- Those contracting parties of GATT having responsibility, either singly or
with other states, for the direction in Germany or
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Japan of matters
provided for in GATT, would
accept the obligations of the latter in respect of such area
or areas for which they may have such responsibility, to the
extent of and for the period of their responsibility.
Exceptions to this undertaking should be provided to permit
(i) measures relating to the security of the occupation
forces, (ii) measures pursuant to peace treaties and related
instruments in regard to such areas for the conclusion of
World War II, and (iii) measures made necessary, pending the
conclusion of a special exchange agreement in accordance
with paragraph 6 of Article XV of GATT, by reason of the absence of an exchange
rate.
- (b)
- In return for the above undertaking, those contracting
parties of GATT and other
countries which might wish to adhere, would obligate
themselves to extend general nondiscriminatory and
most-favored-nation treatment and the other benefits of
GATT to the occupied
areas.
- (c)
- The protocol or commitment providing such reciprocal
treatment should be voluntary and open-end in character in
the sense that (i) only those contracting parties of GATT which wish to extend to
and receive from the occupied areas such treatment need
adhere, and (ii) such countries as are not parties to GATT but wish to enter into a
reciprocal arrangement of the above type with the occupied
areas, would be free to adhere.
- 2.
- If in connection with a commitment along the above lines,
contracting parties of GATT should
raise the question of tariff negotiations with respect to the
occupied areas, it should be indicated that at least the United
States as an occupying power would be agreeable to undertaking such
negotiations for its zone at the earliest opportunity. In this
connection it should be pointed out, however, that at the present
time no effective tariff structure is being maintained in the
occupied areas and that it may be some time before it would be
possible to undertake tariff negotiations for the occupied areas due
to the prevailing abnormal circumstances.
discussion
At the current ITO Conference in Habana
effort is being made to bring the occupied areas into the Charter so
that they would have firm assurance of receiving the benefits of the
Charter, particularly m-f-n treatment, when the ITO came into effect. For this purpose the U.S. Delegation
at Habana has proposed an amendment to the Charter, similar to the
undertaking suggested in sub-paragraph (a) of the
first recommendation above, which is designed to bring the occupied
areas within the Charter.
At Habana, however, strong opposition to the U.S. amendment has
developed, particularly from the U.K., France, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and China. The Czechs have indicated that they could not accept a
Charter with the occupied areas in it, and the U.K. and
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France have suggested that the problem of
the treatment of the occupied areas should be left to a later date. The
legal competence of the Habana Conference to consider the problem has
also been brought into question.
The likely outcome of these discussions at Habana is not yet clear, and
any conclusions reached now can only be tentative and subject to
modification in the light of the results of the Habana deliberations.
Mr. Clayton has indicated that if the present opposition to the U.S.
amendment for the occupied areas continues, the amendment would be
withdrawn and, instead, an effort would be made to obtain at the
forthcoming GATT meeting acceptance of
a commitment along the lines of recommendation 1 above. Even if the U.S.
Delegation is successful in pushing through its amendment at Habana, it
would be desirable to obtain a similar commitment at the GATT meeting so that the occupied areas
could be assured of m-f-n treatment at the present time rather than
several years hence when the Charter becomes effective.
Sub-paragraph (c) of recommendation 1 suggests
that the protocol or commitment should be voluntary and open-end in
character. The reason for this suggestion is to afford a procedure
whereby such countries as Czechoslovakia and possibly China, which are
strongly opposed to any m-f-n commitment for the occupied areas, to stay
in GATT and abstain from such a
commitment while other GATT countries
accept such a commitment for themselves. The open-end nature of the
proposed commitment would enable the occupied areas to obtain from
countries not party to GATT a similar
commitment for m-f-n and general nondiscriminatory treatment. Though the
commitment may have to be worded differently for such non-GATT countries, an effort should be made
to obtain their consent to applying to the occupied areas as much as
possible of the general provisions of Article I and Part II of GATT.
It is possible that when a commitment for the extension of the benefits
of GATT to the occupied areas is
proposed at Habana, some countries may raise the question of tariff
concessions from these areas. At present no effective tariff is being
maintained in these areas, and it may be some time due to the prevailing
abnormal circumstances before tariff negotiations for these areas could
be undertaken. Subject to this qualification, however, the U.S. as an
occupying power would not be averse to undertaking such negotiations for
its zone at the earliest opportunity.