Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
Subject: Norwegian Efforts in the Atomic Energy Field
In accordance with the request contained in the memorandum from your office dated 29 October 1948,1 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the matter of the advisability of the United States Government concurring in British assistance to the Norwegian Government in processing uranium oxide for use in an experimental heavy water pile.
The processing of the uranium ore by the British would obviate the necessity for construction of the necessary plans in Norway. If Britain refuses, Norway may try to get this service from the French, who, if willing, probably could process the ore, although on a considerably less satisfactory and timely basis than could the British. The process is not highly secret, but plant construction is time-consuming and relatively costly by European standards. The effect then of processing the ore by the British or French would be to save the Norwegians one step in the production of fissionable material. An undertaking by Norway to produce fissionable material from refined products would involve development there of a potential for atomic or radiological warfare.
Establishment in Norway of facilities for the production of fissionable material is undesirable from the military point of view for the following reasons:
- a.
- If undertaken with United States and/or British consent or assistance it would establish an extremely dangerous precedent in that other nations would be sure to make similar requests which would then be difficult to deny. Moreover, as Norway acquires experience and facilities in the atomic energy field, requests for additional information and assistance could be expected;
- b.
- It increases the possibility that secret information obtained from the operation of the plant may fall into wrong hands, thus shortening the period of grace during which the United States will be the only nation possessing the atomic bomb;
- c.
- It exposes to possible capture by the USSR Norway’s fissionable material, processed uranium, and her production facilities;
- d.
- It involves large and unnecessary expenditures by a nation now in such straitened circumstances that economic aid is being provided by the United States; and
- e.
- It would create an additional demand for raw materials already in extremely short supply and for which the United States is competing in the world market.
The denial of the Norwegian request would avoid the establishment of a precedent and would also have the effect of delaying the production [Page 789] of fissionable material in Norway for a considerable period of time. These considerations alone are believed to be overriding, even though it is possible that some degree of collaboration may, in consequence, result between France and Norway unless this can be forestalled on the diplomatic level.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore feel that every effort should be made to prevent or at least discourage the establishment of facilities for the production of fissionable materials, pending the adoption of international control of atomic energy by the United Nations They also feel that no favorable consideration should be given to any such request as Norway’s pending adoption of a general over-all United States policy on such matters, this policy to include provision for certain selected atomic energy information or assistance to be granted only in return for direct and major security benefits not obtainable otherwise.
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
- Not found in Department of State files.↩