Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

IO Files: US(P)/A/M/(Chr)/12

Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Paris, Hotel d’Iéna, October 7, 1948

Paris, October 7, 1948

secret

[Here follows list of persons (33) present.]

1. Review of Slates for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

Mr. Blaisdell explained that it was planned to hold the Council elections at the Plenary Session of the Assembly tomorrow. It was therefore necessary for the Delegation to come to a final decision on the candidates. He asked Mr. Popper to report on the present situation.

Mr. Popper explained that the Delegation’s position was determined, except with respect to one seat on the Security Council and one seat on the Economic and Social Council. In the case of the Security Council a choice had to be made between Turkey and Egypt, and there were substantial reasons in favor of both candidates. Turkey would provide dependable support for the United States on the Security Council, and from an organizational point of view its election was perhaps preferable since it had not served previously and since its choice would make clear the principle that the Arab States do not enjoy an exclusive Security Council seat to themselves. On the other hand, Egypt was very anxious to serve, was the agreed candidate of the Arab League and would put an Arab State on the Council, which might be helpful in connection with the Palestine problem.

The Secretary inquired whether it was thought that the election of Egypt would be of positive benefit to the United States or would simply be a preventive and purely defensive choice and asked specifically whether the United States would gain something by voting for Egypt. Mr. Villard replied that the United States could hope to work very well with Fawzi Bey, the probable Egyptian Representative, who had proved to be the easiest of the Arabs to deal with on Palestine. In that situation he believed the choice of Egypt would represent a positive gain for the United States. On the other hand, Fawzi Bey would certainly vote in accordance with the interest of all the Arab States and would never vote as we would wish on Palestine. Mr. Villard noted that Egypt had only the support of the Arab League.

The Secretary asked Mr. Jessup for his views. Mr. Jessup stated that, on balance, he believed the United States should support Egypt on the first ballot. It might gain some favor by this action, and in particular, it might create a better atmosphere for the solution of the Palestine problem and also the question of the disposition of the Italian Colonies. He believed, as regarded other Security Council issues not directly concerning the Arab States, Egypt would come along with the United States in general, and it would only be on those questions where the Arabs had a special interest that its position would be likely to run counter to that of the United States. For these reasons he suggested that the United States support Egypt on the first ballot but perhaps shift to Turkey, depending upon developments.

Ambassador Austin, basing his position on his Security Council experience, believed Egypt could contribute to the work of the Council, even though it would be opposed to the United States on many things. He questioned whether it was wise to choose Turkey simply because it would vote with the United States. He wanted the Delegation to cast its vote on the basis of what would produce the most good and on that basis, he was personally convinced that Egypt was the best candidate. Mrs. Roosevelt indicated she had no way of choosing a preferred candidate in this situation. Mr. Cohen said he would defer to the judgment of Mr. Jessup and Ambassador Austin, although, on the basis of the arguments put forward in Mr. Villard’s paper (US(P)/A/135) he would lean toward Turkey. Ambassador Sayre said that he believed the strengthening of the Security Council was the most important consideration in this case. He did not think that the Palestine problem would be solved in the near future nor that its solution would be facilitated by the election of Egypt. He wondered whether the strengthening of the SC was, therefore, not more important than the possible political advantage of supporting Egypt. He thought Turkey would be a stronger rod to lean on and for that reason, favored its candidacy.

Mr. Gross asked what position the Soviet bloc was taking and Mr. Popper indicated that there was no information on this point. Mr. Raynor thought Turkey would certainly be opposed by the Soviet group. He pointed out also that not only the British Commonwealth but also all the Western European States favored Turkey. Mr. Rusk thought undue emphasis had been placed upon the importance of the election in relation to specific political issues. He pointed out that Egypt had already sat on the Security Council and doubted that its choice would alter the general political situation. He believed the United States should support Turkey.

While noting that weight should be given to the views of those working in the Security Council, Mrs. Roosevelt said she felt there would be no real security with Egypt, even though now and then it might vote with the United States, because more often it would not work with the United States. She thought Turkey a more reliable choice. Ambassador Austin indicated that the situation balanced up closely on both candidates.

The Secretary said he would hesitate not to follow the preference of the United States Representatives in the Security Council, though personally he preferred Turkey. Nevertheless, he would agree that the United States should vote for Egypt on the first ballot. Ambassador Austin noted that it would be possible to work well with either country, as both Sarper (Turkey) and Fawzi Bey (Egypt), their respective representatives, would be easy to work with. As for the problem of getting votes in the Council, he commented that ordinarily the USSR drives the other states on the Council to vote the opposite way in self-defense.

Mr. Jessup thought that it was almost a toss-up and Turkey would probably be elected. He himself was a good deal impressed by the problem of general relations between the United States and the Arab States, and thought it would be helpful if we let the word get around that we are backing Egypt. He did not think it would be bad for the United States if Egypt were elected and proposed again that the United States vote for Egypt on the first ballot. Mrs. Roosevelt wondered whether our position with the Arabs would improve at all, unless we voted with them on Palestine. Mr. Jessup thought we would not lose the entire world on the Palestine issue and that the longer range problem of friendly Arab-American relations was most important. Mrs. Roosevelt asked again whether anything would really have the slightest influence, and Mr. Jessup said he would defer to the Near Eastern experts on this question.

Mr. Ross agreed fully with Mr. Jessup. The United States was always sure of its credit with Turkey. Any positive gain in our relations with Egypt would be an improvement. He favored supporting Egypt on the first ballot.

The Secretary stated that the Delegation would support Egypt on the first ballot but would make no reference to its position on further ballots. It should inform only Egypt, although the Secretary noted that Egypt would undoubtedly spread the United States commitment around. This raised the question as to when the Egyptians should be told of the Delegation’s decision. Mr. Ross believed they should be told immediately. Mr. Jessup indicated that the political officers would be under pressure as to how the United States would vote and he thought it should be possible to tell all who inquire that we are voting for Egypt on the first ballot. Mr. Rusk suggested that we should make it clear that we would be glad to see either Turkey or Egypt on the Council. The Secretary did not think this was desirable, since it appeared to qualify our support and believed it would be better simply to see what the situation was after the first ballot. Mr. McKeever commented that if the Egyptians were told immediately, the Delegation could expect to read in the morning papers that the United State was supporting Egypt. For this reason he thought it would be preferable to delay telling the Egyptians until after lunch. The Secretary said he would leave the question of when the Egyptians should be told up to Mr. Jessup. Mr. Jessup thought it would be all right to wait until after lunch. The Secretary then indicated that if Egypt failed on the first ballot, the United States would vote for Turkey, but would not let that fact be publicized at this time lest it result in bad feelings from both state.

Turning to the situation on the Economic and Social Council slate, Mr. Thorp recalled that the Department had originally agreed on Canada for re-election but that the Canadians had indicated that they would not wish to run against India. However, Canada had once indicated that if both Chile and Peru were supported for re-election it might change its position. He was, himself, very much concerned about the effect of India’s participation in the Council and referred to the fact that in his first speech in Committee II, the Indian Representative had been sharply critical of the metropolitan powers, in particular, in relation to their participation on regional commissions, and had also charged the exporting powers (the United States) with discriminating in favor of Europe against Asia. He thought it would be desirable to check this situation again with the Canadians although it might be too late to shift our position. Mr. Raynor commented that he would be glad to check with the Canadians but noted that it had been known for several days that Chile and Peru would be supported for re-election and the Canadians had not raised any questions. Mr. Rusk recalled that Mr. Hume Wrong had called him in Washington shortly before he left to inform him that the Canadian Cabinet had decided that Canada should not stand for re-election and had asked that the United States not embarrass Canada by supporting it. Mr. Thorp indicated that if Canada did not want the seat, there was no question of supporting her. It was agreed that the Delegation should support India.

2. Slate for the International Law Commission.

Mr. Washington explained that Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) had asked that the United States support Ambassador Amado for the ILC. Ambassador Amado was now on the secondary United States slate. In view of the general cooperation which the United States received from Brazil, Mr. Washington suggested that the Delegation might wish to reconsider its previous decision, approving the United States slate, and include Ambassador Amado. On a question from the Secretary, Mr. Blaisdell explained that the original slate had been chosen on the basis of personal competence, and secondly, equitable geographical representation. He recommended that the Delegation stand on its previous decision. Mr. Gross, referring to the fact that the Brazilian request was tied up with another matter, said he did not believe the United States should change its slate. … It was agreed that the slate should not be changed and that the Brazilians should be told that the United States had chosen the candidates which it would support on the basis that they were the best men for the posts.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]