IO Files: US(P)/A/M/(Chr)11
Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the United States Delegation, Paris, Hotel d’Iéna, October 4, 1948, 9:15 a. m.
[Here follow list of persons (28) present and discussion of a prior agenda item.]
2. Progress Report on Slates for the Security Council and Economic and Social Council (Mr. Popper)
Mr. Popper explained that there would probably be a plenary session of the Assembly Friday, at which the Council elections would be [Page 151] scheduled. For this reason certain preparatory work would have to be undertaken immediately, and it was thought desirable to review the situation with the Delegation.
On the Security Council, he noted that no opposition had developed to Norway’s candidacy, although Norway was not actively campaigning. In accordance with Secretary’s request at a previous Delegation meeting, the British had been asked whether they would campaign actively for Norway. Mr. Raynor stated that the British had taken no campaign action for Norway to date.
Turning to the Latin American candidate, Mr. Popper asked Dr. Corrigan to bring the Delegation up to date on the discussions in the Latin American caucus. Dr. Corrigan explained that Cuba’s candidacy had been confirmed by the caucus. On the Economic and Social Council, Chile had made a strong plea for reelection on the special ground that if it were not reelected, the implication would be that it had been repudiated because of its strong policy toward the U.S.S.R. The caucus had voted (12 votes for Chile and 10 votes for Peru) to support both states for reelection to the Economic and Social Council. Mr. Popper pointed out that the reelection of these two states, along with China and France, might be organizationally undesirable, particularly because it gave the impression that the Economic and Social Council was a closed corporation. However, it would be necessary to support Chile and Peru unless the United States was prepared to depart from its previous policy of accepting the agreed candidates of the Latin American states. Mr. Thorp believed the United States was bound to support Chile in view of Santa Cruz’s strategic position on Committee 2 and Committee 3. It was agreed that, these two states should be supported for reelection.
Mr. Villard reported that the deadlock between Turkey and Egypt for the Security Council still continued. Turkey claimed four votes and Egypt eight from the states in the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian areas. There appeared to be no chance that Turkey and Egypt would agree. Mr. Villard indicated that the British were in the same dilemma as the United States; although the British Delegation favored Turkey a number of the British experts on Middle Eastern affairs, who were keenly conscious of Arab problems, favored Egypt. Mr. Villard expressed the hope that the United States could agree with the British on a common candidate from this area.
It was pointed out that if the United States continued to postpone decision on this matter it would lose favor with both states. Mr. Ross recommended that the United States support Egypt. He believed that there was more to gain and less to lose by this step. The credit of the United States was at a low ebb with the Egyptians. At the same time the failure to support Turkey would be unlikely to damage United [Page 152] States-Turkish relations. Moreover, if Egypt’s candidacy were opposed, it might affect the chances for a settlement in Palestine. Mr. Ross believed we should tell the British our views and try to persuade them to take the same line.
Emphasizing again that Egypt and Turkey had not succeeded in reaching an agreement, Mr. Popper suggested that it would be better in the long run if there could be an agreed candidate from the whole group of Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian states. He proposed that the Delegations of Turkey and Egypt be informed at this time that if they were unable to agree, the United States would be forced to make its own choice. He suggested that it might be unfortunate for Egypt to return again this soon to the Security Council since it had immediately preceded Syria.
Mr. Cohen believed there was great strength in this point of view, and he thought the Delegation should bear in mind the fact that the choice of Egypt might build up a precedent to the effect that the Arab states should at all times be represented on the Council. If the Arab states insisted on an exclusive seat, it might create a demand for an increase in the members of the Security Council which would present obvious difficulties.
Mr. Ross said that, while he agreed bascially with the organizational desirability of passing Security Council seats around, in this case he considered that political factors outweighed these adverse considerations. He did not think that there was any danger that the Arab states would insist that the single Security Council seat belonged to them in perpetuity. In any event, he doubted whether in terms of practical politics, they could maintain such a position. However, he said he saw no objection to hold this matter over, preferably not later than Tuesday morning, or at the latest, Wednesday, thus giving the two contenders a final opportunity to reach a compromise.
Mr. Raynor thought there were some political reasons in favor of Turkey. He pointed out that France and the Western European states preferred Turkey. He thought their views should count in this situation. In addition, one should not overlook the importance of having state on the Security Council upon which the United States could depend; in this connection, Turkey was certainly more reliable than Egypt. Mrs. Roosevelt felt certain that the United States would get no support from Egypt, particularly because Egypt was strongly anti-British at this time.
Mr. Villard saw no objection to a further delay of 24 or 48 hours in deciding upon the preferred candidate. He pointed out, however, that the two states really could not be expected to reach an agreement and both would be delighted if the United States made the decision.
Mr. Gross referred to the earlier remarks as to the desirability of an agreed candidate from the Middle Eastern bloc of states and [Page 153] thought there might be some advantage in dividing the block. Mr. Popper saw the general objection to bloc politics but emphasized that in elections there was the mechanical problem of getting a two-thirds majority which necessitated lining up support for candidates before an election. The whole problem was facilitated if there were agreed candidates from a broad geographical area. Nevertheless, Mr. Gross believed some of the bloc difficulties arose from willingness to utilize blocs on organizational items, such as elections. Their use there subsuquently deprived the United States of the moral strength necessary to discourage on principle the use of bloc techniques in committees.
Mr. Cohen asked what position Pakistan and India had taken. He did not think there was any objection to agreement between Middle Eastern states on a common candidate since there was already the understanding that one Security Council seat was to go to this group. He agreed, however, that the development of blocs should not be encouraged. Mr. Villard indicated that Pakistan, as a Moslem state, was supporting Egypt, while India favored Turkey. Mr. Gross felt that from the standpoint of the interest of the United States, there was a serious question whether Egypt’s presence on the Security Council might not be extremely dangerous.
Mr. Ross agreed that Turkey was a “surer bet” than Egypt. At the same time our relations with Egypt were at a turning point. He believed that it was a reasonably good gamble that Egypt’s election might swing it to our side. The strongest evidence for this position lay in the fact that the Egyptian government was not very stable. The people in Egypt who were trying to promote a moderate policy on Palestine were those who were anxious for Egypt to be elected to the Security Council. If Egypt were not elected, it seemed likely that less moderate leaders would take over the government, and United States-Egyptian relations would worsen. Mr. Gross referred to the bad relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom and thought that Egypt would probably continue in this policy and would be likely to take any position, regardless of its merits, which opposed the United Kingdom. Mr. Ross thought it was certain there would be a deterioration in relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt under existing circumstances. If Egypt were elected to the Council, the situation might improve. Mr. Thorp thought his view over-emphasized the importance of the election, which he believed was only a minor factor in the total situation. Mr. Villard agreed, in general, with Mr. Ross and noted that the United States had been able to work more effectively with Egypt than any other Arab state because of the moderate attitude of Fawzi Bey. Fawzi Bey would probably be the Egyptian Security Council representative. Ambassador Austin pointed out the importance of the personal factor in Security Council proceedings.
[Page 154]Terminating discussion of this subject, Ambassador Austin indicated that the Delegation would postpone final decision pending conversations with representatives of Turkey and Egypt, in which it would be indicated that the United States is about to make an independent decision on this matter unless the two states can reach agreement.
[Here follows discussion of agenda item 3.]
4. Slate for the International Law Commission1 (Mr. Maktos)
Mr. Maktos explained that under Article 13 of the Charter the General Assembly had responsibility for the codification and progressive development of international law. It would be called upon to establish an International Law Commission of 15 members who were to be experts in international law and who would serve in their individual capacity, rather than representatives of states. The slate combined not only considerations of general geographical distribution and representation of various systems of law, but at the same time placed primary emphasis upon the individual qualifications of the candidates. Mr. Maktos then read the list of candidates. Ambassador Austin inquired as to the meaning of the secondary candidates and Mr. Maktos explained that, if there were an impasse on the first ballot or if some of our candidates made a bad showing, these were the alternative candidates to which the delegation might shift its vote.
Ambassador Sayre asked whether the candidates were chosen on the basis of individual qualifications or on the basis of geographical distribution. Mr. Maktos said that individual qualifications had come first, but indicated that in the case of Prince Wan (Siam) geographical distribution had been the deciding factor. Nevertheless, Prince Wan had done considerable work in international law and was well liked. It was noted that he had been elected Vice-Chairman of Commttee 6.
The slate was approved by the delegates without further comment.
[Here follows discussion of another subject.]