501.BC/8–2248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iraq (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
499. Under instructions from Prime Minister1 (who is also acting Foreign Minister), former Foreign Minister Jamali called on me yesterday evening. He explained that Regent2 having on August 17 appointed him a minister (top grade) in Iraqi diplomatic service, he had been assigned to special duty in Foreign Office charged with preparing [Page 113] material for and attending as Iraqi delegate all meetings of Arab League and UN organs.
Object of his call was to ask me enquire whether Department is willing in circumstances outlined below to say as of now that it is disposed include Iraq (as successor to Syria) on its list of three candidates for election to SC at September meeting of GAUN:3
- 1.
- All regional non-Arab states (Turkey, Greece. Iran, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia) are believed willing yield election to an Arab state. Iran already has so declared itself formally to Arab states, and other regional states, together with India and Pakistan, have been or are to be approached in this sense.
- 2.
- Arab states desire that Iraq succeed Syria; and Iraq is prepared if elected to resign from TC and support election thereto of any other region state.
- 3.
- He, Jamali, has advised Regent and Prime Minister against Iraq candidature unless Department’s reply should be “favorable or at least not unfavorable.”
I suggested in reply that it might be awkward for US among other states to commit itself to supporting any Arab state for seat on SC when knowing in advance that all Arab states will strongly oppose admission Israel to UN membership.
Jamali commented that “Arab states do not and cannot recognize existence of such a state dominated as it is by terrorism and aggression.”
I asked if on basis statements made by his own Prime Minister it was not fair to draw conclusion that if Israel be admitted to UN by two-thirds vote GAUN Iraq would urge all Arab states withdraw from UNO.
Jamali answered that “in any decision on this point it would have to be by collective decision of states members of Arab League and this could not transpire unless and until Arab states should come to conclusion that principles of Charter had been irreparably violated.”
Surely, he added, no more effective action could be taken to restore Arab confidence in UNO than for US and other powers to proceed on assumption that no ground will exist for such ultimate decision by Arab League and consequently as in the past to elect Arab states to UNO positions, thus enabling them continue play role as constructive members that organization.
I gathered clear impression that Jamali personally did not believe Arab states would agree “collectively” to withdrawal from UNO. He made particular point of saying that when assuming his new functions he had urged and found Regent and Prime Minister favorably inclined towards early action in pursuance of Tigris–Euphrates development [Page 114] master planning discussed with World Bank last fall. This, he felt, should be made Iraq’s major policy irrespective of political or military developments in Palestine.
He commented that Arab states had lost heavily during latest phase of Palestine dispute. Consequently they should strengthen themselves and their international position for next phase which would probably be dominated by world tension. In that order of ideas Iraq’s fate and future lay in and with Anglo-American cooperation.
Pouched Arab capitals and London.