501.BC/8–1148: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
1010. Although (a) we are not aware of the political or geographical considerations which may account for the Department’s tendency to favor India for the Near Eastern vacancy on the SC (Department’s 426 to Ankara, August 9), and although (b) we have personally strongly supported India for a place on the SC in the fall of 1946 and 1947, and (c) still feel that in due course India should have a place on the SC, on the other hand we feel strongly for the following reasons, that it would be a mistake to support India this year:
- 1.
- India’s apparently intemperate and intransigent attitude with regard to Kashmir and Hyderabad1 scarcely qualifies her this year under Article 23, paragraph 1 of the Charter.
- 2.
- US support of India while the Kashmir dispute is still unsettled might well be regarded as a grave affront by Pakistan.
- 3.
- In the present situation respecting Palestine we must not risk further impairing our relations with the Arab states by supporting a candidate to succeed Syria which is not either, (a) one of the other Arab states or, (b) the free choice of the Arab states. It might be expected that the Arab states, if they cannot agree on one of their own group would prefer Pakistan over India since Pakistan, (a) is a Moslem state, and (b) has been the strongest supporter of the Arab viewpoint with regard to Palestine in the UN. Or, as an alternative to Pakistan the Arab states might be expected to favor Turkey.
Our recommendations are as follows:
- 1.
- We should put aside any thought of supporting India this year or Pakistan either since Pakistan is also one of the parties in the Kashmir dispute.
- 2.
- We should sound out the Arab states to the extent feasible (we can do this with Syria and Egypt here) as to their views concerning, (a) one of the Arab states as successor to Syria, or (b) alternatively, Turkey.
- 3.
- In discussing this matter with the Arabs, we should, (a) indicate that we wish to be guided primarily by their views concerning the successor to Syria, (b) very delicately hint that the Arab states themselves might find it convenient to agree on Turkey, and (c) indicate that the Arab states could always, of course, have a place at the council table when Palestine was under consideration and that the election of Turkey might therefore be considered as giving them an additional voice.
Our positive reasons for favoring Turkey if the Arabs could be induced without impairing our relations with them to agree upon Turkey are as follows:
- 1.
- Turkey is a vitally important link and buffer in the problem of Near Eastern security.
- 2.
- It would be to our overall advantage to build up Turkey’s prestige.
- 3.
- Turkey could be of very great assistance as a member of the SC in matters concerning the maintenance of peace in Palestine with which the SC will undoubtedly have to deal for some time to come.
We should appreciate the Department’s reactions to the foregoing and instructions as to conversations with Syrian and Egyptian representatives here.
It may be added that Ignatieff2 told us yesterday that he understood Pillai,3 the Indian representative here, had advised his government against seeking election to the SC this year.