According to a memorandum, dated March 26, 1948, to Mr. Lovett from Mr.
Rusk,1 regarding the
implementation of Article 43 of the UN
Charter, the Secretary indicated that subject to the views of the Under
Secretary the Policy Planning Staff should consider whether the United
States should submit an offer of the forces it will make available to the
United Nations Security Council. Mr. Lovett subsequently approved of a
suggested Planning Staff study.
[Annex]
Report by the Policy Planning Staff
secret
[Washington,] June 29, 1948.
PPS/34
Armed Forces To Be Furnished Under Article 43
of the United Nations Charter
the problem
To determine whether the United States should submit an offer of the
forces, assistance and facilities it will make available to the United
Nations Security Council, and if so, under what circumstances and after
what preparatory steps.
facts bearing on the problem
Most of the facts bearing on this question are set forth in the appendix
to SANACC 219/18 of April 21,
19483 attached as Annex A. The
following further items are pertinent to this paper:
(1) Senate Resolution 239 containing the following passage:
“… that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that
this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly
pursue the following objectives within the United Nations
Charter:
“…
“(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United
Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to
obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation
and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable
guaranty against violation.…”
(a) The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
proposed at the recent session a bill with a provision advocating
“Agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as
contemplated in the Charter”. In reporting out this bill, the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that “the failure to provide the
Security Council with contingents of the armed forces of the member
nations as an instrument for maintaining peace and security has been a
negative default of obligations imposed by the Charter”; that
“Implementation of article 43 is a sine qua non
to effective functioning of the Security Council.”
(3) The Soviet Government, on June 3, 1948, proposed several small
changes in the Soviet estimate of armed forces to be provided under
Article 43, apparently designed to bring their estimates closer to those
of the other four permanent members of the Security Council.
Specifically, they brought their ground forces estimate in line with
[Page 360]
that of all the other members
of the UN Military Staff Committee. In
naval force categories other than battleships and aircraft carriers they
brought their estimates substantially in line with the other estimates.
In the category of air forces, without changing their total figure, they
revised their figures on bombers, fighters and miscellaneous in order to
bring them more closely in line with those of the British, French, and
Chinese. The purpose of this appears to be to make more conspicuous the
difference between the air estimates of the United States and the much
smaller estimates of the other four.
(4) Executive authority to negotiate agreements to make United States
armed forces available to the United Nations Security Council is
provided in Section 6 of the “United Nations Participation Act of 1945”
(Public Law 264—79th Congress), which reads in part as follows:
Sec. 6. The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement
or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to
the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,
providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and
assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the
Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of
said Charter.
discussion
- 1.
- There is no obligation resting on us by virtue of the UN Charter to volunteer to make a
contingent of forces available to the Security Council. On the
contrary the Charter specifically states that the agreements
envisaged in this article shall be negotiated “on the initiative
of the Security Council.” On the other hand, there is nothing in
the Charter which would inhibit our taking such a step. (See
Annex B.4)
- 2.
- There is no positive consideration of national interest
involved. On the contrary, the Policy Planning Staff considers
it generally dangerous to U.S. interests for the Security
Council to attempt to employ armed force in order to assert its
security powers in the present state of international relations.
The Kremlin has no abstract interest in the maintenance of peace
and security. The Soviet leaders do nothing in foreign affairs
which is not apt, in their opinion, to contribute to the
strengthening of the position of the international communist
movement at the expense of the position of the leading members
of the western community of nations. If, therefore, in a given
instance, the U.S.S.R. were to choose not to exercise its veto
over a proposal to use
[Page 361]
the UN forces in a security
matter, this could be only because it had decided that such
UN action would be apt to
have the effect, in the last analysis, of furthering
international communist purposes. In any joint undertakings for
the use of UN facilities in
security matters, the western powers are therefore betting
against the Kremlin on the ultimate repercussions of such
undertakings on the world situation.
- 3.
- Nevertheless, the United States Government is deeply committed
to press to the limit for the implementation of Article 43.
Numerous executive statements have emphasized that the UN is to constitute the cornerstone
of our policy.
The Senate has now passed a resolution calling specifically for “maximum
efforts to obtain agreements to provide the UN with armed forces as provided by the Charter”.
Finally, we are committed by many statements of responsible leaders of
this Government to make the United Nations a cornerstone of U.S.
policy.
recommendations
In the light of the above facts, the Policy Planning Staff recommends
that:
- (1)
- The State Department should request from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff an indication of the numbers and types of forces the
United States would be prepared to make available, and
confirmation that these forces would be available if offered to
and accepted by the Security Council of the United Nations. If
the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot give the requested
confirmation, the plan to make such an offer should not be
pursued at this time.
- (2)
- If an affirmative reply is received from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the State Department should consult with the French,
British, and Canadian Governments with a view to making sure
that an offer of United States forces to the United Nations
would not encounter their opposition in the Security Council.
Should any of these powers have strong objection to the proposed
procedure, the matter should be reexamined in the Department
before any final step is taken.
- (3)
- If favorable replies are received to the inquiries mentioned
in Recommendations (1) and (2), the Government of the United
States should submit to the United Nations Security Council an
offer setting forth the assistance, forces and facilities which
it would be willing ta make available to the Security
Council.
