711.93/4–447
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 8.]
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge letters from Mr. John Carter Vincent dated February 25 and March 11, 1947,51 enclosing memoranda on China policy and an exchange of letters on the same subject [Page 92] between the Secretary of War and yourself.52 These were all extremely informative and we of the Embassy from our more restricted local standpoint find ourselves in hearty agreement with the points as listed.
It is somewhat disappointing not to be able to report more progress in government reorganization. President Chiang K’ai-shek has repeatedly told me that he was almost ready to show me the new name-lists, only to be forced to admit that some new complication had arisen. The latest one is the demand of the Youth Party to have a larger number of both Central and provincial posts. He regards these as quite unreasonable and has left for an absence of a week or more, ostensibly to visit his ancestral graves on the Spring Festival, perhaps also as employing a familiar Chinese device for solving problems of this nature. It means, however, that it may be well on toward the end of the month before a final announcement can be made. Thus far the only definite decision of major importance is the appointment of Governor Chang Ch’un of Szechuan as President of the Executive Yuan. Although certain other items have come to my knowledge it may be as well not to report these until they can be included in a completed list.
General Tsai Wen-chih, Deputy Commissioner of the Peiping Executive Headquarters until its closure, has recently given me his opinion on the Communist Party issue. He is convinced that this cannot be settled by military conflict; that while the Communists have lost heavily in manpower yet the Government losses both in this and in matériel have also been substantial and perhaps on the whole with more serious consequences, this attrition being of the essence of Communist strategy; that the Communists will probably be driven into the mountains where they will find food as well as ammunition more of a problem than hitherto, but that the Government will also have to maintain a difficult encirclement to prevent frequent sallies by means of which the Communists can replenish food and munitions, disrupt railways, etc.; that, assuming there is no radical change meanwhile in the international relations, the Communist Party will probably be ready to make overtures for peace about the end of this or early in the coming year. He thinks that Russia will aid the Chinese Communist Party only if or when it is gaining in power, not when it is losing. He quoted what he regarded as some very significant comments [Page 93] of his former Communist colleague in Executive Headquarters, General Yeh Chien-ying, just before his departure for Yenan early in March, to the effect that the China issue would certainly be discussed in the Moscow Conference where an agreement would be reached to have it settled jointly by Russia and the United States, perhaps including Great Britain, and that there was no more reason why the Chinese Communist Party should not be aided by Russia than the Kuomintang by the United States, it being already virtually a satellite of that country.
President Chiang, as I have reported previously, thinks that the Government’s military objectives will have been obtained by September at the latest, and his Chief of Staff, General Ch’en Ch’eng, is even more optimistic—as he usually tends to be.
One of the uncertainties in any such attempted forecast is the Communist psychology. Judging by recent broadcasts and other published statements, their misconception of American designs is more distorted than ever, so absurdly unrealistic in fact that one wonders whether there is any hope of their being willing to cooperate with a National Government which they are convinced is guided and protected by America for her own ulterior purposes. There has also been more open admission of worldwide Communist connections. For instance, Mr. Wang Ping-nan remarked to me just before he left Nanking that before this Government could crush the Chinese Communist Party they would have to do this to the Communist Party in every other country. On the other hand, Mr. Wang also said to me more than once toward the end of his stay here that they did not regard the peace discussions as broken off and that they would doubtless by [be] relying again on American mediation within the next few months. I still incline to the belief that when they are convinced that it is to their interest to temporize by agreeing or appearing to agree to a coalition government they will be ready to resume negotiations.
The difficulties UNRRA continues to encounter from both sides illustrates the baffling complexities and irritations of the conflict. Despite explicit promises that there would be no more strafing by Government airplanes of workers on the Yellow River project and orders from General Ch’en Ch’eng to that effect, a third wholly unwarranted attack has been made on an LST landing supplies on the Shangtung coast, in which the master was very seriously injured and four of the crew wounded. To offset this, UNRRA has just announced the largest relief airdrop ever undertaken in the Far East—nearly one million pounds of clothing and medicine dropped in 80-pound bundles by United States Marine Corps planes in the North China Communist [Page 94] area, in a series of 94 mercy flights. But I learned from a trustworthy nurse who had every opportunity for personal observation that practically all of this went to Communist troops rather than to the country people for whom it was intended. These are the two latest occurrences of this nature which have come to my knowledge.
President Chiang has heartily accepted my personal suggestion that Dr. T. V. Soong be appointed as the new Governor of Formosa with a group of American economic advisers. Dr. Soong himself is willing if he is not to be subject to interference by his successor in the Executive Yuan. It is largely, therefore, a matter of working out a suitable formula. With such a man in charge and the emphasis on civil rather than military administration and on economic restoration, better treatment of the islanders and in general a more honest and enlightened administration could be hoped for.
The problem of the “reactionaries” in the Kuomintang—in so far as they are sincere but narrowly bigoted rather than selfishly greedy or ignorantly militaristic—is how to absorb them into a constructive program. This applies especially to the notorious Chen brothers. Dr. Soong had intended to try to get rid of them but they turned the tables on him. It is interesting to watch President Chiang’s handling of them. He apparently is convinced that it would create more difficulties than it would remove by trying to eliminate them. He has also strong personal attachments for them and has for many years somewhat shared in certain respects their viewpoint. He knows that he can count absolutely on their loyalty to him and to the Party and that they are energetic and efficient. Yet he restricts their activities to relatively minor public affairs. They are themselves free from the evils of graft and hate it. They are quite leftist socially. I have therefore been trying again, with somewhat more hope of success than when you were here, to stimulate their interest in agrarian reforms and in attacking corruption especially in local hsien. They are becoming convinced that the only really hopeful method of combatting Communism is by demonstrating that the Government can do more for the welfare of the rural population. If they can be induced to concentrate on this they have a valuable contribution to make. At the worst their obstructionist influence can be partially neutralized.54
In general I must confess to a measure of restive impatience while waiting passively for the conditions to develop which might make possible more positive American assistance to China. But I remind myself of the surpassing importance of this country in the overall world situation if it can be started toward a progressive form of Government [Page 95] that provides at once for political freedom and for the economic betterment of a peacefully contented citizenry.
Respectfully yours,
- Letters from Mr. Vincent not found in Department files.↩
- The following memoranda were sent by air pouch on February 28 to the Ambassador in China: Memorandum of February 7 by Mr. Vincent to the Secretary of State, p. 789; memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) on February 17, p. 1066; memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State and Dr. S. C. Wang, Chinese Supply Commission, on February 17, p. 1069; and minutes of conference concerning China between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy (Forrestal), and others on February 20, p. 946. For the exchange of letters cited, see letter of February 26 from the Secretary of War (Patterson) and reply of March 4, from the Secretary of State, pp. 799 and 809, respectively.↩
- For a further report on the C-C clique and other factions in the Chinese Government, see telegram No. 744, April 5, 1 p.m., from the Ambassador in China, printed in United States Relations With China, p. 735.↩