811.2393/11–1547

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: At the Committee of Two meeting of 3 November 1947 you asked me to check on the status of withdrawals of United States Armed Forces in China so that you would have this information available in the event that it is needed during the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In your letter of 31 March 1947 to Mr. Molotov,99 you gave him the estimated figures for United States Armed Forces in China as of 1 June 1947, by which date it was expected that reductions then in progress would be completed. You will see from the following tabulation, [Page 919] which corresponds to the one in your letter to Mr. Molotov, that the strength of the Armed Forces could not be reduced by 1 June 1947 to the estimated ceiling but that Naval personnel and Marines are now below that ceiling. The reasons for this delay and the difficulty of reducing the Army and Air Force strengths to the estimated ceiling, although they are very close to that figure, are explained below.

Estimated ceiling for 1 Jun 47 Actual Strength 1 Jun 47 Actual Strength 1 Oct 47 Projected Strength 1 Jan 48
United States Army (All staff & services)
Advisory Group 750 750 750 750
Office & Property Guards 351 444 460 516
Air Transport 160 308 161 187
Graves Registration Serv. 94 80 73 39
Miscel. Staff & Services 155 96 87 100
Total Army 1510 1678 1531 1592
Actual Strength 1 Nov 47
United States Navy
Advisory Group 128 142 84
Services in connection with port & weather facilities, Shanghai, Tsingtao and Tientsin. 1043 1382 1147 Not to exceed
Total Navy 1171 1524 1231 1150 1171
Actual Strength 6 Nov 47
United States Marines
Combat type:
Infantry 1636 2402 1591
Air 499 565 417
2135 2967 2008
Staff and Service:
Ground 1154 3890 1379
Air 210 441 383
1364 4331 1762 Not to exceed
Total Marines 3499 7298 3770 3452 3499
[Page 920]

You will see from these figures that by 1 June 1947 the strength of United States Army including Air Force personnel had been reduced to the estimated level except in two agencies, Air Transport Service and Office and Property Guards. It is now estimated that it will not be possible to reduce the figures for these two services to the original estimated ceiling. As of 1 January 1948 and for an indefinite period thereafter the Air Transport Service, including attached Airways Communications Service and Air Weather Service units, will require a strength of 187, which is 27 higher than the estimate. Also, because of increased pilferage and other changed local conditions it has become necessary to augment rather than decrease Office and Property Guard personnel so that the projected strength for an indefinite period beginning 1 January 1948 will be 516, which is 150 higher than the original estimate of 351. It is not expected that the ceiling will be exceeded for the other services. Fluctuations in strength of Miscellaneous Staff and Services are caused by the inclusion under that heading of personnel enroute to and from China. The American Graves Registration Service is scheduled for inactivation on 15 December 1947 but will require until 15 February 1948 a residual strength of 39 to close out contracts, dispose of property and arrange for the termination of services. After that date no personnel will be required for this work but in other respects the projected strength of United States Army personnel will continue at the figure given for 1 January 1948. The functions of the Army Advisory Group require the full complement of 750 men and the other activities which are necessary to support the Army Advisory Group will continue to require the full services of the additional agencies listed.

The Navy and Marine Corps strength is now below the established ceiling and it is not expected that the ceiling figure will be subsequently exceeded. The delay in reducing strength to the ceiling figure was due to several reasons, including the following: non-availability of shipping lift; extensive damage by the Chinese Communist Forces to the rail line southwest of Chinwangtao which caused some delay in withdrawal of Executive Headquarters from Peiping to Tsingtao; the need to return or turn over enemy alien, foreign and Chinese property to the proper authorities; completion of the determination, declaration and turnover of surplus property; settlement of all foreign claims; the segregation and shipment control of items to be shipped to the United States and Guam from required stocks to be kept at Tsingtao.

I will be glad to furnish you any additional information should you desire it.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal
  1. Ante, p. 622.