893.00/3–2347: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 24—1:32 a.m.]
636. Capture of Yenan by Government forces is a significant political event and to a substantial extent meets the Government need mentioned in previous Embassy telegrams for a striking victory to bolster its position.
It is noteworthy that Government’s decision to take Yenan was apparently reached during this month. In this connection it should [Page 82] be recalled that Generalissimo in his statement of February 16,36 indicating Government’s intention of consolidating its current positions and concentrating on opening lines of communication, spoke in the following words:
“On its part the Government will confine its military efforts to the protection and restoration of communication systems so necessary for the economic life of the nation and we shall spare no efforts to continue to seek for a political solution of the Communist problem.”
At that time T. V. Soong categorically stated to Embassy that both he and Generalissimo were of same mind that Yenan should not be attacked. Subsequently, MA37 was similarly advised by G–2 Section38 of Ministry of National Defense. It is, therefore, fair assumption that taking of Yenan was later required by the Government in general and Chen Cheng in particular for prestige purposes. There are also indications that the timing of the Russian démarche regarding Chinese occupation of Dairen and Port Arthur area39 and Molotov’s proposal at Moscow conference so increased apprehension that Russia might be planning another move that it was even feared that it might accord some form of recognition to Chinese Communists which capture of Yenan would frustrate.
It is a fact that capture of Yenan does represent a significant psychological and political victory for the Government which it is now attempting to exploit to the full propagandawise. To the Chinese people no less than to the rest of the world, Yenan was the capital of the Chinese Communist government and the effect of its capture will be interpreted by many as the beginning of the end. Actually, Yenan was the headquarters of the CCP and the capital of only one of several regional governments.
Although the Government claims it routed over 100,000 Communist troops, this appears to be a gross exaggeration since American observers during the return of Communist mediation personnel reported the virtual evacuation of Yenan. It has long been apparent that the Communists had prepared well for this eventuality and that they never had any real intention of defending Yenan should such action appear to be costly. Rather it is more in keeping with their long developed tactics to evacuate any given point in the face of enemy pressure, draw him into a pocket, and thereafter gradually sap his strength with guerilla tactics. Furthermore, Government lines are seriously extended into territory which can be counted upon to be hostile in all respects. US officer in charge of Executive Headquarters [Page 83] Liaison group, on his return from Yenan, reported that General Chu Teh had told him that holding Yenan and surrounding areas and maintaining order would immobilize 17 Government brigades.
MA reports that G–2 Section of Ministry of National Defense informed him that air reconnaissance indicated Communists had withdrawn in two groups to the hills around Yenan. It remains to be seen now whether they will employ their customary guerilla tactics or in due course make an all-out attempt to retake Yenan.
Department please repeat to Moscow as 3.