893.20 Missions/9–847
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Chief of the Army Advisory Group in China (Lucas)54
Dear General Lucas: In your letter of September 5, 1947 you request the comments of the Embassy with regard to political implications which may result from your plan to send American advisory [Page 885] teams to such division training centers for the Chinese Army as the Ministry of National Defense may establish south of the Yangtze River or in Formosa.
In connection with a conversation which you had had on June 30 with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to a projected divisional training program, the Embassy reported to the Department of State on July 11 that in as much as the primary mission of the Army Advisory Group in reorganizing the Ministry of National Defense and senior command echelons of the Chinese Army had been virtually completed, the next logical step was to advise and assist in unit training. The Embassy went on to point out, however, that this type of training would inevitably carry with it the definite stigma of direct involvement in the present civil war even more so than formerly because of the promulgation of a National Mobilization Order on July 4.
It was further pointed out to the Department of State that it would be questionable under the existing Chinese military command situation whether the risk of direct involvement in the civil war entailed in the launching of such a training program would be commensurate with any practical benefits to be derived therefrom by the United States. The Embassy stated that it realized that approval of this training project would constitute realistic and immediate action to permit more efficient use of Advisory Group personnel already in China; nevertheless, the Embassy was constrained to observe that the implementation of such a program would be interpreted by the Chinese as a relaxation of American efforts to bring about fundamental and beneficial changes in the Chinese Government, that many months would elapse before the effect of the training program would be felt in combat areas and that in final analysis no training program could be disassociated for long from the question of supplies of matériel and munitions.
The Embassy is aware of the desirability from a purely military point of view of proceeding with advice and assistance to Chinese divisional staffs on organization and training, but feels that this matter cannot be divorced from other and larger considerations involving overall American policy decisions regarding not only China but the entire Far Eastern area. Specifically in the case of Formosa the Embassy is concerned with regard to the projected presence of American military advisors in an area which was the scene of rebellion against the policies of the Central Government early this year and where conditions which brought about the rebellion in large measure continue to exist.
It may be assumed that the report of the Wedemeyer Mission will consider among other questions that of American military aid to [Page 886] China. In as much as this question is susceptible of overall review in light of prevailing conditions in China, the Embassy considers that final decision with regard to American participation at Division Training Centers is unlikely at this time and would be premature. The Embassy believes that the complexity of our position in the Far East is such that decision with regard to expansion or contraction of the present American military advisory effort in China will form but a part of overall policy decisions arrived at between the concerned departments of the Government in Washington.
This letter is being brought to the attention of the Department of State for its information.
Very sincerely yours,
First Secretary of Embassy
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 985, September 8, 1947; received about September 26.↩