893.00/3–1947
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the plans for the reorganization of the Government have been progressing slowly through the maze of Chinese political and social relationships. President Chiang has been working assiduously at the task but is encountering obstacles in all directions. It is essential to the scheme that minority party members and independent leaders be assigned posts. The former insist quite properly that to make their participation real their members should have a substantial share in both the national and provincial administration. But this means the dislocation of those now holding such positions and—if the Chinese tradition is retained—at least a large proportion of their subordinates, with all of the economic hardships and personal animosities involved. Nor is it easy to replace [Page 70] them by better qualified individuals who are willing to incur the odium of joining a very unpopular Government and the undesirable consequences of its possible collapse. The same considerations obtain more or less among those of no party. Dr. Carson Chang is a case in point. He has led a group of its members to break away from the Democratic League and to organize the Social Democratic Party on a liberal and progressive basis. He was chiefly responsible for the draft of the Constitution adopted last November. He has been offered the headship of the Judicial Yuan, a post for which he would be admirably suited. But he vacillates because of fear of jealousies or estrangements within his own party, the dangers he would face should the Communist Party come into power, and his preference for writing and lecturing rather than for official responsibility.
The structure of the State Council is to be altered so as to consist of twelve Kuomintang members and twelve others—four each for the Youth Party, Social Democratic Party and Independents. But the heads of the five yuan are to be ex officio members, which would in effect give the Kuomintang seventeen. If Carson Chang were made the head of the Judicial Yuan it would be in order to allot another Yuan to the Youth Party, thus permitting the Kuomintang to have a total of fifteen as against fourteen for the others, to whom this arrangement would seem quite equitable.
The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang began its annual meeting on March 15 with the expectation of being able to adjourn after one week. This body is to elect the Kuomintang members on the State Council. This session of the Central Executive Committee is supposed to terminate the period of party tutelage. The Kuomintang will, it is maintained, cease to have special privileges, taking its place on an equality with other recognized political parties.
Dr. W. H. Wong,27 Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, has confided to me that the redistribution of Cabinet posts among the various cliques within the Kuomintang itself will doubtless cause such discord that it will be more difficult than ever to do business smoothly and efficiently—this even apart from the entrance of “outsiders”. The reactionary “C-C” clique has become much more active of late and is growing even more powerful. The much more liberal “Political Science” clique combined with it to accomplish the overthrow of Dr. T. V. Soong, but it can scarcely be expected that these mutually incompatible cliques will continue long in harmony.
President Chiang is in a perplexing dilemma. In view of the refusal of the Communist Party to continue peace negotiations on any practicable terms, the Government has determined—quite understandably—to eradicate their propagandist and subversive activities [Page 71] in various centers by sending all of their members who can be discovered back to Yenan, following those connected with the peace efforts already conveyed there by us. But in carrying out these instructions, the secret service operatives have been causing another outburst of terrorism especially among liberals and students, large numbers of whom have been arrested or threatened. The excessive measures in Peiping, for instance, were due, as Dr. Hu Shih27a is convinced, to the recent surprise attack on Tunghsien (Tungchow) after local spies had obtained secret information that the military unit stationed there was to be withdrawn. The Peiping authorities were fearful of similar espionage and its consequences in that city. Should the Government, on the other hand, put into effect the principles of freedom of speech and publication, the right of habeas corpus, etc., as promised in the Constitution and previously on more than one occasion by President Chiang with unquestionable sincerity of intent, these privileges would be utilized by the Communist Party as part of their all-out purpose to defeat their hated enemy. The Government regards itself therefore as fighting for its own existence and for national independence against an utterly unscrupulous armed rebellion. In the process the reactionary elements are gaining power and in their use of it are still further alienating and embittering all who do not go the whole way with them, while the liberals are intimidated from making themselves articulate and organizing effectively.
It will be proposed at the present CEC meeting that a final effort be made to persuade the Communist Party to cooperate for economic recovery by permitting the reopening of the Tientsin–Pukow and Peiping–Hankow Railway lines. If they agree this might even lead to a resumption of peace talks. If not, the prevailing sentiment is to attempt to clear these two railway zones by armed force. An overall scheme for economic reform is being drafted for approval at this meeting of the CEC.
Formosa is a tragic illustration of current trends, highlighted by the surpassing opportunity it afforded to take over from the efficient but imperialistic Japanese rule and demonstrate to these islanders the ability of their ancestral fellow-countrymen from the mainland to give them beneficent administration with a large measure of autonomy. Instead of this there has been misgovernment with all its attendant evils. Misunderstandings and a conflict of interests would no doubt have been inevitable in any case, but these have been aggravated by gross ineptitude and more perhaps than the usual amount of private graft, together with unwise exploitation of natural resources for much-needed public revenue. The “C-C” clique has been opposing Governor Chen Yi, who is supported by the Political [Page 72] Science clique of which he is a member. In this instance my sympathies are with the former of these two groups now struggling for mastery within the Kuomintang and for dominant influence upon President Chiang.
I have been painfully aware of the discrepancy between more objective reports of what is happening in Formosa and those which reach President Chiang and influence his policy. In this as in other issues I continually find myself tempted to exceed diplomatic propriety by assuming the role of a friendly unofficial adviser.
President Chiang has asked me to express to you his very deep appreciation of your stand at Moscow regarding the proposal that China be put on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers’ Conference.28 It has been interesting to note the spontaneous and wide-spread reaction in China against this proposal, notably among many of the more “leftist” elements. President Truman’s message to Congress29 in which he recommended loans to Greece and Turkey has also had a very reassuring influence upon Government leaders and their sympathizers. It is too early yet to ascertain the final effect of this upon Communist Party policy, but I incline to the opinion that both of these declarations will help toward their ultimate willingness to renew the peace talks. This will probably be even more true if the projected Government reorganization encourages the possibility of further American aid to enable it at once to recover economic strength and to succeed in practical reforms.
Respectfully yours,