893.00/4–2847
Memorandum by Brigadier General T. S. Timberman, U. S. Army Representative in the Embassy Executive Office, to the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Butterworth)83
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Herewith is a copy of the report84 setting forth the status of American weapons and ammunition in China as of 31 March 1947. This report was received from General Yu Ta-wei, and is being taken to Washington by General Gillem in order that it may be presented to the War Department in an unofficial manner and to preclude the possibility of its being in any was [way] considered an official request from the Chinese Government.
Attached is a tabulation84 showing the total ammunition supplied by the United States Government to the Chinese Government since V–J Day, including the stocks which were in West China during the war, and subsequent shipments to East China which were made to assist the Chinese in the reoccupation of Manchuria. The tabulation shows the percentage of this U. S. ammunition which still remains in the stocks of the Chinese Army. It further shows the number of days of supply which these quantities of ammunition represent. In determining the number of days of supply, comparison has been made with the ammunition consumption of the Chinese Army in India during the Burma campaign. Only U. S. type weapons reported on [Page 822] hand by the Chinese Army have been considered. This is the only comparative data available for expenditures of ammunition by the Chinese troops. These figures are considerably higher than the present experience of the Chinese armies where their operations and engagements have been of a desultory nature.
Inspection of this table shows that the quantity of ammunition remaining varies from 7 per cent to 100 per cent of the total quantities, by caliber, which they have received from the United States. This represents the ammunition requirements for periods varying from 25 days of supply to 123 days of supply. For normal wartime operations, 30 days of supply is considered as the minimum which must be on hand and additional reserve stocks must be available for continuous flow into the operational area to replenish expenditures. Any large-scale offensive would deplete this supply of ammunition within a short time, and, thereafter, leave the Chinese Army wholly dependent upon what could be manufactured within China.
The above analysis is based on the stocks of U. S. ammunition as reported by the Chinese and does not take into consideration any quantities of ammunition which may fall into the hands of the Nationalist Army as a result of the evacuation of the Marines from North China, nor does it include any stocks of ammunition which may have been manufactured in China or obtained from sources other than the United States.
It is interesting to note that in the case of 60 mm mortar shells, the stock is the lowest of any item of ammunition; however, this particular type has been placed by the Chinese in the second priority of supply. This would indicate that their manufacturing capacity within China, as reported by Major Powell, is adequate to prevent any serious shortage. The first priority of shipment is given to caliber .30 ammunition which, reportedly, has been given first priority in the establishment of manufacturing sources within China.
Conclusion: The quantity of U. S. types of ammunition, as reported by the Chinese, is inadequate for protracted operations by the Chinese Army units equipped with U. S. weapons.