Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

121.893/8–447

The Consul at Peiping (Freeman) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)⁸³

No. 28

Peiping, August 4, 1947.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of General Wedemeyer’s schedule of engagements and appointments⁸⁴ during his stay in Peiping from August 1 to August 4, 1947, which was prepared for him in advance of his arrival in accordance with instructions contained in the Embassy’s unnumbered telegram of July 31.

There are also enclosed as of possible interest (1) a copy of an outline used in briefing the mission on major items of political interest in Peiping; (2) four memoranda prepared for the mission by Consul General Clubb on the political situation in Manchuria;⁸⁵ and (3) a memorandum giving the substance of Colonel Barrett’s⁸⁶ briefing on the military situation in north China and Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

Fulton Freeman

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Consul at Peiping (Freeman)

Outline of Main Points in Political Situation, Peiping

I. Movement Toward Establishment of Third Party.

A. Résumé of movement outlined in Peiping’s despatch no. 25, July 1, 1947 to Embassy.⁸⁷

[Here follows résumé.]

II. Increased Popular Disillusionment Over Generalissimo Personally and Growing Belief He Is Incapable of Bringing About Peace in China.

A. This feeling being openly expressed in many quarters and not nearly as covertly as might be expected.

B. However, no person unanimously suggested as successor (with exception of General Feng reportedly being pushed by third party group).

C. Certain professors and liberals, who have long had faith that realization of future importance in history might at last minute convert Chiang into real statesman who would bring opposing sides together, now believe this chance irrevocably lost and no hope for peace under Chiang.

III. Fear of Communists and Democratic League Evidenced in Mass Arrests of February 17, 1947.

A. Majority of over 2,000 persons arrested now released, some having been held incommunicado for four months.

B. Questioning during imprisonment concentrated around connections with Communists and Democratic League.

C. All persons arrested were cautioned on release never to mention details of imprisonment, but some have talked.

D. Absence of any formal charges or trials, imprisonment without notification to relatives under extremely bad conditions, and not infrequent cases of torture provide adequate evidence of absence in Peiping of rights of personal freedom.

IV. Information From Communist-Held Areas.

A. Majority of reports from correspondents, UNRRA personnel, and missionaries returning from Communist areas highly favorable toward Communists, both as a well-equipped, well-disciplined, seasoned military machine and as an efficient, incorrupt government administration. Same reports agree, however, on many shortcomings of Chinese Communists, with particular reference to individual freedom, but claim good points more than compensate.

B. Recent trip to Kalgan of Vice Consul Jenkins, Language Student, brought out quite a different picture of area formerly under Communist domination.

1. Several Soviet officers reportedly entered Kalgan on heels of Chinese Communists. Ten lived in Kalgan. Others came and went during Communist occupation.

2. Soviets reported completely to control Communists through curt instructions which were immediately obeyed. Not simply advisors to Communists.

3. Distribution of UNRRA supplies by Communists as “gifts from Soviet comrades”. In some sectors only distributed to party members and in others only to families who had member in Communist armed forces.

4. Chief criticisms of Communist regime: lack of personal freedom (speech, press, religion, etc.); ceiling prices for merchants; Communists’ insistence on everyone attending daily meetings of various kinds; practice of tou cheng [liquidation?]; secret police; frequent imprisonments; wholesale destruction on departure of everything Communists could not carry away; etc. However, Communist troops almost universally praised for excellent conduct.

5. Many reports in Kalgan and plateau area that Soviets supplied Communists with arms, tanks and planes—General Fu also so stated—but no evidence found.

6. Actions of Soviet troops in Chahar Province. Removed sheep, goats, cattle, horses in American trucks; violated women; looted villages of everything valuable. Effects of Soviet action visible in all towns and villages of plateau.

C. As pointed out, Jenkins’ report at variance with reports received from Communist-held areas in Hopeh, Shansi, Jehol and other places. This may be due to fact that Soviet troops apparently invaded most of Chahar Province and proximity of Kalgan to Soviet territory may have made possible Soviet direction of Communist occupation without probability of publicity in other areas.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Consul General at Peiping (Clubb)

Peiping, August 3, 1947.

Subject: Public Opinion and American Interest in China.

The Kuomintang-controlled press at present appears to be following the propaganda line of purporting that Communism in China is not a domestic problem but an “international problem”, the result of “international conspiracy” (Peiping Chronicle, August 1, 1947), and it calls for a “firm policy” (ibid.) on the part of the United States in respect to events in China’s Northeast. The suggestion is that the “firm policy” should be similar to that adopted by the United States in respect to the Balkans. Those same publicity organs at present assert directly that the Soviet Union is interfering in Chinese affairs, talk not too obliquely of the prospects of a third World War, and take overt offense at the circumstance that Japan is being rehabilitated more rapidly in the post-war period than is China. This published material is paralleled by stronger remarks to the same general end from Nationalist administrators and militarists, and there is evidently a deeply-rooted belief in some Kuomintang circles that war between the United States and the Soviet Union is inevitable and not far distant. Comments have been heard indicating a Nationalist belief that such a war would from the point of view of the National Government be desirable, as incidentally offering to China a readymade solution of the “Communist problem”.

The problem of social change in China is one of long standing and has troubled the country for upwards of a century; at times there have been attempts to deal with those problems pacifically, as when Premier Li Hung-chang endeavored to modernize the country’s military machine in the later part of the 19th Century and when Emperor Kuang Hsu tried to reform the country by law in the hectic “Hundred Days” of 1898; but more commonly the existence of those problems has been shown by violent social eruptions such as the T’aip’ing Rebellion of 1850–65, the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the drive of the Kuomintang–Communist coalition against the warlords in the 1924–27 period, and in the struggle which has occurred between those two groups after their split in 1927. The present situation, with basic economic debilities aggravated by the dislocations and stresses of the war years 1937–45, is essentially revolutionary by the standards established by Chinese history. This time the main leadership of the mass of people desiring either reforms or revolution has been assumed by the Chinese Communist Party.

History has taught the difficulties attendant upon the selection of particular groups to support in China. Under present conditions, with potential clash of American and Soviet interests in Asia, and with the existence of the United Nations organization which 1) offers a sounding board for possible criticism of American actions and 2) is in any event an instrument which under certain circumstances would be of great value to the United States in respect to hypothetical international conflicts if by American and other United Nations’ action it can only be developed into a coalition of some force, it is more than ever incumbent upon the United States to be circumspect and judicious in its approach to the problem of how to help China in its present difficulties. The present revolutionaries, if Communist, are still Chinese, and the United States supports the principle that every people has the right to determine its own form of government. During the period of the functioning of the General Marshall mission, there was strong criticism of American action from not only the Communist camp but from various Chinese groups in Nationalist-held areas for alleged interference in China’s domestic affairs by extension of support to the Nationalist Government. That criticism has died down, but for the reason that the mission has been withdrawn, American troops have been recalled from China, and the quantities of materials supplied to the National Government have been limited. Assuming the adoption of a new American approach to the problem, along a line of action where it would appear that American aid was going to the National Government to buttress up that political entity against the attacks of the Chinese Communists, a recurrence of anti-American feeling in some Chinese camps can be expected logically to recur, probably in aggravated form. Further, unilateral action along those lines without reference to the United Nations would probably result in a renewal of domestic American and international adverse criticism of the sort voiced at the time of American action in respect to Greece and Turkey. One possible result of that criticism would be the weakening of that very United Nations organization which we desire to strengthen so that the “Nations of good will” shall be found solidly knit together in the event of aggression from the last of the imperialists.

Chinese Kuomintang publicity does not suggest that the Chinese State proposes to take the matter before the United Nations’ Council as one which threatens to disturb international peace, even when it charges “international conspiracy”. It is obvious that the Kuomintang publicists would prefer to have the United States come forward directly in support of the National Government’s case 1) without judicial analysis of China’s case by an international body and 2) without that Government’s being caused to grant as a quid pro quo to the United States those political, economic, and social reforms which it refused consistently to grant to the country during the tenure of the mission of General Marshall. It is submitted, however, 1) that the by-passing of the United Nations would be a fresh blow at that organization given at a time when it cannot well stand even unintended blows from one of its main sponsors; 2) that the extension of aid to the National Government recognizable as designed primarily for military purposes instead of for the obvious general good of the Chinese nation, would probably call forth strong criticism from important sections of the Chinese population on the grounds that the United States was acting in China to further its own interests without reference to the will of the Chinese people; and 3) that both embarrassments could possibly be avoided by a more indirect approach to the problem at hand. Noting that the Netherlands Government has accepted the American offer of mediation in Indonesia after the initial reference of the matter to the United Nations, it is suggested that reference of the Chinese imbroglio to the United Nations might well be expected to elicit revealing reactions in certain quarters, that consultation with interested friendly nations might result in our getting helpful advice or helpful action instead of our being made a new target for criticism, that the establishment for instance of a UN commission of inquiry to investigate charges of “international interference” might prove to have certain objective value to the United States, that such prior reference to the United Nations would not only probably not hinder but might actually facilitate American action in Asia directed toward the over-all objective—the checking of the spread of totalitarianism in Asia. Reference of China’s economic and social problems to more than Nationalist Government self-interest would assuredly make more cogent such recommendations as might be presented to that Government regarding reforms—for the recommendations would represent the joint objective opinion of the United Nations, and would not leave latitude for the charge that the United States was concerned primarily with its own needs rather than the common good. Any extension of the “Marshall plan” to Asia would be most effective if it followed the general pattern laid down for Europe, that is, if it were related to concrete basic reforms in China in respect to which the Nationalist Government engaged itself to perform the major effort, rather than where it might be proposed essentially to meet the Nationalist Government’s demands for assistance along purely military lines in combatting the revolutionaries. It is submitted that the main support for this argument is found in the near certitude that revolutionary processes in China cannot be stopped by military action alone, that American assistance along such lines would probably ultimately fail of its objectives, and that such failure would leave the United States in a worse moral and political position than if it had given of its aid only to the extent that the aid was either approved by international authority or acceptable to the main groups in the Chinese population itself.

It is not believed that the calling for international guaranties for the status quo, or the status quo ante August 1945, in Manchuria, would be attended by success; both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets probably feel that the revolution is too close to victory in that area to make bargaining along those lines worth their while. The Soviets would not and could not admit that they had any connection with the Chinese Communist movement which would enable them to guide Chinese Communist policy, and the Chinese Communists themselves would feel that the United States was simply endeavoring to save something from the burning for the Nationalist Government. It would seem possible, however, that the enlistment of the authority of the United Nations, even if it were simply put behind the United States, if related to an offer to assist China in those economic fields where reforms had been achieved, work was being done, and prospects of effective use of American funds and materials seemed good, might lead to the development of new possibilities for American mediation in China. Such mediation would, it is thought, necessarily have to start from the premise that the Communists are faced with important political and economic problems and desire at least a long period of truce, that they no more than the Nationalist Government or semi-independent old-time warlords will ever give up their armies unless defeated in the field, that the best that the mediation could achieve would be something in the nature of freezing the politico-military situation in something approximate to the status quo, that such freezing would 1) relieve the present strains on the Chinese people with a commensurate reduction of their now mounting miseries, 2) offer opportunities for some measures of economic rehabilitation which would in turn contribute stabilizing elements to the political situation, and 3) give time for the evolution of further measures of political action (a) by the National Government, for the purpose of counter-acting the Chinese Communist program through its own measures of economic and social reform, and (b) by the United States, especially in the international field. It is submitted that time thus gained in China particularly and in the world generally might turn out to be one of the most valuable elements in the postulated American or UN accomplishment of stopping the current civil war in China. It is of course to be noted that, if the National Government particularly failed to make good use of the time thus gained, it would in the end be as badly off, if not worse off, than before; but that the United States would stand to gain if only there could be achieved that temporary stabilization of the situation which would give more time and latitude for implementation of American policies.

O. Edmund Clubb

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the Consul General at Peiping (Clubb)

Peiping, August 3, 1947.

Soviet Policies, Attitudes and Actions in Respect to Manchuria

The current trend of Nationalist publicity purports that Communism in China is an international problem, not a Chinese domestic problem. The full purport of this contention is that the Soviets are supporting the Chinese Communist drive against the Nationalist position in China.

[Here follows discussion of subject.]

It must nevertheless be assumed that in its broader aspects Chinese Communist policy will be in general accord with the “Communist line” as evolved in Moscow. This does not mean that Soviet material assistance can be established by “concrete evidence” at this stage. As is well known, the Kwantung Army on V–J Day had in its possession large stocks of military supplies in Manchuria. That many of those arms have found their way into the hands of the Communists is established. That there may have been Soviet connivance is entirely possible, even probable. That there is an important trade now carried on between north Manchuria and the Soviet Union, with exchange on barter basis of Manchurian goods such as grains and furs for Soviet goods, is a matter of agreement in reports coming from north Manchuria. That the Soviets under certain circumstances would extend direct, as well as indirect, assistance to the Chinese Communists, in the form of Soviet arms or Russian advisors, is to be anticipated on the basis of past performance. That direct material assistance has already been given is to be considered a possibility, but it must be admitted still unproven—and Soviet wariness would naturally make proof difficult. With the situation in Manchuria to be termed essentially revolutionary, and with the Communists in possession of both the aforesaid Japanese stocks of arms and a large Chinese population to draw upon for manpower, it would hardly be necessary for the Soviets to come forward and follow such a line of action in support of the Chinese Communists as might bring them important embarrassments in the international field. In short, the Communists at present lack neither munitions nor manpower in Manchuria, and as far as technical skills are concerned have been enabled to make use of certain Japanese technical workers. Should they wish also for either Party or political reasons to attach certain Soviet advisors to their organization, they would be enabled to find Soviet citizens of Chinese or Mongol race with extensive Party and Soviet Red Army training for such employment. In such case there would be relatively little chance offered to the world for detection of the true citizenship of those experts and advisors.

In sum, the aims of the Soviet Government in respect to Manchuria are readily deducible on the basis of history and present perform ance in eastern Europe. The manner of implementation of the Soviet program would probably be one in which Soviet complicity would be very difficult to establish in a court of law, for the Communists who are themselves Chinese will evidently be expected to do the bulk of the work. The significance of attainment of Chinese Communist aims in Manchuria, that is, of the complete conquest of Manchuria by Communism, is clear: the last missing segment in the Soviet “cordon sanitaire” of sympathetic political groupings about its Asiatic frontiers will have been fitted into place; the existing Soviet positions in Korea and the Mongolian People’s Republic would have been substantially strengthened; the bringing of the remaining Korean and Mongol ethnic groups into the Soviet fold by the indirect method of bringing about the adherence of their homelands to Soviet-controlled politics would have been facilitated; and, finally, the Nationalist position in North China would be confronted with an enhanced threat from the Chinese Communists in their powerful new position. Assuming that the Nationalist Government took no political measures adequate to strengthen its authority in China Proper, it must be considered that the Nationalist position would still be ultimately untenable after that hypothetical withdrawal to shortened lines in North China: the Communist organization is politically even stronger, being of longer standing, in North China than in Manchuria. The achievement of withdrawal intact of Nationalist forces from Manchuria prior to military collapse in that area, would temporarily strengthen the Nationalist position in North China—but it would seem likewise to lead ultimately to the long-anticipated breakup of China. That breakup would be the initial result of the first major Communist victory, instead of the prompt establishment of Communist rule over all of China, would seem probable in view of the loyalties and military forces commanded by various leaders now in the Kuomintang camp. This circumstance makes it practically impossible for the Communists, ill-equipped as they are in terms of administrators and technicians, to extend in short order their political authority over the whole of China in a manner to bring about social stabilization. That there would be a tendency for Communist control to grow in a China broken up into a number of parts controlled severally by semi-independent warlords is hardly to be gainsaid. That Communist practice would in the meantime undergo certain changes seems likewise hardly open to doubt, but it must be noted that Communist practices, under desperate economic conditions, might in strict logic as readily take on a more radical, rather than less radical form, as compared with the days when they practiced most of their doctrine in the largely self-sufficient agricultural countryside.

In sum, the Communist conquest of Manchuria would seem to herald the beginning of the end of Kuomintang rule, and the introduction of a new stage in Chinese revolutionary history. Unless the National Government embarks upon such measures of radical political reform as would counteract the Communist program and effect a commensurate strengthening of the Nationalist hold on the loyalties of the Chinese people (and particularly on the people of Manchuria), and unless in the immediate future the military position of the Nationalists in Manchuria is strengthened by the dispatch of a large number of reinforcements, it is to be anticipated that, as shown by the developments of the past year when the Nationalists became weaker in Manchuria and the Communists continued to grow in strength, the Communists will achieve their ultimate aim of establishing their power over all of that strategic area. Whether or not the National Government will embark upon major political reforms depends upon the influences which can be brought to bear by other non-Kuomintang and non-Communist political groups in China. Whether the National Government can afford to reinforce Manchuria with troops which may now be in the line or on guard inside the Wall is problematical. That there exists in China a revolutionary situation which can be met effectively only by political and military means of fundamental nature, designed to go to the roots of maladjustments which have troubled China since the Revolution of 1911, is however apparently beyond controversy.

O. Edmund Clubb

[Enclosure 4]

Memorandum by the Assistant Military Attaché in China (Barrett)

Peiping, 6 [3?] August 1947.

1. On 3 August, 1947 undersigned commented on the military situation in Manchuria and North China to General Wedemeyer and the members of his mission. General Wedemeyer requested me to present in writing what I considered the essential points in my comments.

[Here follows survey of military developments in Shantung, Hopei, and Manchuria.]

To sum up the general situation in North China and Manchuria, it appears that the situation of the Government in the Northeast is desperate, in Hopei about a stalemate with the initiative in the hands of the Communists, and in Shantung in a fluid state which may or may not turn out fairly well for the Government.

4. What to do, what to do?

From a purely tactical viewpoint, the position of the Government in Manchuria is probably, and in North China possibly, untenable, and it seems that a withdrawal to south of the Yellow River would be the wisest move. But tactically unsound as an attempt to hold in Manchuria may appear, I believe it should be made at all costs.

The reasons why Manchuria and North China should not be given up to the Communists and the Soviet Union are numerous, and mostly so obvious that they need not be recapitulated here. Outside of the fact, however, that this is the move which the Soviet Union surely hopes most ardently will be made, there are two other very strong reasons for not throwing in the towel in Manchuria. First of all, such a move would deliver a body blow to Chinese morale. Second, it would open a vast new frontier which would attract a great part of the best elements in China, namely those who would have the courage and initiative to seek an opportunity to grow up in a new country, certainly not a paradise, but at least a country where there would be jobs for the skilled, the energetic, and the resourceful.

In a desperate situation, it is always better to do anything sensible than do nothing. In my opinion, there are still shots left in the Government lockers, some of which are listed below. All of these, as far as I can see, China cannot or will not undertake on her own initiative, but aid or pressure from the United States might make a great difference. In other words, you can not make an omelette without breaking some eggs.

To my mind, if the National Government can only maintain her toe-hold in Manchuria and thus deny freedom of action in this area to the Communists and the Soviet Union, the situation in North China can never deteriorate to the point where it can seriously threaten the stability of the country as a whole. It appears to me that the following measures should be taken before abandoning the Northeast to the Communists:

a. Appoint a competent Commander-in-Chief of Government forces in Manchuria. I would suggest Lieutenant General Fan Han-chieh, former Chief of Staff to General Hu Tsung-nan; General Fu Tso-yi, or even Lieut. General Sun Li-jen. I certainly do not think Pai Chung-hsi is the man for the job. In 1944 he was given command in Kwangsi to stop the Japanese advance south from Hankow and he failed miserably. His failure was due almost altogether to causes beyond his control, but he demonstrated no qualities of leadership.

b. Rush ammunition, arms, and equipment to Government forces in Manchuria.

c. Reinforce Government forces in Manchuria. China’s manpower has not been touched, but a rotten system of conscription is permitting a great proportion of eligible youths to escape military service. A tightening of conscription methods would not immediately provide trained personnel, but even untrained replacements would help. It is probable that a large proportion of Communist conscripts receive little training before seeing action. Furthermore, it is believed that a careful and accurate survey of forces presently available to the Government would produce reinforcements which could be sent to Manchuria without weakening any active front. As a suggestion, it might be possible to send reinforcements from Szechuan, China south of the Yangtze and the Northwest.

d. Get the Chinese air force on the job. This would involve getting rid of Chou Chi-jou and obtaining planes and parts from the United States, neither of which are impossibilities.

e. Take steps to enlist the support of the people of the Northeast behind the National Government by:

(1) Removing Hsiung Shih-hui.⁸⁸

(2) Relaxing the present economic stranglehold of the Government, or of companies and individuals with Government backing, on the Northeast.

(3) Giving the people of the Northeast a chance to govern themselves by replacing carpetbag officials with native sons. Specifically, I would make Mr. Wang Hwa-yi Governor of Liaoning Province.

(4) Organizing a people’s militia in the Northeast. A start in this direction has already been made by the Northeast People’s Mobilization Committee.

(5) And, most bitter for the Generalissimo to take, by appointing Chang Hsueh-liang⁸⁹ as head, even though only a nominal one, of civil administration in Manchuria, with other old Northeast leaders, such as Ma Chan-shan, Tsou Tso-hua, and Chang Tso-hsiang, in showy but not necessarily responsible positions. I hold Chang Hsueh-liang in low esteem, but I would like to see him used as suggested because I believe the people of the Northeast ardently desire him back in high place.

One reason for the Communist success in the Northeast is that they are able to make use of the people, whether with or without their consent makes little difference. On the other hand, if the National Government has left any stone unturned to drive the people of the Northeast into the arms of the Communists, I do not know what it is.

5. Time is against us.

Even if all the things suggested above were done, it may be too late. Even so, I think these measures, backed in a realistic and hardboiled manner by the United States, might yet save the day. I believe the Chinese, if they thought there was some hope, would be capable of a back-to-the-wall stand which might stem the red tide in the Northeast till help from inside or outside China could arrive.

6. If we can’t save Manchuria and North China let’s get out of the rest of it.

In my opinion, a feeble, emasculated, mendicant China, shorn of the area from the Amur to the Yellow River, would be worth nothing to the United States, either as a sphere of economic activity or as a buffer against Soviet domination of all Asia. From such a China I would pull out most U. S. Government agencies except normal consular and diplomatic representatives and as many intelligence agents as I could muster, using the latter for the purpose of observing as closely as possible the Roman holiday which the Soviet Union would enjoy in an area for the preservation of which to China many thousands of Americans have given their lives.

David D. Barrett

Colonel, GSC

83. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul at Peiping without covering despatch; received September 23.
84. Not printed.
85. Mr. Clubb’s two memoranda, dated August 3, on “Relationship of Japanese, and particularly Japanese holdout troops, to Chinese Communist actions in Manchuria” and “Relationship of Koreans and Mongols to Communist movement in Manchuria” not printed.
86. Col. David D. Barrett, Assistant Military Attaché in China.
87. Ante, p. 218.
88. Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters in Manchuria.
89. Head of the Manchurian administration and armed forces until the Japanese occupation of 1931–32; detained since the Sian incident of December 1936, for kidnapping Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.