761.93/8–447
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in China (Ludden)78
The Embassy has been requested by the Mission to present a summary of the relationship between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Communists. The question of this relationship has been the subject of a considerable volume of reporting from this Embassy over a period of years and has latterly become a major factor in any estimate of the situation in China.
There has never been substantive proof put forth, even by the Central Government which stands to gain the most thereby, that the Chinese Communist Party enjoys the active support of the Soviet Union. Such proof, however, is unimportant. What is important is that the affinity between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union should not be misunderstood and underestimated.
Revulsion at the manifest corruption and ineptitude of the Kuomintang leads many foreign observers and many Chinese liberals and intellectuals to view sympathetically anything which is non-Kuomintang. The result is they tend to regard the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers and to lose sight of the fact that the Communists are not agrarian reformers per se, but play that role because it is required by the environment in which they find themselves and is merely a tactical phase in the overall strategy of the eventual realization of a Communistic state.
Liberal apologists of the “agrarian reform” school of thought too often fail to point out that top Communist leaders themselves are the first frankly to admit that in ideology and aim they are Marxist Communists, but that existing social and economic conditions in China make the early achievement of their end impossible and therefore it is necessary to adopt such interim measures, even of democratic and capitalistic coloration, which may be necessary for the achievement of the end, however long the period.
Time after time Communist leaders have been advised by well-meaning foreign visitors to change the name of their party to something better calculated to win foreign sympathy. The Communists have rejected this advice for the simple reason that they are, after all, Communists and see no cause to be ashamed of it. The fact remains, whether palatable or not, that the Chinese Communist Party is a highly organized group of purposeful, disciplined, revolutionary [Page 694] zealots unswervingly dedicated to the eventual realization of communism in China by whatever means may at the moment offer the best prospect for furthering that end.
From time to time reports are received, usually Central Government inspired, to the effect this or that important Chinese Communist leader has been called to Moscow for consultation. In principle, the Embassy tends to be skeptical of such reports. The Kremlin is far more skittish regarding open relations with the Chinese and other Far Eastern Communist parties than with regard to those in Europe. Apparently there is still a desire on the part of the Soviet Union to preserve the fiction of a “correct” attitude toward Chinese internal affairs. If necessary, contact between the Kremlin and Chinese Communist leaders could be maintained through intermediaries unknown to the outside world but it seems to the Embassy that such direct contact or liaison between Moscow and the Chinese Communists is unnecessary.
The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin79 and firmly convinced that these doctrines are correct and will ultimately prevail not only in China but throughout the world. These doctrines have been predigested and adapted for the special problems of the Communist revolution in China. There is no need to seek instructions from the Kremlin.
There has always been a predilection in Chinese Communist Party public statements and the Party press toward following closely the Soviet party line. Formerly the similarity was confined to broad ideological generalizations. Since early 1946, however, following a Yenan statement of policy with regard to Manchuria, the Chinese Communist general tendency to follow a Soviet line has become more clearly a matter of firm policy. Foreign correspondents and other observers are still searching—but thus far without success—for a Chinese Communist who is in any state other than one of complete agreement with all Soviet actions.
The most important recent manifestation of the existing affinity between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union was a lengthy statement issued by Lu Ting-yi, head of the Chinese Communist Party Department of Information in January of this year.80 The statement was entitled “Explanation of Several Basic Questions Concerning the Post-War International Situation” and is the most outspoken statement of loyalty and adherence to Soviet doctrine yet made by the [Page 695] Chinese Communists. At great length the statement proclaims the Tightness and infallibility of Soviet words and actions.
As long therefore as Chinese Communist leaders are wedded to classical Communist concepts emanating from and interpreted by the Kremlin they must be considered to be an arm of Soviet foreign policy. In 1944 in the face of external Japanese pressure and the non-participation of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern War an effort was made to test the theory that the Chinese Communists could be weaned from any potential tie-up with the Soviet Union. The test was inconclusive because of the objections of the Central Government. It was always apparent, however, at Yenan and in Communist forward areas that top Communist leaders were firmly Marxist Communist and however unpalatable the term “communist” might be to Americans, no ideological deviations could be expected other than those which were tactically necessary to meet the immediate requirements of a given situation. There has been no change in this attitude except that it has been strengthened.
There has been much speculation with regard to the possibility of a split within the Chinese Communist Party. Much of this speculation can be classified as wishful thinking, but the possibility cannot be ignored completely. Reports with regard to the development of a line of cleavage between a Nationalist Group and a pro-Russian Group within the Chinese Communist Party crop up from time to time, but available information tends to show that such a split is most improbable.
There has undoubtedly been considerable divergence of opinion within the inner circles of the Chinese Communist Party with regard to policy. Such differences, largely on tactical procedures, may be expected to continue, but it is characteristic of Communist Party discipline, not alone in China, that once policy decisions are reached there is presented to non-believers a solid party front.
There is some reason to believe that in Manchuria actual Chinese experience with the Russians and the heterogeneous elements drawn into the Communist ranks there since V–J Day may bring about dissidence within the Party. On the theory, however, that nothing succeeds like success, even in Manchuria a split in the Party at this time seems a remote possibility.
It may be expected therefore that both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists will continue to disclaim all connection of one with the other. In the long run it is ideological affinity between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union which offers the greatest danger by making one the agent of the other.
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his despatch No. 915, August 4; received August 15. The despatch stated that this “oral presentation” was made to Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer on July 31.↩
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.↩
- See United States Relations With China, p. 699.↩