Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00 Sinkiang/11–2847

The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State

No. 53

Tihwa, November 28, 1947.
[Received August 23, 1948.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to Tihwa’s despatch to the Department No. 31 of August 27, 1947 on the subject: “Implementation of the Military Terms of the Ili Agreement”⁵⁴ and to make the following report of the present status of implementation of the political terms.

A translation of the Chinese text of the agreement was transmitted to the Department under cover of Tihwa’s despatch No. 19 of June 24, 1947, entitled “Translation of the Agreement for the Settlement of the Ili Revolt”.⁵⁴

Copies of this office’s telegrams to the Embassy at Nanking pertinent to the subject, are enclosed.⁵⁵

There is, as will be shown, little question that the Chinese authorities have carried out fully to the letter and, to surprising degree, in spirit as well, all the formal pledges given in the political terms, but the Ili faction is still not content.

The following possibilities, to explain the continued dissatisfaction of the Ili dissidents with the Chinese Government’s actions to conciliate the native opinion, seem to cover the ground:

(a) The continued failure of the Ili group to accept the Chinese actions at face value is due entirely to the latter’s persistence in its time-honored policy toward non-Chinese “minorities. This policy is one of cultural imperialism, disguised in many forms, now waxing as opportunity permits, now weaning as resistance strengthens, but never altogether abandoned, or possible to abandon, so long as Chinese culture remains convinced that it is the best for all mankind.

(b) The refusal of the Ili group to cease their obduracy springs wholly from Soviet instigation. It would vanish immediately were the support of the U. S. S. R. in arms (either by sale or gift) and advice (so extended as almost to imply control, in all but name, of the government of the dissident zones) withdrawn. This assistance has been given due to the Russian desire to take over, as soon as possible, full sovereignty of these zones with a view to the eventual absorption of the rest of Sinkiang and its incorporation in the Soviet Union under the name of “East Turkestan”.

(c) The cultural intolerance of the Chinese and their feeling of innate superiority to the natives has played into the hands of Soviet agents operating in the three zones. It is assisting them to strengthen their influence, amounting in fact to effective control of this area, but there is little present probability of their taking the overt step of assuming political sovereignty over any part of the Province until Russian world polity calls for a forward movement. This advance would undoubtedly be regarded with disfavor in international circles and might be expected to lead to complications in Russian relations with other powers, since it would be hard to disguise it as other than unprovoked aggression on China. Despite the case that could be made out for Chinese past misgovernment here, General Chang Chihchung has said that open Soviet assistance to the Ili group would imply war on China. Though this risk may later appear justified to the Kremlin, it is felt that there is little likelihood of such a step being taken before the end of the summer of 1948. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the natural avenues of commerce are between Sinkiang and Russia rather than China, though the Tsar did have political sovereignty over the area of the present dissident zones for a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, Russia has never taken over open political control of any part of Sinkiang east of the Manass River.

The presumed reasons for the former relinquishment of Russian control over the cis-Manass territory probably still govern now, i. e. the difficulty and expense involved in maintaining order in the area where mineral and agricultural resources exist, with the addition that, though the mineral resources are now understood to be more important than was formerly believed, there is less necessity to exert actual sovereignty in order to continue their exploitation. All that is needed is to prevent the patrolling of the border by Chinese National Government troops and to keep the local authorities of the area well disposed toward Russia. Both of these objectives seem to be gained by merely preventing a complete settlement between the representatives from Ili and those from Nanking. This the Soviet agents are in a position to do at little cost. It merely requires giving advice to the Ili leaders designed to prevent the implementation of the agreement and selling arms to them. The failure to reach full agreement on the political terms will continue to give excuse for refusal to permit the National troops to take up their stations along the border as provided by the military terms which form part of the same agreement. As this appears to be exactly what the Russians desire and as they seem able to keep the leaders of the three dissident zones compliant to their will in this respect, no early change in the picture is anticipated. The hour when Moscow is willing to risk international disapproval to the extent of an open attack on Chinese territory in order to seize this mostly barren land may not come very soon.

(1)56 As discussed in detail in the enclosed telegrams the Chinese Central Government has undoubtedly permitted and assisted in carrying out the elections called for under Article I of the agreement. Both the Ili group and independent Turki informants claim that the Chinese have, in certain instances, been guilty of coercion or fraud. This appears likely but the Chinese, on their part, make the same charges against their opponents, with apparently equal reason. It seems undeniable that elections have really been held and that where an obvious majority has been firmly in support of one candidate, this feeling was taken into consideration by the local administration. The people already have in their hands a democratic tool for power, faulty though it may be, and if they fail to use it to the full, the primary responsibility should fall on themselves. The significant fact is that these are the first direct popular elections ever held in China and that the Australian secret ballot has not yet been introduced is somewhat compensated for by the absence of ward-heelers. Both may come later.

The Ili group seems to have accepted the elections in principle or they would not have sent delegates at all to the Provincial Consultative Assembly which met in Tihwa. Its disbanding in disorder, they claimed, was for another reason—the appointment of Mesud, a Turki, as Chairman of the Provincial Government.

(2) There is no present evidence of anything that could be called “religious discrimination” by the government in the area. There is no attempt to prevent anyone following his own religious observances as he sees fit, provided no proselytizing is done and others are permitted their own liberty. However, as this article was inserted at Muslim request, it is probably used as the basis for their recurrent charge that Muslim girls, being married by Chinese army personnel, are weakening their religious and cultural habits. The Chinese declare that this is now prohibited and that the prohibitions are being enforced. A few instances of violation might easily have been greatly exaggerated by zealous Mullahs and popular resentment could be fanned to flames by Soviet propaganda.

(3) The recognition of the use of the native language can not be denied. It is in effect and is a great step forward.

(4) The use of the native languages in the schools appears to be working satisfactorily though as yet there are not nearly enough schools, but this situation is gradually being improved. The principle of respect for the non-Chinese tongues is being undeniably observed for the first time at least since the last Chinese conquest of the area.

(5) Presumably the insertion of this article in regard to free development of racial cultures and arts was a result of the feeling of Chinese cultural intolerance. If so, the natives can take satisfaction from the success of the musical and dancing troupe from Sinkiang, now apparently having a successful tour in the coast cities under the sponsorship of the government.

(6) Freedom of publication, assembly and speech, while not yet complete, is greatly improved over anything previously experienced in the province.

(7) Taxation no longer appears a serious ground for popular complaint, particularly in view of the remission of all taxes for 1946.

(8) Trade between Sinkiang and China is now permitted and even encouraged, though blocked absolutely during Sheng’s time. The Chinese Government cannot be blamed for the failure of Moscow to make any reply to its proposed terms for renewal of the Sino-Soviet Trade Pact.

(9) Until the break-up of the Provincial Consultative Assembly over the appointment of Mesud to the chairmanship and the departure of the dissident members the “coalition” Provincial government committee had been functioning perhaps not perfectly, but well enough to weather the serious storm of the February incident. (See Tihwa’s despatch No. 43 of October 28, 1947 on the subject: “Incident of February 25, 1947”.)⁵⁷

(10) This article is exclusively concerned with military dispositions. The recriminatory charges of responsibility for failure to fulfill them have been previously discussed. (See Tihwa’s despatch No. 31, “Implementation of the Military Terms of the Ili Agreement”, dated August 27, 1947.)

(11) There is little reason to believe that either the Chinese or the Ili group now hold any prisoners who can properly be considered covered by this article. However the Chinese have charged that several months after the signing of the agreement, some seven hundred Chinese were murdered by a Turki mob in the Tacheng zone. The Ili group claims, on the other hand, that arrests during the summer of 1947 in Tulufan, Shan-shan, and Kashgar are connected with the Ili Revolt, though the Chinese deny any relation with these events of several years past.

Annex I—The selection of personnel of the Provincial Government Committee and specific appointments to the various positions of responsibility in the government appear to have been governed meticulously by the terms of this annex. In certain instances appointees have never appeared to assume their responsibilities and their absence has greatly handicapped the efficient operation of the government. Some of these absences, such as that of the Chief of the Board of Sanitation, have produced serious gaps. No effective public health program is possible without trained medical personnel in charge and, in this instance, it happens that the Vice Chief is a local (Tungan) Chinese Muslim who has only had limited education as a pharmacist. Chinese Government doctors can hardly be expected to work under his direction so the local hospitals are without medical specialists, except for two women volunteers whose husbands have other positions here. Not even a satisfactory supply of drugs is possible in these circumstances. Those patients not eligible for the attention of the Chinese military hospital can receive treatment only at the Soviet Consular hospital, with resultant credit to the U. S. S. R. It is conceivable that this situation is attractive to the Russian agents and their advice to the Ili group to insist on reservation of the post of Board of Sanitation for them may have had in mind this outcome. Certainly it was clear that the natives have no qualified physician for this post.

A similar case is that of the Chief of the Educational Bureau, an Ili appointee, who has returned to the dissident zones, leaving the responsibility for these important functions in the hands of the Vice Chief, a Chinese, who is making a valiant attempt under adverse conditions.

Accordingly, no charges can reasonably be laid against the Chinese authorities of failure to make a reasonable gesture toward implementation of all the political terms of the agreement and of apparent willingness to discuss any reasonable suggestions made by the Ili group for further compromises.

The Ili group, for its part, appears to have failed to assist in fulfilling the terms in every instance where any concession is required from them, meanwhile seizing on all points that serve their own advantage. They have not permitted government committees to supervise the elections in the zones under their control. They have blocked traffic in much needed food supplies across the Manass River, though continuing to carry on barter trade across the Soviet border. Also they have completely failed to carry out their obligations under the military terms agreed on in Article 10 of the main agreement and Annex II thereanent.

The Ili leaders, despite repeated requests by the Consulate, have failed to cite specific instances of Chinese noncompliance with the political terms. It is plausible, therefore, that the principal reason for the reluctance of the dissidents to proceed with any of the concessions promised is that the Kremlin’s agents refuse consent lest peace and popular satisfaction should disturb Soviet propaganda against the Chinese Government, It is difficult to see what the Chinese Government could do that it has not already attempted in order to alleviate the conditions of the people. Even granted that there may be full basis in fact for all charges of corruption and oppression by Chinese military and civilian officials which have been brought to the attention of the Consulate, as well as the common cultural intolerance of the Chinese for any way of life other than that of the Hans and their still rumored plans to Sinicize all the Muslims of Sinkiang, the Chinese Government has obviously made a far greater attempt to live up to its obligation under even the political terms of the Ili agreement than have the dissidents. The three zones appear to have fulfilled almost none of their commitments, either military (which they have flouted) or political (which they have ignored insofar as any occasion for action on their side arose).

The Administrative Program is being analyzed in a separate despatch.⁵⁸

Respectfully yours,

J. Hall Paxton

54. Not printed.
54. Not printed.
55. Not printed as enclosures to this despatch. Many of these telegrams, however, are quoted or summarized in telegrams from the Embassy in China printed in this section.
56. Marginal notation states that numbers in parentheses refer to articles of the June 6, 1946 agreement.
57. Not printed.
58. No. 54, December 12, not printed.