893.00 Sinkiang/11–1047
The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 23, 1948.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Consulate’s despatch No. 45 of November 6, 1947 entitled “Visits to Ili and Tahcheng Zones”46 and other despatches in the enclosed list47 and to enclose copies of Tihwa’s telegrams to the Embassy48 giving reports of recent Soviet irregularities and interference in Sinkiang and to give a brief analysis of the policies that may be directing the program of the U. S. S. R. in this area.
It is a well-known tendency of the Chinese to blame most of the ills that curse their country on foreign machinations. To admit that they themselves are at fault is psychologically impossible in their ethos because it would involve a “loss of face” from which no escape is provided. Their system lacks the solution for this sort of moral problem, developed by Christianity in the west, which allows that “repentance” can be followed by “forgiveness”. However, in our apportionment of blame for the present chaos in Sinkiang, the Chinese in this area do not appear alone guilty nor are those they accuse entirely innocent. It seems increasingly clear that considerable responsibility for existing conditions must be borne by agents of the Soviet Union.
As will be noted from the telegrams enclosed, though much unverified evidence has been cited from Chinese sources, whenever possible it has been confirmed by personal observation or from “White Russian”, or other non-Chinese reports.
This documentation indicates to my personal satisfaction that Soviet agents have given “aid and comfort” to dissident elements in the province in armed revolt against the Chinese Government’s control.
They provided matériel and military advice (either gratis or more probably for payment) for the Ili revolt. The strategy of this revolt, it seems well established, was Soviet-inspired. The date of its commencement in 1944 was November 7, the anniversary of the October revolution. The date of the truce negotiations, moreover, was also apparently timed to suit Russian purposes. It was just when the [Page 576] Provincial Capital was the rebel army’s for the taking but before such an outright threat to the National sovereignty, as the capture of the city would have been, was answered by a full-scale attack by the Chinese Army that it suited Moscow’s current plans to end hostilities.
Parenthetically, Russia seems to have been involved also in the Sarikol “revolt” in August 1945, of which I have learned from Mr. Shipton, British Consul General at Kashgar, though little attention appears to have been paid to it by this Consulate at the time. According to his account, the Sarikol range in Nanchiang, not far from Kashgar, was occupied by a force of alleged tribesmen coming over the Sino-Russian border. Advancing from this base they laid siege for some weeks to Yarkand in early 1946. They were finally driven back over the border by August of that year. Other information implying Russian complicity in the Sarikol revolt was received from the Sinkiang Garrison Commander, Lt. General Sung. He had earlier stated that detailed Russian staff maps of Nanchiang were found on the bodies of uniformed Red Army officers killed in this area. If these accounts are correct, it would seem that this uprising failed because insufficient propaganda preparations had been made in advance of the invasion and the expected support of the people largely did not materialize. The Chinese troops, accordingly, were able in the end to settle the matter without need for any truce arrangements by the Soviet authorities.
Besides participation in open armed revolts it is common knowledge that Russian agents have been active in keeping the natives in a turmoil of opposition to their Chinese-appointed governors. This work is greatly assisted by the instability of the Turki population and the frustrated ambitions of their leaders as well as by the ineptitude of the Chinese as colonizers and their egregious blunder in sending corrupt and unimaginative satraps to represent them in outlying portions of the province. These subordinates antagonize the local people by abusing power to their own advantage at the expense of both the natives and their own national interests.
In addition to the simple task of stirring up dissensions to weaken Chinese control over its northwest province, there is evidence that considerable Soviet propaganda has been used to incline the predominantly Turki population toward the political ideology of the U. S. S. R., though here Communist economy is less stressed than in areas where conditions are more favorable to its development.
Another method of strengthening Soviet influence has been the Russian program of procuring additional nationals. Reports have been received that pressure has been applied in many cases and there is usually no requirement that the new citizens renounce their existing [Page 577] allegiance. This creates a great deal of confusion since many inhabitants carry Chinese papers as well as Soviet passports, which they can use at choice as seems most advantageous at the moment. There is little reason to doubt that most of these citizens could be persuaded to cast their votes in favor of the Soviet Union if a plebiscite were held.
Opposition from “unreconstructed White Russian” refugees from the Communist State has not been permitted. Soviet officials resent their presence in this area and have been particularly flagrant in their attempts to convert them to the true faith or failing that, at least to prevent their escape into China proper beyond the borders of this province, where they could make reports of existing conditions here.
The purpose of Soviet Russia in interfering in Sinkiang affairs and assisting in armed revolts, it has been said, is that she has stood to gain sovereignty over the entire province or at least its pro-Soviet orientation. If this were true the Ili insurrectionists might temporarily have maintained a precarious independence under tacit protection of their Westerly Neighbor and the Russians would hardly have prevented the native armies from pursuing their Chinese oppressors, then in rout, to the very borders of the province. In opposition to this conjecture, however, is the fact that the truce negotiations unquestionably began at the initiative of the Consulate General of the U. S. S. R. in Tihwa.
Russia seemed disinclined to take early sovereignty over Sinkiang, even at the time of Sheng Shih-tsai, according to information I have recently received from my British colleague at Kashgar, which he had earlier collected from certain German missionaries who escaped during Sheng’s ascendency. They claimed to have knowledge of plans for a plebiscite to have been held in 1946 had the Tupan remained in power. This would have been a development of Sheng’s plan, allegedly discussed during his visit to Moscow, for him to continue for his lifetime in supreme control of Sinkiang as a province of the Soviet Union. If such a plebiscite had been held it would have been a simple matter for Sheng to arrange its “satisfactory” outcome and the USSR would thus, in due course, have been able to acquire the area under a guise of legality.
That Russia may not now want full political control over Sinkiang was further suggested by information received by Mr. Robertson, a leftish sympathizer of Australian nationality, who has visited Kashgar. He stated that the Soviet Consul General there, one evening in an expansive mood being somewhat “fatigued” with wine, told him that the U. S. S. R. could have, at any time in recent years, taken all Sinkiang into the fold but did not consider it “worth the trouble”.
[Page 578]Russian present reluctance to advance in Sinkiang may be due to the fact that they are not yet ready to take overt steps to arouse the ire of the Chinese Central Government or world opinion and they will probably not act now unless they can find a suitable stooge to hand over the territory to them without their having to seize it.
Little evidence is apparent that Russia has ever considered the whole of Sinkiang a desirable possession. Although Imperial Russia did in fact occupy the Ili Valley for a period in the mid-nineteenth century, there is no record known of its ever having exercised full political suzerainty over the area to the east of the Manass River—though the Soviet will was completely unopposed by Sheng during his pro-Russian period. Despite the undeniable economic connection of the entire area and its geographically easy trade communications (though officially blocked, at present, by Moscow’s refusal to renew the trade pact with Nanking) political connections have generally followed the long and arduous desert route eastward to China.
Perhaps due to the fact that the U. S. S. R. is able to draw out of the three Zones all the advantages that might accrue from assuring the outright pro-Soviet alignment of the remainder of the province, it may not consider the assumption of responsibility for the whole province now desirable. These advantages presumably consist of trade (even though the border is officially sealed, barter undoubtedly continues), exploitation of natural resources (such as known workings of petroleum wells, alleged wolfram mines and conjectured uranium deposits), and establishment of a buffer-state friendly to the Soviet Union, in order to absorb the first shock of an attack against the latter or to mount one against Chinese territory.
At the same time Russia seems unwilling to consent to the exertion of actual Chinese control over any part of the three dissident zones. This was shown in the recent recapture by the Ili group of Ashan Zone from the Kazaks under the anti-Soviet Osman who had made a quick raid in the summer of this year and taken almost all the towns.
The withdrawal of the Ili group representatives from further negotiations at Tihwa was reported to the Chinese authorities through the Soviet Consul General here and, therefore, obviously had his approval. As a result of this cessation of negotiations in regard to the implementation of the terms of the Ili Agreement it remains impossible for Chinese troops to patrol the Soviet borders; it is consequently doubtful whether implementation of this step was ever planned by the Russian authorities. Perhaps they permitted the Ili group to agree merely because of Chinese insistence on the point (which was only natural) and because the Soviet advisors already had in contemplation the effective methods to burke it that they have now adopted.
[Page 579]It, accordingly, appears that the U. S. S. R., after Sheng’s defection, followed by his overthrow, has had no immediate plan to take political suzerainty, either openly or through native puppets, over any of the trans-Manass River region. My conjecture is that, so long as Chinese troops are not patrolling the border, no direct move to expand the part of Sinkiang now under effective control by the Soviet Union is at present planned by their local representatives. This picture could be changed overnight, however, if the Kremlin world policy called for an advance in this area, when it considered that the price of world repercussions would be worth the prize of the rest of Sinkiang.
Respectfully yours,