Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East: China, Volume VII
893.00/4–2147
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram no. 689 of March 29, 1947,26 which stated that President Chiang had expressed interest in Ambassador Stuart’s proffer of background information [Page 451] concerning the situation in Taiwan. A memorandum which recapitulated the events beginning in Taiwan on February 28 and which supplied suggestions for a possible amelioration of the situation there was prepared by Vice Consul George H. Kerr, who has been on consultation at the Embassy, in conjunction with the Political Section of the Embassy.
The English and Chinese texts of this memorandum, copies of which are enclosed for the Department’s information, were handed to the Generalissimo by Ambassador Stuart on April 18. The Ambassador submitted the memorandum without comment and the Generalissimo indicated that he would personally read the Chinese text.
Respectfully yours,
Minister-Counselor of Embassy
Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Taipei (Kerr)
Memorandum for the Ambassador on the Situation in Taiwan
background
[Here follows review of developments.]
aftermath and settlement
Public opinion, Nationalism and Communism
However bitter their criticism of local administrative policy before these uprisings, there can be no question that the Formosan-Chinese have felt loyalty to the Central Government and toward the Generalissimo. Fifty years under Japanese rule had sharpened their sense of Chinese nationality and race and in doing so developed a strong sense of island-wide social unity. Formosans have been ambitious to see Taiwan become a model province of China. From February 28 until March 9, while Formosans were in effective control of the island, the leaders in the Settlement Committee, leaders of the Youth Groups and editors of newspapers which have been most critical of the local government all took great pains to emphasize their fundamental desire to become a model province in China, proud of their race and nationality and proud to be taking part in the National Reconstruction.
(For specific reference, see editorials and speeches quoted in the Chung Wai Jih Pao, March 6; Min Pao, March 6; Hsin Sheng Poo, March 5; and other journals of that week.)
Reference has been made earlier to the intense distrust and fear [Page 452] of communism which was fostered intensively by the Japanese. There are a few Formosans who have been suspected of interest in overseas communism but they have always been counted of little importance. Of direct external influence a few communist pamphlets of mainland origin were found in the autumn of 1946 but they were not especially designed for Taiwan. So long as the living standard remained at a relatively high level there was little danger of communist doctrine finding a reception on Formosa. A large number of Formosans who had been conscripted into Japanese army labor battalions were repatriated from Hainan Island in conditions of extreme poverty in 1946. They had not been treated as “liberated Chinese” but as defeated enemies after the surrender. Failure to find employment on Formosa in the months since has undoubtedly increased their discontent and made them susceptible to the arguments of any confirmed communists who may have come back with them.
It may therefore be said with a high degree of assurance that as of March 1, 1947, communism in any form was of most negligible importance on Taiwan.
However, a local form of communism is not only possible but is believed to be a highly probable development if economic organization collapses under the pressure of continued military occupation.
The military commitment and possible economic consequences
If the Central Government chooses to support a policy of suppression of all criticism of the government and to confirm the authority of present officials by establishment of military garrisons throughout the island, the cost will be very high and will not diminish. Firm control will necessitate the maintenance of troops at all large cities, at all important rail and highway junctions and in the vicinity of the power plants upon which the normal economy depends. The ports and harbors must be garrisoned. Almost 14,000 square miles will have to be policed by military force.
It was not possible before March 17 to assess the truth of some Formosan claims that large supplies of arms had been seized in the central part of the island and transported into hiding. The opportunity presented itself and was probably taken.
It is presumed that the Formosans, if oppression continues, will not attempt a resistance from fixed positions, but will continue to harry Government troops, creating a continuous drain upon men and supplies, and will use the mountainous hinterlands as cover. Perhaps no single province in China involved so little military expenditure as that needed for Formosa before March 1, 1947. It may now well become one of the most costly, if the economic losses in production and hampered transportation are added to outright military costs.
[Page 453]It is significant that throughout the trouble the local government has emphasized the fact that the Army represents the Central Government most directly. Thus, when it began to be clear that the word given by the highest ranking military officers was to be broken, Formosans began to lose faith in the Central Government as well.
With industry in such a precarious condition in February 1947, it must be presumed that the dislocations attendant upon the present trouble and a military occupation will hasten the disintegration of the industrial structure of Taiwan. China loses thereby an asset of immeasurable value. This established industrial structure (including the food processing units which make agriculture so profitable) has a substructure of semi-skilled local labor. UNRRA investigations have shown that young Formosans are no longer able to go into industrial schools or apprenticeships as in the past, but enter the common labor market as they see industry after industry shrivel up as capital investments dwindle and small industries close. Unemployment will increase with acceleration of this trend.
The rice crisis in January indicated that in present circumstances Formosa may have no immediate food surpluses upon which to draw. The addition of large numbers of troops, feeding on the countryside, will further diminish available supplies. Rice and other foods will go into hiding. Sabotage and slow-down tactics may be anticipated.
The total losses of a military occupation are incalculable. Prominent Formosan-Chinese—conservative, liberal and extremists—and many young men have been killed or seized or are driven into hiding. The educational development of the island, especially in the technical schools of middle grade, will be greatly retarded at a time when China needs every trained man. Highly qualified mainland doctors and foreign medical personnel predict that the public health system may break down badly within the year, bringing on a larger scale the cholera epidemics which appeared in 1946.
A state of near anarchy is a distinct possibility for Formosa by the end of 1947 if drastic efforts to revise policy and effect governmental reforms (free of military pressure) are not undertaken speedily. Having known a relatively high standard of living under the Japanese regime, the Formosans are not going to lose what they have without a struggle directed against the forces which they hold responsible. If the Central Government meets increasing difficulties compounded of economic and military struggles of the mainland, the Formosans will be tempted to increase their resistance in proportion.
For eighteen months Formosan-Chinese blamed the provincial administration and at the same time assured themselves that if the Generalissimo were made fully aware of conditions he would reform [Page 454] the system in effect on Taiwan. Later it was assumed that the application of the new Constitution would bring to Taiwan the measure of self-government needed to restore the total economy to its former high level of production, to the permanent benefit of China.
There may be a sullen peace achieved by military action, but it cannot be enforced. Further uprisings of far more serious proportions than these recent spontaneous outbursts may occur at a time when the over-all peace settlement in the Far East is underway, and problems are being reviewed for inclusion or exclusion in the conference agenda. Anyone who wishes to embarrass China will find good material in a revolutionary situation on Taiwan.
Formosa should be put to work earning foreign credit for China. Its peculiar character as an industrialized and technically developed province should be sheltered from the greater economic difficulties found on the mainland. Taiwan was returned to China as an outstanding economic asset, an example of the advanced technological economy toward which all other provinces of China are striving. Two years of concentrated rehabilitation effort in Formosa hereafter will produce permanent assets of two kinds. Raw materials and products such as fertilizers, cement, foodstuffs and industrial chemicals will become permanently available to China in increasing amounts. Others such as tea, camphor, sugar, industrial salt, pineapples, and light manufactures can be directed to overseas markets. A moderate share of the foreign credit so created must be returned to Formosa for rehabilitation and expansion of state-owned industries and the expansion of private enterprise. Formosan-Chinese must be admitted to greater participation in all aspects of economic administration and reasonable profit if the island is to prosper and to return to the high and constant level of production achieved in former years. Economic stability and expansion must be founded on a sound political and social administration. Now is the time to act. To encourage and ensure wholehearted effort the Formosan-Chinese must be allowed to take a larger part in government at all levels. Changes in personnel as well as in the structure of the administration must be thoroughgoing; it is felt that halfway measures and palliatives now will only postpone a larger repetition of the current protests against corruption, maladministration and autocracy in the provincial government. Formosa can be restored to its former high level of political allegiance and of economic production by prompt and fundamental reform.
The following developments have been reported as occurring during the end of March and the first part of April:
The continuing presence of fresh bodies in Keelung Harbor and other evidence indicate that the elimination of the informed opposition is continuing. The bodies of at least two men known to neutral [Page 455] sources as having taken no part in any activities during the recent incidents have been identified. It is reported at Taipei that although shots and screams in the night have become less frequent, they continue, and that there is no palpable difference in the tense atmosphere of the city. Mainlanders generally are reported to be apprehensive of further trouble, and many of them are said to feel that Formosan cooperation under present circumstances will be difficult for an indefinite time in the future. Of serious import is the reported continued undermining of Taiwan’s advanced economic structure.