The memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Kerr was prepared at the Embassy’s
request as an analysis of the possible effects of General Pai’s activity in
the light of Mr. Kerr’s knowledge of the Taiwan situation. Mr. Kerr’s
personal observation of the bloody events in Taipei and the subsequent
brutal suppression of representative Taiwan elements perhaps make his
comments appear highly keyed in tone and in certain instances categoric in
content. However, with the continuation of Chen Yi’s regime in power in
Taiwan, there is coming to be less and less middle ground which can be
occupied by coolly impartial opinion.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Taipei
(Kerr) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)
[Nanking,] April 10, 1947.
On March 17 General Pai Chung-hsi, Minister of National Defense arrived
in Formosa for a 10-day (extended to three weeks) investigation of the
uprisings then in progress. He conferred with General
[Page 446]
Chen Yi and his government, granted
interviews, issued public statements and made radio broadcasts, of which
the principal one was in five languages in an effort to “correct” the
world’s misunderstanding of the government’s policy in Taiwan. At
Nanking on April 7 he issued a statement which is believed to reflect
the Government’s official attitude toward the affair, subject to the
Generalissimo’s review of General Pai’s reports.
While in Formosa General Pai appears to have devoted his public efforts
to strengthening General Chen Yi’s position, to have accepted the
Governor’s explanation of the uprising and to have given full support to
the measures taken to quell the disturbances. His radio address to the
aborigines in the mountains, asking them to cooperate in driving out
dissident elements seeking refuge there and his address to the students
of Taiwan (at a University assembly) in which he gave his personal
pledge that none should suffer harm, were among his less fruitful
actions. In general terms he promised reforms in education (to root out
Japanese influences), reorganizations in economic administration (to
relieve unemployment) and changes in the administrative system to permit
Formosan-Chinese to enjoy greater participation in government.
General Pai’s public statements suggest that the Generalissimo had
indicated broad policy toward the affair and had entrusted to him the
task of making recommendations for change; General Pai indicated that he
expected his reform measures would be adopted. His lengthy statement at
Nanking, therefore, must be taken ad interim as a reflection of the
Government’s official attitude toward the situation on Formosa, and may
be summarized as follows:
General Pai believes the Formosan-Chinese have been misled by long
Japanese indoctrination which taught them to villify the Chinese
Government, the people and the troops. Japanese educational influence
will be eradicated. Ambitious local politicians and communists have
plotted and led the uprisings. They are being eliminated. Students,
being impressionable and hasty, followed these local leaders. Under
stricter control they will now be led to understand the traditional
Chinese virtues.
Unemployment is a most serious problem, for which there are various
reasons such as the return of 100,000 able-bodied men from overseas
service as labor conscriptees and the failure of industry to survive
because of the lack of fertilizer for agricultural pursuits.
Formosans should have a larger share in government. The administrative
structure will become that of a regular province, but with certain
additional departments and bureaus and the provision of deputy
department heads, by inference to be filled by Formosans. At
[Page 447]
some time in the near future
Formosans can elect their own mayors and magistrates.
Though the Monopoly and Trading Bureaus have been very profitable for the
Government, it is recognized that their operation has restricted the
activities of private enterprises. The Monopoly Bureau will be reduced
and the Trading Bureau will be replaced by a Supply Bureau.
Public lands (which occupy 70 per cent of the island’s area) will be
opened to private agricultural use.
In order to stamp out corruption entirely, a special supervisory
commission for Formosa within the Control Yuan will be recommended.
General Pai’s recommendations are in themselves believed to be mainly
superficial, and are presented by him with certain serious
misrepresentation of fact.
As an ideological corrective, the measures he proposes hold implications
that all leadership which has dared to criticise the government since
1945 must be wiped out and a new and properly trained leadership of
local people must come into being. The sweeping condemnation of the
Settlement Committee for the February 28 Incident leaves no other
interpretation. General Pai made no public gesture toward limiting the
seizures and executions in progress during his inspection of Taiwan, but
on the contrary indicated his approval.
As a political corrective, the transformation of the Government will
affect the titles and may affect the prerogatives of the Governor, who
remains a Central Government appointee. The enlargement of the
Governor’s administrative staff and the creation of deputy posts which
can be filled by Formosans is superficial; the one Formosan who
heretofore held a Deputy Commission in the Department of Education
(since seized and presumed killed) had resigned in February, charging
that the mainland Commissioner and his subordinates ignored him, and
bitterly charging the Governor (in a personal interview) with having
condoned this as general policy toward Formosans. It must be observed,
however, that capable Formosans admitted to deputy posts would in time
acquire knowledge of executive office at that level, an opportunity
(with this exception) so far nonexistent.
As an economic corrective for the fundamental difficulties on Formosa,
General Pai’s proposals foreshadow even less economic opportunity for
the Formosans. In proposing the abolition of two of the old (Japanese
established) Monopolies he chose two which have had least effect on the
public economy, namely, Matches and Camphor. He ignored the virtual
monopoly exercised by the Government in at least 32 fields of major
economic activity in the Government’s total
[Page 448]
or partial control (shared with the National
Resources Commission) over some 222 formerly independent enterprises in
these fields. He does suggest that these government enterprises may be
“adjusted”.
In proposing that the present Trading Bureau be abolished and replaced by
a Supply Bureau, he merely proposes a change in terminology and further
proposes that this Supply Bureau may hereafter become the purchasing
agent for private industries, which is a serious extension rather than a
reduction of the monopoly on import and export enjoyed by the present
Trading Bureau, run by a mainland clique.
General Pai avoids suggesting the release of seized (and well-developed)
Japanese lands to the Formosan farmer but appears to allude only to the
extremely rugged mountain territory of the aborigines and to public
forest lands when he speaks of opening 70 per cent of the total acreage
to farmers “in accordance with current local land regulations”. This
would mean further pressure on the aborigines without substantial gain
to the agriculturalist, and suggests a serious threat to the
long-cherished forest conservation and soil erosion controls instituted
in 1898.
General Pai adheres to General Chen’s misrepresentation of the incident
as primarily an organized insurrection and rebellion, characterized by
attacks on the Governor-General’s office and the Garrison Headquarters
and accompanied by demands that all national troops be disarmed. It may
be that for public purposes, at least, a military government has to have
a military reason for action against its own people. By alluding to the
“slanders” which had been heaped on General Chen’s government General
Pai suggests the revenge motive which is believed to have much to do
with the systematic killing or seizure of all who have criticised the
local government in the past 18 months.
In referring to the “emotional shock” suffered by mainland civil servants
(and their material losses) General Pai touches a problem which, it is
believed, will become increasingly grave as mainland government
employees and civilians abandon their work in Formosa to return to the
comparative security of the familiar mainland. During the period in
which Japanese technicians were retained to assist in the takeover only
mainland Chinese were in a position to benefit by their instruction.
General Pai realizes that the withdrawal of key civilians will further
cripple the economy.
General Pai refuted assertions made in the China Weekly
Review that about 5000 were killed or wounded during the
incident, but in his own statements stressed only casualties suffered by
mainlanders and dwelt upon military losses. An American newsman present
at
[Page 449]
the interview states that
General Pai became confused and finally asked that casualty figures not
be quoted. His assertion on April 7 that “about forty” dissidents had
escaped to the hills is in conflict with his March 25 statement that
approximately 1000 had escaped. It is believed that his attempt to
appeal to the aborigines by radio (March 26) reflects a genuine concern
that resistance will be organized in the mountain region.
General Pai declared that he did not know whether news censorship,
imposed by the Garrison Headquarters, had been lifted or not.
That General Pai’s tour is used as a political issue per se in Nanking is
indicated by comments heard among influential Chinese and noted in the
press. An article entitled “The Inside Story of General Pai Chung-hsi’s
Pacification Mission to Taiwan”, which appeared in the Hsin Chung Hua Jih Pao April 4 is enclosed as an
illustration.
In some aspects the conduct of General Pai’s investigation and the
presentation of his conclusions smacks of an attempt to recover an
embarrassing political situation created when General Chen’s military
operations against the people of Taiwan and the revelations of his
apparent incompetency there threatened to upset complicated negotiations
in the contemplated changes of Government at Nanking. Members of the
Central Executive Committee made forceful and public demands for the
dismissal and punishment of General Chen Yi, a Political Science Group
member and close associate of General Chang Chun.25a The
Generalissimo spoke firmly in defense of General Chen Yi on March 10 and
later before the Central Executive Committee plenary session. The issue
was dropped in the press, which confined itself thereafter principally
to reporting General Pai’s trip and his public comments, which in
themselves may suggest a preconceived solution to the Formosa problem.
For example, a foreign reporter at Peiping stated (in the China Daily Tribune March 26) that “All
newspapers [at Peiping] received instructions to cease publishing news
of the Formosa fighting, speculation and causes since the situation has
been officially declared stabilized”. Vernacular newspaper comment on
the Taiwan situation, which had been almost universally condemnatory of
Chen Yi, virtually ceased in Shanghai and Nanking after the
Generalissimo’s attitude was made known; at the same time the only news
stories appearing were those given out by the official agency.
It is concluded that General Pai’s visit to Taiwan further alienated the
people of Taiwan from the Central Government. Throughout the
negotiations with Governor Chen from February 28 to March 8, responsible
Formosan-Chinese, the stable elements of the community,
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encouraged themselves in the hope that if
the Generalissimo were appraised of the true course of events on Taiwan
and if he sent a high civil officer of government to investigate, he
would of course take steps to remove General Chen, prevent a military
occupation and revenge, and reorganize the Government in consonance with
the reform program which the officially recognized Committee was
proposing for discussion. This faith in the Generalissimo and high
officers of the Central Government was the basis for the appeal made to
the American Consulate to forward a message to the Generalissimo through
the good offices of the American Ambassador.
General Pai’s unfaltering support of General Chen Yi, his identification
with the will of the Generalissimo, the character of his reform
proposals and the fact that seizures and executions continued throughout
his visit of inspection must all be calculated to have increased rather
than to have modified the difficulties of the Government in regaining
the allegiance and economic cooperation of the Formosan-Chinese
People.
