893.00/6–1847: Telegram
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 21—10:50 p.m.]
100. Communist recent offensive appears to have passed its peak as far as active combat concerned. Communists should be gratified by accomplishments. Offensive, while differing slightly in tactics employed, followed usual Communist patterns, namely, occupying large areas but allowing Nationalists to hold cities therein. Noteworthy that with all reports of Communist success affecting Mukden and Changchun, Communists actually only hold one city, Kungchuling, which has [no?] immediate effect on Mukden, although they have quite an effective blockade around Mukden and Changchun. One of most interesting points of Communist offensive was similarity of Communist tactics to those employed by Soviets when driving down rail line against Japs. Communists as in past do not appear either ready or desirous of taking or holding cities. Only places taken were localities which could be occupied without too great loss. After city taken, only skeleton Communist force left therein to enforce acts Communist civil officials. When Nationalists counterattack Communists seem to prefer letting Nationalists into city and then stage own counterattack. One indication Communists not interested taking Mukden is they still give no evidence of desiring to fight defensive warfare which they would have to do if they took Mukden. Notwithstanding persistent rumors of Soviet equipping Communists with artillery and heavy weapons, such rumors have not been substantiated by appearance of such ordnance in field in noticeable quantities. Morale and numbers of Communists seem definitely superior to Nationalists but nevertheless Nationalists are still by far superior force insofar as training and ground and air [equipment concerned.] Communist accomplishments in month of offensive warfare listed in order of importance are:
- (1).
- Economic: Communists control large share of food producing areas and have taken considerable quantities of stored surplus food. Even though Nationalists able retake areas, Communists depreciated value of food stores by effectively destroying lines communication. Will suffer more from this than Manchuria because other surpluses which could have been exported will now have to be used in Manchuria. Offensive also considerably weakened already shaky economy in that prices immediately soared because of possibility of future shortages before any actual shortage existed. Communist successes caused flight from Manchurian currency and frantic buying of gold bars. It will be very difficult to stem this inflation because average Chinese merchant seems more dominated by avarice than by patriotism.
- (2).
- Psychological: Manchurians formerly [skeptical of southern Kuomintang Chinese have become openly hostile. Morale of people and troops lowered greatly by incompetency, greed and lack of public spirit of Kuomintang public officials and military officers. This attitude becoming more apparent each day. Many Chinese, in discussing conditions, make no attempt to conceal their contempt for the Kuomintang controlled government. This attitude, however, has not yet reached rebellion stages,]65 and even though Nationalist troop morale has deteriorated considerably and thereby lowered their combat efficiency, they still appear capable of putting down any open rebellion. However, as time passes and discontent increases, movement will grow stronger and although these dissatisfied persons probably will not actively cooperate with the Communists, their passivity will materially aid Communist cause.
- (3).
- Deteriorating American equipment: Wasting of Nationalists’ advantage of American-supplied weapons, ammunition, transportation and aircraft strong Communist accomplishment. Communists forced terrific expenditure of movement. American equipment, particularly vehicles and planes, constantly deteriorating and there appears no likelihood of immediate replacement.
- (4).
- Loss of equipment: Communists appear to have captured considerable quantities of Nationalist military equipment, particularly in heavy weapon class. This is type of equipment which Communists need most and which to date has given Nationalists decided advantage.
- (5).
- Loss of men: Appears Nationalist losses in men have been heavy. Although manpower is cheap, trained soldiers are not. Replacements are coming from North China but northern soldiers and southern officers are not compatible.
Recent reports indicate Communist immediate tactics will be to delay Nationalist re-entry into areas captured, although not anticipated Communists will set up strong defense. Communists have achieved important objective in that they have weakened Nationalist strength [to] extent that next offensive should be even easier. Nationalist reinforcements arriving place Nationalists in position to launch counteroffensive, but by time they are actually ready to move, Communists will have time to withdraw sufficiently so that Nationalist military accomplishments, per se, will be negligible.
Sent Embassy 172, repeated Dept 100, Changchun 76.
- Bracketed insertion made on the basis of another copy of telegram filed under Lot F–79, 800 Kmt–CCP 1947.↩