Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

856E.00/5–2947

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Schnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] May 29, 1947.

Participants:	Mr. F. C. Everson, First Secretary of the British Embassy;
	Mr. Frederick Nolting, NOE;
	Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA;
	Mr. Alexander Schnee, SEA

Mr. Everson handed us a British version of the summary of the Dutch note of May 27 and stated that his Government viewed the note favorably. Since his last discussions with the Department (about May 19), the danger of the Dutch resorting to force appears to have been lessened as indicated by the fact that the Dutch, including the Prime Minister, recently explicitly denied any intent to resort to force.

Conversations between his Government and the Netherlands Government indicate that the latter consider this a favorable time for the United States and the United Kingdom to exert their influence on the situation by persuading the Indonesians to accept the Dutch proposals. Should the United States and the United Kingdom adopt this procedure, the Dutch would prefer that the initiative appear to come from the United States and the United Kingdom and not from the Netherlands. If the Indonesians reject the Dutch proposals the latter would then favor arbitration by the United States and the United Kingdom, such arbitration not to take place without prior approval of the Netherlands Government.

Mr. Everson was instructed to inform the Department that his Government was proposing that the United States and the United Kingdom adopt a similar course of action and endeavor to persuade the Indonesians to accept the Dutch proposals.

Mr. Everson expressed the opinion that the Dutch proposals were designed to “smoke out” the Republicans and to make them face the issues. He also expressed the opinion that Sjahrir’s position is very difficult in that his support stems from the left non-cooperative faction of the Republican Government.

As regards the views of the Dutch in Indonesia, Van Mook in a conversation with the British Consul General described the note as an ultimatum and said that there are only two courses of action open to the Dutch (a) limited military action and (b) abandonment of the Netherlands East Indies. Mr. Everson finds that whereas the Dutch in The Hague are now unanimously against the use of force, the Dutch in Batavia appear to be unanimously in favor of resorting to force.

In conclusion, he stated that he would like to know whether this Government is willing to pursue a parallel course of action with the British to exert pressure on the Indonesians to accept the recent Dutch proposals. He said that he would leave an aide-mémoire with the Department tomorrow. Mr. Landon replied that the Department would consider the British proposal.