856E.00/5–2147: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 80
2861. 1. Further to ourtel 2837, May 20,81 Foreign Office today showed us another message just received from Batavia stating there [Page 928] still no indication of break in Dutch-Indos deadlock. According this message, Hirschfeld82 had told British Consul General83 on 18th Indos still playing for time which Dutch with heavy military expenditures, loss of trade and dollar exchange could ill afford to sustain for any length of time. Hirschfeld, apparently with eye to Indochina example, advanced thought it perhaps best if Dutch launched military operations to destroy Republican opposition. He argued that although there would be outcry in US and UK they would be placated by consequent resumption of trade. Only alternative, Hirschfeld continued, was for Dutch to withdraw (at least from Java), thus leaving Indos in chaos and open to Communist infiltration.
2. Dening84 returned London this morning from The Hague where he had long conversations with Vredenburch on Dutch-Indos situation. Dening tells us he urged patience, pointing out Dutch in Indos no more than British in India and Burma could go on ruling native peoples by force. He expressed thought that Indonesians have absorbed large measure Dutch culture and thought, as Indians and Burmese have British culture and thought, and that if patience and tact exercised in all three areas peoples thereof can doubtless work in cooperation with Dutch and British. Dening says Vredenburch did not dissent from this view, but he made it clear Dutch could not go on indefinitely in face Indos’ intransigence and stalling tactics. He said to Dening Dutch had three alternatives: (1) Use of force; (2) withdrawal from Indos; (3) resort to US as mediator. In latter connection, Vredenburch expressed view US “ham-fisted” probably unable arrange satisfactory solution.
3. Dening states Vredenburch emphasized it not Dutch policy to use force in reaching solution. Dening observes it his view this true statement of Dutch policy, but he thinks there is a possibility Dutch extremists (particularly the military) might take the initiative, in which event moderate elements might be powerless to rectify situation.
4. Dening discussed situation with Sir Orme Sargent85 (who is in charge of Foreign Office during absence of Bevin on holiday) this afternoon. Later this afternoon Dening is to lay situation before Prime Minister86 with a view perhaps to calling in Dutch Ambassador to [Page 929] suggest that Dutch Government refrain from use of force on Indos and exercise patience in negotiations.
5. Foreign Office has not instructed British Embassy Washington to discuss situation with Department but may do so in near future.87
Sent Department 2861; repeated The Hague 21.
- Repeated by the Department to Batavia as No. 137, May 22, 5 p.m.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Economic Adviser to Netherlands Prime Minister Beel.↩
- Gilbert MacKereth.↩
- Maberly E. Dening; British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Clement R. Attlee.↩
- In telegram 189, May 27, 5 p.m., from Batavia, Mr. Foote commented that “any interference by British Foreign Office or USA may wreck all efforts and may lead to fighting which Dutch trying avoid”. (856E.00/5–2747)↩