740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1947: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
481. Cite Zpol 1391. Reference Deptel 262, November 17.
- 1.
- General Hodge will issue statement (text will be forwarded separately) which, in order to reach the maximum number of Koreans, will be given to the Korean press, broadcast over the South Korean radio network, and dropped in leaflet form on isolated regions.
- 2.
- I am collecting all information possible pertinent to the subject matter of the telegram under reference (also subject matter of Warx 90136,75 111834/Z) and plan to proceed to Washington via Northwest Airlines departing Seoul November 21 or 23. Will advise later exact date.76
- 3.
- Before arrival, Department officers concerned may wish to take under consideration a suggestion that UN, instead of asking [Page 862] USAMGIK to undertake preparations for elections, ask the Commanding General in South Korea and the Commanding General in North Korea to instruct their respective delegations on the Joint Commission to act as a liaison group, each operating in its own separate zone, to confer with local Korean officials appointed under the laws of the respective zone to begin preparations for an election pending the arrival of the Commission.
There are several advantages in this approach to the election problem. First, it will constitute another effort to perpetuate the agencies established under the Moscow decision and may thus constitute an incentive for the Soviets, if they should have a change of heart, to cooperate with the UN Commission. Second, it would utilize the best qualified and experienced group of American and Soviet nationals anywhere for the difficult task of organizing election preparations. Third, insofar as South Korea is concerned (on the assumption that we shall proceed in South Korea regardless of whether the Soviets cooperate) the members of the American delegation are far more qualified for the duties contemplated than USAMGIK which is an operating agency already overburdened and likely soon to be required to undertake greater burdens involved in withdrawal. Fourth, USAMGIK with its Korean coalition officials is viewed with a certain degree of distrust by the rightists (especially Rhee’s group) so that election preparations carried on as indicated above might be more acceptable to all concerned than election preparations under supervision of USAMGIK.