740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–347: Telegram
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Department of the Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
priority
Zgcg 1337. To Dept of the Army for JCS info CINCFE.58 Subject is Korean attitude on troop withdrawal. The immediate purpose and intent behind the Soviet proposal for immediate mutual withdrawal of both US and Soviet forces and allowing Koreans to form their own government without any aid or guidance from outside powers is apparently well understood by all Koreans.
The Communists and their followers including several rated as “moderate leftists” and the “middle of the road” parties favor the Soviet proposal in toto as the surest early means of obtaining “the people’s” power, and are working hard at propagandizing its popularity. Soon after the Soviet proposal was made there was an outspoken, demand on the part of many Korean groups that US forces stay indefinitely to protect Korea. However, today that early trend has changed to where no Korean would dare make such a statement publicly to demand that US forces remain one day longer than required to establish a Korean representative government and start moving out. Koreans generally are watching our moves in UN with tongues in cheek to see if Russians will stymie us again. It must be kept in mind that the general idea of eliminating foreign armed forces and occupation has a growing appeal to all Koreans, which will increase each day that there is no progress toward independence. They are becoming more and more impatient for some settlement that will relieve Korea of the burden and stigma of occupation. Some non-Communist leaders are now beginning to say that it would be better to take troops out now as per Soviet proposal and let the Koreans fight it out among themselves than to continue the occupation and the division of Korea. Syngman Rhee, who has greatest following of any Korean individual, tells me that he is convinced that Koreans can handle their own affairs if the great powers withdraw troops. It is. possible that in this self hypnotism, he may soon go on a campaign to get troops out willy nilly, thus in effect joining the Communist demands. He is becoming more anti-American every day. From what I read and hear in news dispatches and radio on UN political committee proceedings, it appears that a willingness for further delay in a Korean solution is creeping into UN thinking in spite of the [Page 853] initial US statements and aims in presenting the case. No one here believes the Russians will agree to any settlement other than complete Soviet control of Korea, and I feel our delegation should continue its drive to get UN backing for the fastest possible settlement here so that we can move immediately toward establishment of a representative govt at least in South Korea. The Communist strength in our zone is currently at its lowest ebb since our arrival in Korea, but any further international stalemates that prevent taking positive action in our zone with or without UN supervision will result in a. strong upsurge of feeling against the US. It will build up Communist influence through a growing popularity of the Soviet proposal to withdraw and will probably bring on an all-out demand by all Koreans to get all forces out of Korea without qualification.
Again I urge that in our thinking on the Korean problem, we consider the borders of Korea and its effect on our position here. We have lost well over a year in gains of political stability in our zone and in institution of popular basic reforms through our honest adherence to international agreements and our hope of some agreement with the Russians.
I urgently recommend that if UN does not agree to the original American resolution and/or if the Russians do not indicate a willingness to participate, we proceed immediately with an election for a. South Korean legislature with or without UN observers, and establish at earliest possible date a representative interim govt of South Korea. If we do not act along this line at early date we will be in a worse position than ever to meet future Soviet moves and propaganda in this area. If press indications are correct, and the current proposal that UN will send a delegation here only to observe selection of representatives for further consultation with UN, we have gained nothing in local authority. On the other hand, if we go ahead now with our election of a legislature, I know of no better means for final selection of representatives needed for consultation than through having them selected by an all-elected legislature. The sooner we can announce the date of a general election in South Korea, the better our local position will be, and the less trouble we may expect in local administration during this critical period. Jacobs concurs and requests pass to State Dept.