740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2247: Telegram

The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

secret

438. Cite Zpol 1296. The following is substance of certain information concerning the plans of Soviet authorities in North Korea with respect to the Korean problem which have recently come to attention from what is believed a highly reliable source and which check with certain other information already in possession of our military authorities. Details have already been sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Commanding General in his Zgbi 129 about the middle of June, the Soviet authorities, apparently believing that the American delegation of the Joint Commission would agree to Soviet plans for consultation of only democratic parties and social organizations which fully supported the Moscow decision arranged through their stooges in North [Page 844] Korea for the convening of an indoctrination conference of Army, security police and Coast Guard representatives at Pyongyang on June 24. At that time the Soviet delegation for some reason felt assured that none of the rightist groups in South Korea would participate as they had refused to do the previous year because of their aversion to the trusteeship. Shortly thereafter the Soviets found they were mistaken in their belief.

At the aforementioned conference the chairman who was the head of the Interior Section of the North Korea Government stated that it was expected that the Joint Commission would shortly agree to the setting up of an all Korea government and that the members of all the agencies concerned must prepare themselves to be ready at the proper time to take over South Korea and eliminate the reactionaries and rightists in order to establish for Korea a “progressive democracy” which would ultimately lead to the establishment of a truly democratic state along Soviet lines within the Soviet orbit. The members present were cautioned against adhering too strictly to nationalistic Korean concepts as it was necessary that all peoples go through the “progressive democratic” stage leading up to the ultimate ideal of becoming a member of the USSR and through it of the brotherhood of all the nations of the world. The representatives were told to go back, indoctrinate their men and prepare for coming events.

On September 6, a larger conference of the same groups was called at which time the representatives were told that General Shtikov would propose the mutual withdrawal of troops, which he actually did, 20 days later on September 26. The same line of indoctrination given on June 24 was repeated with greater emphasis. The United States was condemned as being in the hands of reactionaries who were working with reactionaries in Korea. An attempt was made, however, to give the impression that all Americans were not reactionary; that ultimately the United States would go through the “progressive democratic” stage and evolve into an ideal Communist state; and that there were not enough atomic bombs in the world to kill all the truly democratic leaders.

The representatives were told to go back to their posts and prepare for eventual invasion of South Korea the moment the signal was given which would be when the United Nations, to which the United States had referred the question, decided that the North Korean army must be disbanded.

The tactical plan to be followed was somewhat as follows: A special initial group of saboteurs would enter South Korea and through sabotage and assassinations create terror and chaos. At the moment of their entry into South Korea, the electric power from North Korea would [Page 845] be cut off so that most cities would be in darkness which would assist these saboteurs who had definite instructions to kill without mercy all police, constabulary and South Korean officials. The second phase would follow shortly after which the North Korean army would move into South Korea and occupy the principal centers. The third phase to be handled by what might be called the “liquidation squads” who would follow the army, take charge of security control and police and liquidate the remaining South Korean leaders and reactionaries, mentioning by name Syngman Rhee, his foreign wife and Kim Koo.

The plan seems to have been based on the assumption that the United States and Soviet troops would have previously been withdrawn from the country and the proposed uprising would take place when the United Nations attempted to disarm the North Korean army. There does not seem to be any plan to have the Soviet troops assist in this uprising. However, the information [informant] believes that the North Korean leaders are fanatical enough to attempt to carry out the plan even with US soldiers present in South Korea. He stated that the representatives were told to be cruel not only with respect to Korean reactionaries but also “our foreign enemies”, presumably Americans in South Korea.

One interesting comment of the informant was to the effect that when the chairman of the meeting on September 6 called for helpful suggestions from those present, nobody said anything, which seemed to irritate him and the other leaders who curtly stated that they would draw up the plans which would be carried out faithfully. The informant on September 28 fled to South Korea with several others all of whom were disillusioned because they discovered that the Soviet plan contemplated not an independent Korea but a satellite of the USSR.

The informant also stated that another meeting would be called for October 20 in order that all those who were to participate in this enterprise would be given further indoctrination as well as passwords and proper identification documents. All old identification documents and signs were to be called in and new ones supplied. We have learned from other sources that the identification documents of some North Korean army units and of some of the security police have been called in but that new badges or documents have not yet been issued.56

These plans reveal rather clearly what was really behind the Soviet proposal for the mutual withdrawal of troops, namely, the taking over of South Korea by the North Korean army and security police for the purpose of setting up a democratic front, Communist-dominated government [Page 846] in all Korea. Pending the outcome of our efforts to find a solution of the Korean problem at UN we have no other comments and no suggestions except to state that our Army forces will need to be more alert than ever before for an increase in subversive activities instigated from North Korea, The meeting planned for October 20 forebodes evil days ahead if the Soviets do not go along with the proposed UN resolution.

Please see in connection with this message the so-called Soviet master plan for Korea transmitted with my despatch number 39, August 7.

Jacobs
  1. Further details were given in General Hodge’s telegram Zgbi 1294, from Seoul, received October 22, 8:35 p.m., not printed.