740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–847: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State
414. Zpol 1238. In view of recent Soviet proposal for mutual troop withdrawal we have been giving renewed consideration to reports and other information concerning the situation in North Korea. Weighing our information, it seems that the number of Soviet troops in North Korea has been reduced to two divisions which according to conservative estimates could easily be withdrawn within 30 days. There is considerable information regarding activity of the North Korean Army with renewed recruiting. Units of this army, known to [Page 826] be well-equipped with infantry weapons, have now appeared in the provinces of North Korea bordering on the 38 parallel where they have never previously known to have been in numbers.
Estimate of this situation is that the Soviets are getting ready for withdrawal of their own troops and are preparing and possibly are redeploying the North Korean Army for its future role. We even go so far as to believe that, if the Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal is not accepted soon, we may next be confronted by a declaration on the part of the Soviets that they are withdrawing their troops regardless of whether we do or not. This they can safely do, in view of the North Korean Army which they leave behind and the continued proximity of their own armed forces to Korea. In that event, we shall be left in the unenviable position both at UN and here of continuing our military occupancy of South Korea. At UN the representatives of many states, ignorant of the realities of the Korea problem, may take sides against us. Here in South Korea we are likely to be confronted with demand for our withdrawal by a large segment of Koreans consisting of all leftists plus many well-meaning but ignorant rightists. While most rightist leaders understand the implications of the Soviet withdrawal proposal, the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops will have an immense popular appeal among Koreans. The effects of a similar appeal to the American public should also not be ignored.
In connection with this message, please see Seoul PolAd number 409, October 8.