740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1247: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
Cite Zpol 792. State serial 45 (29 March 1946)97 requested suggestion in revising par 4 b SWNCC 176/18.98 Following are combined views as presently held of Political Adviser and Joint Commission in which Hodge concurs:
4 b (SWNCC 176/18) assigns Joint Commission most pressing political task, establishment of provisional Korean government.
Present position of American delegation in general is that provisional government embodying basic democratic concepts will be government [Page 672] of united Korea, capable of: (1) Maintaining unimpaired efficiency and useful services of government. (2) Integrating under supervision of Joint Commission zonal laws and ordinances paragraph 3.
Providing satisfactory vehicle for bridging interim period prior to inauguration of permanent government utilizing present South Korean Government expanded as framework and pattern. Solution of fundamental problems vital to welfare of all or most Koreans, such as land reform, definition of pro-Japanese collaborationism, ownership and operation of industry, etc., while regarded by American delegation extremely important are visualized as largely functions of a permanent government for final solution, preferably after mature discussion by a nationally elected legislature.
American delegation will urge in Joint Commission forming of provisional Korean government by electoral processes including free elections by secret ballot and freely chosen multi-party slates of candidates. However, it is almost a foregone conclusion that Russians will disagree with this basis. Already General Lebedeff has informed a member of American delegation that Soviets favor appointment of members of Korean provisional democratic government. Soviet tactics both during this and last year’s meetings further belief that Soviets will maintain this stand. However, Lebedeff stated that USSR favored election of national legislature during life of provisional Korean democratic government which probably is indicative of Soviet optimism in gaining control of provisional government. Two other feasible methods of forming the provisional government besides electoral approach described above are: (1) fusion of two existing zonal legislatures which would elect provisional government and (2) appointment of provisional government by Joint Commission followed by general election to select legislature and provisional and lower officials.
In all three methods described legislatures generally representative of the will of the Korean people will probably be in existence. Although any calculations at this time concerning system of permanent government is frankly a leap in the dark, it appears reasonable to suppose that permanent government will grow out of legislative appointment. As to type and structure of both provisional and permanent governments, general form should not differ radically from present interim South Korean Government, with ministers or directors of departments as there is some doubt whether USSR delegation will accept our proposal for a president or chief of state particularly if rightist or center (or coalition of both) control is in sight. Indications were that Soviets favored last year a Council of Ministers with senior minister acting as a sort of premier. Soviets are expected to press for a highly centralized government with intention of communizing [Page 673] Korea. US position favors greatest possible decentralization and autonomy for provincial governments. Politically immature Koreans probably will be strongly influenced along oriental lines and despite their experience with a tyrannical dynasty and domination by Japanese will in the end gravitate toward a highly centralized government while giving lip service to “democracy” which they understand in practical effect only vaguely.
Views of American delegation of the Joint Commission concerning these questions will hardly crystallize prior to consideration of questionnaires submitted by Koreans on the provisional charter and political platform of provisional government and plans for integration, and probably not until the political color of provisional government is decided and reaction of Koreans to this government is learned. Therefore, appreciation of these factors is essential in consideration of this discussion. Measures for helping and assisting political, economic and social progress of Korean people presumably will be taken by both US and USSR in event Joint Commission is successful and permanent Korean government is established under paragraph 3 of Moscow decision. It is impossible at this time to estimate with any accuracy extent of aid and assistance in face of so many variables.
Our national policy will probably insist on minimum allocation of US resources for an independent Korean government. Russians will probably press for equal participation in any aid and assistance granted permanent Korean government until basis is worked out. They then can be expected to offer only token aid. They may conceivably also have withdrawn most of their forces by that time.
In any event, US policy for Four Power trusteeship, viewed in light of our present knowledge of events, should be barest minimum impingement on the sovereignty of Korea, with only such necessary nominal supervision as should be exercised by Joint Commission, or similar body, associated with a strong United States Embassy Mission which will naturally evolve in sequence of events.
- Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. viii, p. 654.↩
- January 28, 1946, ibid., p. 623.↩