740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2147: Telegram
The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
115. General Brown held a 3-hour conference with rightist leaders on 18th May followed by a similar conference held by General Hodge 19th May with reference to the threatened rightist boycott of consultation with the Joint Commission because of objective of “trusteeship”. Under leadership of Syngman Rhee they are now labeling General Hodge as Communist and pro-Communist and saying he intends to sell them into communism through the operation of the Joint Commission. “Joint Commission,[”] “Communism” and “trusteeship” appear to be synonymous in the rightist mind. In conferences they requested definitions be given of “democratic” and “trusteeship” and demanded that General Hodge send message along following lines to State Department:
“Word trusteeship is misused in the Moscow decision and conflicts with the main objective of the Joint Commission which is to make Korea independent. The word trusteeship stands in the way of millions of Korean people who would otherwise support the Moscow decision. In order to get the support of all Koreans, the word trusteeship should be omitted and only ‘help and assistance’ be used therefore. Democracy means one thing to United States and another to Russia. An agreed definition should be presented to the Koreans.”
Conferences with this group are strongly reminiscent of conferences with same group following announcement of Moscow decision in December 1945 during the “trusteeship revolt”.
General Hodge sees little hope of getting needed cooperation of rightist groups with Joint Commission, and feels they will continue efforts to force the proceedings to break down in order that a separate government for South Korea may become an alternative. There is no doubt that this group has real fear of the Russians. There is also no question but that they could muster large and vociferious following here if they start again on an all-out campaign against “trusteeship”. On the other hand their request to General Hodge described above may be face-saving gesture and if they get indication of high level indirect cognizance thereof they may give at least some degree of cooperation. With this in view, it is suggested that the Department may wish to issue a statement for news and radio services to effect that reports from Korea indicate there is still a lack of understanding among some democratic and patriotic Koreans as to the nature of the aid and assistance (trusteeship) provisions of the Moscow decision, and apprehension that four powers intend to impose some burdensome tutelage on Korean people; that the purpose stabilization for the [Page 647] Korean Government during its early stages; to provide necessary aid and assistance to Korea in development of economic, cultural and political stability, to insure orderly transition from a provisional government to a permanent Korean Government according to the expressed will of the Korean people and to insure that during the early stages of the redevelopment of the Korean nation it does not become a mere puppet state, but will move to genuine independence.
It is believed that issuance of a reassuring statement at this critical moment is a strategic necessity. However, if Department thinks it inadvisable that it should itself acknowledge rightist apprehension, the same result might be achieved if Department authorized General Hodge to state publicly that he has received assurances from Secretary Marshall along above lines.
If Department has strong objections to issuing of statements now, in Washington or here, designed to afford the rightists a chance to modify or reverse their present uncompromising stand, we will take it to be the Department’s attitude that rightist non-cooperation or active opposition is a calculated risk we must accept. Penfield concurs.