740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2547
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright)60
confidential
London, April 24,
1947.
- 1.
- In the course of a call at the Foreign Office today, Mr. Drumright had an informal conversation with Mr. MacDermot61 on the subject of Korea.
- 2.
- In connection with the U.S.-Soviet impasse over the future of Korea and the recent Marshall–Molotov exchange of notes, Mr. MacDermot remarked that the Foreign Office had suggested to Mr. Bevin that he endeavor to keep clear of the Korean imbroglio. (In other words, Mr. MacDermot was intimating that Korea is a “hot potato” and that it would be preferable from the British point of view to let the two countries directly concerned—the United States and the Soviet Union—settle their differences between themselves.)
- 3.
- Mr. MacDermot confirmed that the Foreign Office had received an official note from the Chinese Government suggesting a four-power conference on the Korean question. Mr. MacDermot said that the British Government had not replied to the Chinese note, and indicated that Britain was not particularly receptive to the Chinese suggestion for the reason set forth in paragraph numbered 2 above.
- 4.
- Mr. MacDermot said that reports received in the Foreign Office from its representative in Seoul were on the whole of a “gloomy” character. The latter had particularly stressed the political immaturity of the Korean politicians and their inability to cooperate for the good of Korea. Instead of promoting the interests of Korea, these politicians seemed to be intent on seeking personal power and aggrandizement. Mr. MacDermot said that the Foreign Office representative in Seoul had reported very little on developments in the Soviet zone of Korea. That little had suggested, however, that the Soviets had set up a typical “stooge regime” in the north, and that, generally speaking, the Soviets and their regime enjoyed slight popularity among the Korean population.
- 5.
- Mr. MacDermot indicated that the Foreign Office would welcome the projected American grant-in-aid to Korea. At the same time, however, he said that the British Government doubted the advisability of allocating Japanese reparations to Korea. In support of this position, he pointed out that Korea had in many ways benefitted from Japanese occupation, that Korea had suffered little war devastation, and that Korea had not fought on the allied side during the war. The British view was, he said, that Japanese reparations should go to areas that had contributed to the war and had suffered such as China, the Philippines, Malaya and Burma.
- 6.
- Mr. MacDermot said further that a recent report from the British representative in Tokyo had occasioned some misgivings in the Foreign Office. The report was to the effect that an account had appeared in the Japanese press of an alleged interview between General MacArthur and a Korean correspondent in which General MacArthur was cited as having told the correspondent that Korea should be “represented” at the Japanese peace conference. Mr. MacDermot continued that the word “represented” could be construed in a number [Page 638] of ways, but if formal Korean representation was meant, the Foreign Office was at a loss to understand how this could be legitimately arranged. In defense of this contention, Mr. MacDermot asserted that Korea could not properly be “represented” at the peace conference unless her independence were consummated and a recognized Korean Government established, adding that there appeared to be little hope that these developments would eventuate in the foreseeable future.
Everett F. Drumright