740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–147
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
No. 1423
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 1421, November 28, 1947,99 on the subject of the forty-sixth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, and to invite the Department’s attention to the discussion in that meeting as contained in the Corrected Verbatim Minutes forwarded with the reference despatch as an enclosure. (Reference is also made to previous despatches concerning meetings of the Allied Council.)
In placing the subject “Report by the Chairman on Fundamental Changes in the Japanese Educational System” on the agenda for discussion, the Supreme Commander was following a policy of placing subjects on the agenda with a view to evoking helpful and constructive discussion by the Members of the Council, and to illustrate progress which has been made in various aspects of the process of democratization in Japan. The instant topic was placed on the agenda with a view to reporting upon fundamental reforms in the system of Japanese education.
While it is fully realized by most responsible officers in General Headquarters that the reform of Japanese education is not yet complete and that many difficult major problems remain to be solved, it appears beyond question that tremendous gains have been made in effecting fundamental changes along democratic lines. Unfortunately, [Page 324] the meeting under report aptly illustrates a tendency on the part of the Members of the Council to high-light criticisms along their respective national lines, and the conclusion is inescapable that many of these criticisms are voiced, not with a view to being helpful or constructive, but rather solely to further the national interests of the Members.
It had been my hope, by placing a series of subjects on the agenda of the Council, to raise the level of discussion and to evolve a body which would be helpful to the Supreme Commander in the solution of the many difficult problems with which he is faced, and at the same time to lend encouragement to the Japanese people by advising them of the great strides which have been made under the Supreme Commander’s leadership. This hope has not been realized and it appears doubtful whether the Council as presently constituted is capable of sufficient forthrightness to raise its own standards above national or selfish interests.
The general tenor of the remarks made at the last meeting by the Chinese and Soviet Members indicates an inability on their part publicly to acknowledge even in limited scope, the accomplishments of the Occupation. Their respective remarks were so formulated as to focus attention upon matters of detail from which adverse inferences might be drawn that the Occupation authorities, as well as the Japanese Government, have failed in implementing policies formulated by the Far Eastern Commission. Their remarks were, furthermore, obviously designed to impress certain broad elements of the Japanese people with Chinese and Soviet preoccupation in evolving “democratic principles” in Japan. The meeting under discussion also suggests that the Members are taking advantage, in their own national interests, of topics placed on the agenda by the Supreme Commander to voice unjustified and unfair criticism by the use of captious statements unwarranted in fact.
In view of the above considerations and based upon close observation of the tactics employed by the several Members in the Council since its inception, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that any attempt by the Supreme Commander to stimulate constructive and helpful discussion in the Council is foredoomed to failure.
As the Department is aware, the Allied Council provides an efficient sounding board for Soviet (and Communistic) aspirations in Japan, and also serves as a stage to which the Japanese people look for guidance but find instead an advancement of selfish national interests at the expense of the furtherance of processes of democratization. In consequence and in consonance with the realities of the [Page 325] situation in Japan, it is felt here that the need for an Allied Council for Japan, with its fictitious implications of Allied control over the implementation of policy directives, has passed. It is, therefore, my considered opinion that the time has arrived when consideration should be given to whether the fiction of Allied Control in Japan should not at the earliest opportunity be abolished and, in place thereof, the Occupation placed upon a footing of control more nearly in conformity with existing factualities.
It is indisputable that the interests of the major Allies in Japan, similarly with those of other non-occupying Allies and neutral nations, can efficiently and expeditiously be served through normal relations between the respective Chiefs of Mission and the Supreme Commander. The advantages of such an arrangement are obvious. The Soviet and Chinese Governments would no longer be in the position of accepting all the rights and privileges (without assuming any of the obligations) presently accruing to them through their memberships in the Allied Council, and their representatives would not be in the privileged and unassailable positions accorded by the provisions of the Moscow Agreement. The British Commonwealth position would in effect remain unchanged in that the Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Forces would continue to exercise his functions of command through normal military channels, with political liaison continuing as at present through the Chiefs of the several British Commonwealth Missions.
While it is realized, in view of the pending Peace Treaty negotiations, that the Department may be reluctant at this time to raise the question involved, it is believed here that a proposal as envisaged above would place into the hands of United States’ negotiators a powerful weapon in any pre-treaty negotiations. It is further believed that full advantage could be taken in this regard of Soviet intransigence in the Korean situation which, in the final analysis, also stems from the provisions of the Moscow Agreement.
General MacArthur has seen and concurs with this despatch.1
Sincerely yours,
- Not printed.↩
- In airgram of January 2, 1948, the Acting Secretary of State informed Mr. Sebald that John M. Allison, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, would discuss with him upon arriving in Tokyo the views of the Department concerning the subject of this despatch (740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–147).↩