Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Far East, Volume VI

894.628/7–147

The Department of State to the British Embassy

Aide-Mémoire

The Department of State has considered the British Embassy’s notes of June 17³² and July 1, 1947,³³ in which it is stated to be the view of the British Government that the United States Government did not abide by its commitment to consult with other interested governments before authorizing a second SCAP-administered whaling expedition; that discussion of policy with regard to whaling and fishing in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission was adjourned in February, 1947, on the understanding that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, which was not subsequently done; that an alternative proposal by the Australian Government for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices did not appear to have received any consideration by this Government; and that because of these and other considerations the instructions to the Supreme Commander authorizing a second expedition should be countermanded and the question referred back for decision by the Far Eastern Commission and for examination of alternative proposals.

The British Government’s opposition to a second Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander was first made known to this Government in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of April 30 following reports in Japan that a second expedition was under consideration. The contents of this aide-mémoire had been thoroughly considered when on May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring consulted with representatives of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Norwegian Governments to obtain a full expression of those Governments’ views regarding a second expedition, and to acquaint them with United States thinking on the subject at that time. After further careful consideration of the four Governments’ views, aide-mémoire were handed their representatives on June 9 stating that it had been found advisable to authorize the expedition notwithstanding their objections, with which this Government could not concur, because of the expedition’s importance to the reestablishment of a self-supporting economy for Japan. In order that the various Governments might have additional opportunity to present their views it was decided to withhold authorization of the expedition for another week, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Commander had informed the Department that the Japanese would need to know before May 15, one month previously, whether the expedition was to be permitted if they were to have adequate time to complete the necessary preparations. By June 17, when the first British protest was received, the United States position had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19.

It is the view of the United States Government on the basis of the above record of events extending from late April to June 20, when authorization for the expedition was finally given, that this Government fully complied with its commitment to consult with other interested governments, and that ample time was afforded for the presentation by those governments of their views in the matter and any counterproposals they might wish to make. It is a cause of some concern to the United States Government that in the light of these events, particularly the consultations in Assistant Secretary Hilldring’s office on May 27, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have stated in the House of Commons on June 30 that “The United States Government did not consult with the other interested governments, which include the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, before authorizing the second Japanese whaling expedition in the Antarctic.”

As regards the understanding in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, the United States Government regrets that this assurance should have been given, even orally and informally, and the promised papers not subsequently submitted. Work on the papers was begun, but exchanges of view with the Supreme Commander and among the concerned agencies of the Government required more time than had been expected, with the result that the United States position had not yet been determined when a message from the Supreme Commander requesting authorization for a second whaling expedition was received. It was never the intention of the United States Government, or of its representative in the Economic Committee, to forestall discussion of the matter in the Committee, or to deter members who disapproved of this Government’s whaling policy filed with the Commission as FEC–035 to submit alternative proposals for consideration by the Commission.

Regarding the Australian Government’s proposal for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices, the United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its views on this proposal at any time during the six weeks intervening between the time when the interested Governments first became aware that a second expedition was under consideration and the time when the Australian Government’s proposal was received on June 18. As earlier stated, the United States position had by that time reached a definitive form in the statement prepared for reading by General McCoy the following day to the Far Eastern Commission. Nevertheless, in view of the Australian Government’s proposal and of the British Embassy’s notes of June 17 and July 1, 1947, the position of the United States Government was carefully reviewed by the highest officers of the Department and further consultations held with the Supreme Commander in the matter. A reply, of which the concluding paragraphs are quoted below, was addressed to the Australian Embassy on July 9:

“The United States Government has been guided in its reply by the fact that the expedition last year under the Supreme Commander’s control resulted in the acquisition of considerable quantities of foreign exchange through the sale abroad of part of the whale oil obtained on the expedition. These funds have been available for the purchase of other foods needed in Japan, permitting a significant reduction of the occupation burden on the American taxpayer, and would not be obtained by the United States from the 1947–48 expedition under the Australian proposal.

“As indicated in the United States Government’s aide-mémoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Government perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international whaling regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan which is the policy of this Government. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Government does not feel free to accept the Australian Government’s proposal contained in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 23.”

The United States position with regard to the projected second whaling expedition has been finally determined after full consideration of the British Government’s and other interested governments’ views and counterproposals. The United States Government accordingly regrets that it is unable to comply with the British Government’s request that General MacArthur’s instructions be countermanded and that the matter be referred back to the Far Eastern Commission.³⁴

Washington, July 23, 1947.

[For text of Far Eastern Commission policy decision (FEC–032/26) approved July 24, 1947, regarding “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan”, see Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 29: The Far Eastern Commission, Second Report by the Secretary General, July 10, 1947–December 23, 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pages 31–34. It was embodied in a directive, serial 84, August 1, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, and a copy sent by the Department on August 14 to the Far Eastern Commission (694.0031/8–847).]

32. Not printed.
33. See memorandum of July 1, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, p. 244.
34. A reply in similar terms was made to the New Zealand Legation on the same date (894.628/6–2547). In a briefer reply to the Norwegian Embassy, also on the same date, the Department stated: “Since the Norwegian Government is already aware of the compelling considerations which caused this Government to authorize the expedition, as this Government is aware of the Norwegian Government’s opposing arguments, it is believed there can be no advantage in further elaboration of the respective ‘positions.” (894.628/6–2047)