867N.01/12–3147: Airgram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 14, 1948—8:55 a. m.]
A–274. Following is an attempt to summarize the developments of the four weeks since the UN vote on partition and to give the views of this Consulate General relative to partition and its effects on Palestine:
I. General.
In the present period, terror is prevalent and normal life (i.e., normal for Palestine) is disappearing. It is, however, compared with what may be expected in future, a period of relative quiet and restraint. This phase may continue until the withdrawal of the British is more imminent and until the Arabs have made more definite plans to give effect to their determination to prevent partition. Present outbursts are, it is felt, comparatively unimportant and disorganized and are merely the inevitable concomitants of a situation that is tense and waiting. They are prompted by hatred of the Jews mixed with feelings of intense patriotism, and may be expected to increase.
The present situation is also one of extreme uncertainty. The UN has not announced who is going to police Palestine when the British withdraw and what forces are to be used to implement partition. We feel that if the UN expects to be able to partition Palestine without forces to help maintain order and to enforce partition, its thinking is [Page 1323] most unrealistic and its efforts will be vain. Meanwhile, until some statement is made as to what will be done, the situation here will remain uncertain and watchful. No plans can be made to meet an unknown situation.
It is tragic that many of the present casualties comprise innocent and harmless people, going about their daily business. They are picked off while riding in buses, walking along the streets, and stray shots even find them while asleep in their beds. A Jewish woman, mother of five children, was shot in Jerusalem while hanging out clothes on the roof. The ambulance rushing her to the hospital was machine-gunned, and finally the mourners following her to the funeral were attacked and one of them stabbed to death.
II. Jewish Situation.
At the present time the Jews are maintaining comparative quiet. The Stern Gang is limiting itself to occasional attacks on British personnel. The Haganah is concerning itself with protection of Jewish lives and property and with “punitive” reprisals for Arab outrages. In some instances it is felt that the IZL has forced the hand of the Haganah in this respect since the IZL reportedly started these punitive attacks.
The Jewish Agency thus far has not called on the Haganah for any organized defense. However, recent attacks, particularly one in which Mrs. Myerson was involved, may give the JA an excuse for setting up an active defense against the Arabs. The Jewish Agency bitterly denounces the British forces whom it accuses, perhaps with some justification, of partiality to the Arabs. The Jewish Agency has claimed that it is completely impotent to deal with the activities of the terrorists. Pointing to British failures to deal with such persons, they justify the failure of the much smaller Jewish forces to deal with the same people.
There are indications that certain segments of Jewish opinion doubt the economic and military soundness of the proposed Jewish state. Their doubts are reflected in the demands recently made on the UN and the US for help to protect and bolster the nascent state. Mrs. Myerson’s recent visit to the Consul General and her demands that something be done about the inability of the British to protect Jewish interests reflect this concern. The present Jewish difficulties in connection with food costs which are mounting daily, and in connection with road transport for food, are also part of this problem. The Jews produce about 35% of their own food. The rest must come from the Arabs and from abroad. Arab boycotts of Jewish markets, already started in connection with shipments from Egypt, would place Jewish food supplies in a precarious situation.
[Page 1324]III. Arab Situation.
There is a tendency among outside countries to overrate the importance of the present unrest and violence in Palestine. As stated above, most outbreaks of trouble since the partition decision have been sporadic and unorganized. Such disturbances are to be expected in a country where there is so much tension and uncertainty as there are here. But responsible Arab headquarters are undoubtedly watching the situation and waiting for a favorable time to make a serious step. This time may come later in the spring when the proposed actions of the British become much more apparent than they are now. The Arabs will also have to wait until they are better organized and prepared than they are now.
The signs of serious preparation on the part of the Arabs for resistance are many. The women of the country are preparing bandages and material for the welfare of the troops. Young men are being constantly recruited and sent to neighboring states to be trained for military service. Some bands are already organized in the country and are working in a coordinated way. This is evidenced by the recent outbreak of attacks on freight trains and by the carefully selected targets of such attacks. Tons of food and rations have been stolen at such times—and it is most probable that these materials are being taken to safe storage for later use. There is an active market here for all kinds of arms and ammunition. Frequent thefts are made of guns and equipment from the British military. And there are constant reports on the desertion of Arab constables from the Police Force. These latter take their arms with them, and the rate of deserters has presently reached the average daily figure of fifteen. This points to the impracticability of the announced UN intention to rely on the use of local militia to maintain order.
Cooperation among Palestinians and members of the countries of the Arab League is close and seems to be more coordinated than before. Constant information shows that the Palestine Arabs are relying for considerable assistance, especially in arms, food and training of young men, on the surrounding Arab countries. Those delegates to UNGA who before the partition vote spoke with apparent contemptuousness of Arab bluff and will to resist would find it difficult, in this atmosphere, to continue in that belief. Yet observers here note with some wonderment, based on news which has so far reached this post, that the UN still proceeds toward the task of partitioning Palestine with no apparent realization of the extent of Arab determination to resist.
It is felt that the arrival of the UN Commission will probably stimulate Arab activity. It is also felt that the Arab attitude toward the [Page 1325] UN Commission will be indistinguishable from their attitude toward the Jews. UN Commission members and their staff are generally believed to be in real danger of assassination as soon as they arrive in Jerusalem.
As has been indicated, there is a general feeling here that the Arabs will fight. It is not believed that they will even pretend to negotiate with the UN Commission. Their rumored decision not to form an Arab state from the part allotted to the Arabs by the UNSCOP plan tends to bolster this belief. And certain quarters here have indicated that the Arabs believe the world situation will prevent any active UN interference in the war that they intend to wage on the Jews. They point to the fact that there is trouble between East and West. They also point to the fact that the United States is not interested in having Russian troops sent to the Middle East. The same is true of Soviet satellite troops. The Arabs feel that if UN sends troops here to maintain law and order and to implement the partition, either Russian or Soviet satellite troops—or both—will be sent to the Middle East. And the Arabs hope that such a dilemma will be effective in causing the US to oppose UN military interference in Palestine.
IV. British Situation.
Since the British have announced their intention of giving up the mandate, their chief desire seems to be to prevent any organized warfare before their departure. As a result, the strong-arm measures that were formerly characteristic of their occupation no longer obtain. Frequent outbreaks of violence are not stemmed by the police or by the army. When the British interfere in local troubles, they seem to do so only if the violence is of such a nature as would seem to be capable of spreading. The British attitude seems to be one that is governed by a desire not to precipitate general trouble by interfering too much in local situations.
There is probably some reason for the Jewish complaint that the British are favoring the Arabs. There is little doubt that the Palestine Police personnel, especially the middle and lower ranks, are inclined to favor the Arabs and to remain outside of the Arab-Jewish melee. Instances are frequently quoted in the Jewish press of the partisan attitude of the British forces. Requests from Jews for authorization to organize their own protection against the Arabs are refused. Police arrests and searches among Jewish personnel and settlements are the order of the day. The Jewish Agency is incensed at this attitude and is clamoring for the arrival of the UN Commission so that it can keep an eye on the Palestine Government. The Arabs are constantly erecting barricades on the highways and even in the cities. The police say that they cannot cope with all activity of this kind. Even police cars [Page 1326] and personnel are stopped. When the Arabs lay hands on a Jew, he is lucky if he escapes with his life.
One problem that is bothering the British authorities at the present lime is the question of a free port for the Jews. The Ad Hoc Committee for Palestine gave orders to the mandatory government to evacuate a port for the use of the Jews by February 1, 1948. Presumably Tel Aviv will be the port chosen. The Palestine Government fears that such a port will be used by the Jews for the import of arms and war materials which it believes will inflame the Arabs far more than will Jewish immigration. The government is believed to have notified the UN of its concern over this matter, but the situation is not yet clarified so far as we can ascertain.1
V. Position of the American Consulate General.
The first concern of the Consulate General is the continuance of its work here. So long as the British are here, there is little doubt that this mission will live and work in comparative security. The security zone system maintained in Jerusalem by the British makes working conditions possible for us and enables us to maintain contact with officials of the Government. But movement outside Jerusalem is particularly hazardous, and it is out of the question for members of this Consulate to move in and about those parts of Jerusalem which are not in protected zones. Furthermore, the comparative security enjoyed at present by the Consulate will last only so long as the British are here. After their departure, security will become a matter of conjecture. The question of importing enough American troops to protect our interests and to ensure the continuance of our work is a problematical one. Such a move would involve problems such as the question of other powers bringing in units of their own troops, but we have been assured by the present Government that it would not object to the arrival of American troops for the purpose of guarding the Consulate General. The British say they would have to consider similar measures for their own Consulate General which would be established upon their withdrawal.
The Arabs blame the United States for the success of the partition plan. They claim that the US delegation to UN brought pressure to bear on other countries to vote in favor of partition. As a result, the Arabs generally (with the exception of certain broad-minded individuals [Page 1327] who remain cordial) do not look upon US personnel with any favor. Small incidents point up this unfriendliness. In one instance the arrival of American personnel on the scene in the nick of time prevented the burning of cars belonging to officers of this Consulate. Some reports indicate the belief among Arabs that the attitude of our UN delegation toward partition is due solely to the advice and guidance of this Consulate General. And the bombing of the Consulate immediately after the announcement of the US stand on partition is another indication of how the Arabs feel toward local US representatives. This feeling will be intensified by any official statement or act of the United States favoring the Jewish State.
In case of intensified trouble here, the question of communications becomes very serious. At the present time we are taking emergency measures to ensure a reserve of gasoline and food in case they are cut off. Such inadequate measures as are possible, with the limited supply of firearms available, have been taken to protect the Consulate against physical attack, at least for a short while. A radio transmitter has been set up so that communications will not be entirely cut off. But beyond this, little can be done. Even under present conditions trips to Lydda Airfield are out of the question, and our pouch has to be sent to a smaller field nearer to Jerusalem where only C–45’s can land. And the trip to this field, only ten minutes away by car, is not without hazard. In the case of serious trouble, road communications will undoubtedly be blocked, unless the Consulate General is provided with sufficient troops to escort messengers and travelers to the seaports. All exits from Palestine for personnel in Jerusalem will of necessity be through hostile country.
The question of protection of American citizens and property is problematical. Beyond giving a general warning to Americans to leave the country, there is little that can be done. The question is complicated by the fact that a large number of the American citizens here are Jewish. Any Arab uprising will not distinguish between American and other Jews. Since we are here to protect all Americans to the utmost of our ability, the community of Americans that is not Jewish will have to share the facilities afforded with the Jews—and will therefore have to share the hazards of the Jews in the country. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Americans of Palestinian Arab origin are making arrangements to leave the country as far as possible. A similar Jewish trend may be prevented by their inability to reach this Consulate in safety.
VI. Conclusions.
Generally speaking, we believe on the basis of present information that the UN Commission will be attempting a well nigh impossible task. The problems of security and safety for this Consulate may [Page 1328] become insoluble, and the question of what government we will be accredited to will become academic. There will be no Arab State, and if the UN Commission escapes assassination and is able to form an organization in Jerusalem, it may easily find itself in the position of having to function in prison-like conditions where the Arabs might succeed, through constant interference with communications, in preventing the public, including this Consulate General, from having access to it.
- According to telegram 665, December 31, 9 a. m., from Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency sent to the Consulate General at Jerusalem a 13-point memorandum, dated December 26, 1947, for transmittal to the United States Government. The memorandum stated that the Mandatory was acting in a way that would obstruct or delay implementation of measures recommended by the General Assembly. It also reviewed attacks by Arabs after November 29 and charged that the British were not exercising effectively their responsibility for the maintenance of order (867N.01/12–3147). The text of the memorandum was transmitted to the Department by Jerusalem in despatch 239, December 31.↩