868.00/3–1847

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

confidential

A number of arguments for and against sending a letter from the President1 to the United Nations concerning proposed action by the United States in Greece and Turkey have been made. Arguments in favor of sending such a letter include:

(1)
It would demonstrate to the Congress, the U.S. public and to the world that the President did not consider his proposals contrary [Page 125] to the spirit and letter of the U.N. Charter and would clearly be consistent with the Charter.
(2)
It would help to meet the question being raised on the Hill and in the U.S. press as to why the U.S. did not take the Greek and Turkish questions to the U.N. Such a letter would also refute the Soviet press campaign which takes the line that the U.S. by-passed the U.N.
(3)
It would assist in removing from public discussion the point that the proposed U.S. action undermines the United Nations.
(4)
It might strengthen the hand of the United States in the United Nations in the not unlikely event that the question of U.S. action in Greece and Turkey is raised in one of the organs of the United Nations.
(5)
It would serve as a useful background against which to launch discussion with other members of the Big Five in case that ultimately appears to be a useful course.
(6)
It would open the way for periodic reports by the United States to the United Nations on the Greek-Turkish program if, later on, that proves to be a desirable course.
(7)
It would lay the ground work at the outset for the transfer sometime in the future of part or all of the responsibility now lodged in the United States under the President’s present program, to the United Nations and related specialized agencies in case that proves to be a helpful course of action after the emergency job is completed under the present emergency program.
(8)
The Department has thus far been unable to accept a number of Senator Vandenberg’s suggestions about relating this matter to the United Nations; a letter provides a good opportunity for meeting his views at least in part.

Arguments against the proposed letter include:

(1)
It might establish a precedent requiring the United States to report to the United Nations in future instances where the United States wishes to render assistance directly to another nation.
(2)
It would leave the assumption that the U.S. felt obligated to report such programs as those proposed for Greece and Turkey.
(3)
It might be open to criticism as an afterthought, brought on purely by domestic political considerations.
(4)
It might be interpreted as reflecting a “guilty conscience”.
(5)
It might concede a United Nations jurisdiction on matters on which we might wish to argue later that such jurisdiction does not exist.
(6)
It might be interpreted as offering a degree of UN participation in our aid-to-Greece program which we are not in fact willing to accept.
(7)
The treatment of the Turkish aspect is and must be weak. Furthermore, it is understood that the Turkish Government has not asked us directly for assistance, and might resent a statement by the U.S. reflecting even by implication on its efficacy as a government.
(8)
The distribution of the letter to UN Members might be the occasion for action by the USSR in the United Nations designed to embarrass us.
(9)
It might prejudge action by Congress to an extent which would be resented by the latter.

[Page 126]

SPA recommends:

That the above letter be despatched by Senator Austin on the day on which legislation to give effect to President Truman’s program is introduced to the Congress.

  1. A draft letter to be sent by Ambassador Austin (rather than by the President) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations was transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Mr. Rusk with a memorandum of March 18 (868.00/3–1847); neither printed.