868.00/3–1747
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell)
Memorandum on Genesis of President Truman’s March 12 Speech
On Friday, February 28, Mr. Acheson called a meeting in his office attended by Mr. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Mr. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs; Mr. Thompson, Chief of the Division of Eastern European (Russian) Affairs; a representative of the Legal Adviser’s Office; representatives of the economic offices; and myself.
Mr. Acheson said that a note had been received from the British Government saying that they were discontinuing economic aid to Greece on March 31. A meeting had been held at the White House the previous day attended by Congressional leaders, Secretary Marshall and Mr. Acheson. The problem posed by the British note had been discussed and it had been decided to ask Congress to make the necessary appropriations and take other necessary action to enable the [Page 122] United States to assist the present government in Greece. It had been agreed, however, that if such a request was to have any chance of success it must be couched in terms that would make clear the nature and gravity of the world situation. It could not be based solely in terms of assisting a former ally.
At the meeting in Mr. Acheson’s office an agenda was worked out. Mr. Henderson was to carry on the discussions with the Greek Government concerning the nature and extent of their requirements. The economic offices were to make a study of the economic situation in Greece. The office of the Legal Adviser was to formulate the legislation which would be requested.
Mr. Acheson asked me to give consideration to the way in which the broad problem should be put up to Congress and the American public. He said that Secretary Marshall was leaving the following Wednesday for Moscow; that he did not wish the fact that the Moscow conference was about to be held to weaken any statement that should be made to Congress and the American people to an extent that would undermine the success of the request to Congress. On the other hand, it was obvious that the statement should not be any stronger than was necessary. Mr. Acheson said that it had been agreed at the White House that the President should personally address Congress and that a recommendation should be made whether that message should be broadcast or whether the President should address a separate message to the American public.
Friday afternoon I called a meeting of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information and laid the problem which Mr. Acheson had outlined before it. There was an hour and a half discussion of the problem. (The minutes of the meeting are attached.1) It was decided to set up a working party to prepare for the Subcommittee a report which Mr. Acheson could discuss with Secretary Marshall on Monday.
The working party met Saturday morning and there was further discussion for about two hours. The working party consisted of Mr. Thompson, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs; Mr. Villard, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Mr. Strong of the Office of Financial and Development Policy; Mr. Joseph Jones (detailed to PA from Mr. Benton’s office); Mr. Victor Hunt of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs; representatives of the War and Navy Department; and myself. (Attached are minutes of working party meeting.1)
Following discussion by the working party, it was decided that Mr. Thompson, Mr. Villard and I would draft a paper for the Subcommittee to be submitted at a meeting on Monday at 2:30.
[Page 123]I undertook to prepare a section on general policy in an effort to meet the question which Mr. Acheson had posed of how to couch the existing world conflict, i.e. whether as a conflict between U.S. and Russia, between free enterprise and socialism, between capitalism and communism, or however. Mr. Thompson agreed to prepare the section on the existing situation in Greece and Mr. Villard agreed to prepare the section on the background of the Greek problem.
Attached is the SWNCC report.2 Pages 1 to 7 and 14 to 21 were drafted by me; pages 8 to 13 by Mr. Thompson; and several of the appendices by Mr. Villard.
I gave the SWNCC report to Mr. Acheson at 6 P. M. Monday. He discussed it with Secretary Marshall that evening and the next morning asked that the report be put in the form of a message to Congress. Joseph Jones of the Subcommittee was asked to put it in message form. (Attached is the President’s speech.3)
(Mr. Henderson had prepared a draft built around the necessity for continuing to combat “destructive forces in the world”. Mr. Kennan had submitted a draft confined largely to the needs of the Greek people.)