867N.01/2–1547
The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)
Dear Loy: I have been reviewing the last few days’ cables about Palestine, as I know you have been, with concern. The following views and questions are put forward without much confidence but in the hope of provoking some thoughts from you:
- 1.
- It looks as though the London conferences have blown up and that we have come to the end of the period begun in 1945 of trying to find a solution by inquiry and negotiation.
- 2.
- It looks as though the British were preparing to lay the whole matter before the General Assembly without recommendations.
- 3.
- It looks as though the British were prepared to maintain as an interim policy the immigration policy at present in force, that is, 1500 a month.
- 4.
- If the foregoing is true 1947 is going to be a bad year in Palestine and the Middle East, with increasing violence and grave danger to our interests in that area.
- 5.
- I see little hope that without recommendations from the British the General Assembly will be able to do very much.
- 6.
- In this situation I suppose that within a very short time we shall have to discuss the matter with the British Government and I suppose also that if the administration does not give a lead in this matter the Congress will undertake to do so with rather disastrous results.
Therefore, there are two problems that we have to consider. First, is, what should the interim program be particularly about immigration? Secondly, what attitude should we take in the United Nations.
[Page 1049]As to the first, the British view seems to be that if they make any change in present admission of Jews into Palestine it will produce Arab resistance. This may be true but it seems to me that there will be an equal amount of trouble from trying to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, if there is some relaxation of the present strict immigration policy it has the compensating advantage of perhaps making the Arabs more willing to negotiate and to compromise. Therefore, would it be possible to work for an interim policy of 3,000 per month with the idea that if this produces violence we might regard it as a threat to the peace within the jurisdiction of the Security Council and ask the Security Council to rule on that, if possible giving the interim program the strength of its endorsement.
As to the second question—that is what position we should take in the United Nations—if the British make no proposals and take no leadership and we do not I presume that the Russians will take the ball and start off with an immense propaganda advantage. Therefore, it is hard to see how we can escape the responsibility for leadership. Furthermore whatever scheme comes out of the United Nations we shall be called upon to furnish the chief economic support for it and, therefore, we have a considerable stake in helping to formulate the best possible policy. This brings us to the question, if I am right so far, as to whether that policy should be based on partition, which we have favored thus far, or whether we will conclude that despite its domestic advantages for us that policy carries too great a weight of international difficulty to put across. One thing which we should avoid is to get committed at an early stage in any discussions with the British to a plan which will leak and cause repercussions in this country. Therefore, on the long-range plan we ought to get our own views as crystallized and as generally accepted within the Government as possible before exposing them to the British.
I am aware that this only poses but does not answer the $64.00 question but I have come to the end of my ideas for the morning.