Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

891.6363/10–2347: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Tehran, October 23, 1947—4 p. m.

1035. Events leading up to definitive rejection last night of Russian oil proposals were as follows: Majlis formed quorum Tuesday a. m. October 21 long enough to transact routine business but recessed without hearing Prime Minister’s report on oil question since no agreement could be reached between majority and minority on how question should be handled. Minority refused to maintain quorum to hear report unless prior agreement was reached on steps to be taken following report.

After recessing deputies gathered in secret meeting in Majlis building in further attempt break deadlock before afternoon session scheduled for 4 p. m. Qavam’s supporters again attempted to persuade minority to maintain quorum to allow Qavam to present report and Absanjani, majority deputy from Qavam’s home district of Lahijan proposed that bill following points be passed immediately after reading of Qavam’s report:

1. Majlis appreciation would be expressed for Qavam’s efforts to maintain good relations with Soviet Union.

2. Qavam–Sadchikoff agreement on oil (April 4, 1946) would be declared invalid.

3. Iran Government would be instructed to employ engineers (presumably of Swedish, Dutch or other small country nationality) to conduct 5-year oil survey in northern Iran. Oil deposits discovered would be made available for exploitation by stock company composed of 51 percent Iranian and 49 percent Soviet shares.

4. British oil concession in south would be renegotiated to obtain better terms for Iran.

5. Action would be taken to reassert Iranian sovereignty over Bahrein and cancel existing oil concession there.

Minority refused compromise based on foregoing five-point program on grounds that first point in effect absolved Qavam of having illegally negotiated with Soviets on oil in contravention law forbidding such negotiation. Minority insisted that question of Qavam’s guilt was subject for action by competent court rather than Majlis. Agreement could [not?] be reached and meeting was terminated suddenly when unidentified minority deputy shouted that American Ambassador had just returned to Tehran from Turkey and had gone direct from airport to Qavam’s house for important conference. Story immediately spread and was everywhere accepted as correct. Local AP correspondent who telephoned to confirm story was given unequivocal statement that I had not seen Qavam and did not intend to ask for appointment in near future, but denial was too late to have much effect. Wednesday morning’s papers carried elaborated version in which my alleged conference with Qavam was reported to have lasted until 11 p. m. and that attempted reconciliation at Tuesday afternoon meeting had failed because Qavam at my insistence had telephoned his supporters in meeting that Amer Government opposed mention of Bahrein petroleum in five-point program.

Local press on Wednesday morning printed an amended text of five-point program which it was claimed would be introduced into Majlis in session scheduled for that day. Amended version contained following significant changes:

1. Majlis would not express appreciation for Qavam’s actions. On contrary it would clearly brand his letter of April 4 to Sadchikoff as contrary to law and invalid.

2. Oil discovered during 5-year exploration period would merely be offered for sale to Soviet Union.

3. Granting of any further oil concessions to foreigners and even preparation of agreements for joint stock companies with foreigners for exploiting Iran oil would be definitely forbidden.

4. Government would be called on to take steps to right wrongs done to Iran people in connection subsoil resources especially in southern oil fields. Bahrein was not mentioned.¹

While foregoing report was fairly accurate statement of compromise finally reached, it was apparent that agreement had not been reached when deputies gathered Wednesday morning. Session was again postponed until that evening and met finally at 6:30 p. m. October 22 with results described Embassy’s telegram 1031, October 23.

[Here follows a paragraph discussing an interpellation of the Qavam Government by a pro-Soviet Deputy in the Majlis.]

Sent Department; repeated London 138. Department pass to Moscow 123.

Allen

1. In telegram 1038, October 25, Ambassador Allen advised that he had “not yet learned the details regarding elimination of the provision demanding Iranian sovereignty over Bahrein and cancellation of American concession there, which was in the original formula as drafted by a member of Qavam’s party. Certainly I did not request its elimination as is widely believed here. It was undoubtedly included originally along with a provision for canceling the AIOC concession, partly to give appearance of neutrality between USSR and the western powers and partly in earnest, due to nationalism which has been aroused during fight against Soviet proposals. Final omission of any reference to Bahrein resulted, I understand, from views expressed by several deputies during secret debate. We have frequently emphasized to Iran officials that American people were opposed to any aggressive designs, whether by USSR against Azer or by Iran against Kuwait and Bahrein and influential deputies were wise enough not to become vulnerable on this point.” (891.6363/10–2547)