761.91/10–247: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
urgent
949. Qavam read to me yesterday detailed report from Iranian military commanders along Soviet frontier stating that considerable Soviet military activity had been observed during past few days north of Poldasht, Julfa and Astara in Azerbaijan, and Ashkhabad, on Turkistan frontier. Lists were given of tanks, artillery, troops and supplies seen arriving opposite these points. Widely separated places from which these reports arrived and similarity of details given lend credence to them.
[Page 964]I remarked that since much of activity reported occurred during daylight, Soviets might be endeavoring merely to impress Iranians with fear of invasion if oil proposals were refused.
Qavam said he considered situation much more serious. He thought that although Soviets would not attack as long as their oil proposals had not been definitely refused, they would begin action as soon as Majlis turned down the proposals. He felt confident Soviets would immediately begin to send irregular bands into Iran1 to create disturbances and would follow them by Soviet troops as soon as disturbances were sufficient to furnish pretext. He expects Soviets to cite Article 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty in justification.
I pointed out that this article envisaged situation in which Iran was made base of operations by third power directed against Soviet Union. Qavam agreed that Soviets would not be justified in citing Article 6 but felt confident they would do so any way. He said they had threatened him with Article 6 several times during his visit to Moscow in January 1946.
Qavam said that it would do no good to ask Soviet Ambassador concerning these reported troop concentrations, since he had asked the Ambassador similar questions on numerous occasions and the Ambassador had always replied that he had no information. I said I thought it would be useful to ask him again on this occasion anyway, since he, as Prime Minister, could hardly disregard numerous reports of this kind from his frontier. I suggested he also instruct his Ambassador in Moscow to make inquiries. Qavam said he would take both steps, that telegram to Moscow would be particularly useless. He remarked that Iranian request for agrément for new Ambassador to USSR had still received no reply although made 40 days ago. He said he would also telegraph full details to his Embassy in Washington.
I expressed the view that Iran Govt should prepare now to deal promptly with any infiltration before serious disturbances had chance to arise, in order to offer Soviets as little excuse as possible for sending in their troops to reestablish order.
While it is difficult to obtain definite information regarding Soviet troop movements near Iranian frontier, Qavam’s reports may well be correct. Interpretation of purpose of such movement is even more difficult. As regards Qavam’s interpretation it may be pointed out that [Page 965] he is aware that his tenure of office as Prime Minister may be terminated as soon as Soviet oil question is out of the way. Consequently he wished to delay settlement of that question as long as possible. Soviet invasion threat gives him good excuse for following delaying tactics on oil question.
Repeated London 123, Dept pass to Moscow as 109.
- In an urgent message on October 4, the Embassy in Tehran advised that “There are indications that Soviets may now be centering their efforts on bringing about coup d’état in Iran, to put into power govt favorable to USSR. It seems probable that Soviet authorities realize that infiltration of irregulars into Azerbaijan would not be sufficient by itself to accomplish their purposes. Coup d’état, if attempted, would appear as spontaneous act of Iranian people and would enable Soviets to gain effective control of all Iran.” (telegram 960, 891.00/10–447)↩