761.91/9–2647: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran
584. Urtels recently indicate salutary result of American stand on Iran-Soviet relations re oil. Dept feels that strong Soviet reaction, possibly even before formal Majlis action, is possible in one or more of following forms:
- a)
- Start of Greek-type guerrilla warfare on Iran-Soviet border, probably involving Barzanis, muhajirs, and other Sov-Caucasian elements.
- b)
- Inspired disturbances in Azerbaijan cities, Abadan, Isfahan and Tehran, to give credence to Soviet charges that reign of terror exists, and to divert Iranian military forces from border areas.
- c)
- Intensification of anti-Iranian propaganda by Soviets.
In anticipation such Soviet actions, Dept now actively considering its United Nations strategy for such contingency.
We feel, however, Iran Govt itself must take certain immediate measures (final para Deptel 434 July 29) if it is to reduce possibility initial success Soviet reactions indicated above. These measures might prove more efficacious than any ex post facto UN action. We are herein suggesting certain steps which might be taken by Iran Govt, leaving it to your discretion communicate suggestions to Shah, Qavam, Hekmat,1 and other patriotic Iranian leaders in position take appropriate action.
[Page 961]We see as most serious obstacle in way of Iranian national unity, which is prerequisite any successful resistance to Soviet expansion in that country, personal feud between Shah and Qavam (Embtel 859 Sep. 62). We feel both are basically patriotic Iranians but they have permitted their mutual distrust retard progress their country and operate against successful unification various elements Iranian nation. We feel Shah has consistently placed too much confidence in obstructionist advice of military leaders. It is apparent much of this advice not motivated by patriotic sentiments but by desire on part of Razmara and others for domination of Iran by military. Consequently, constant need to cope with Shah–Army group intrigues has done much to hinder Qavam in efforts unite Iranian people. Qavam on his part has at time given Shah serious reason suspect motives by vacillation between sometimes strong front against Soviet pressure and other times apparent willingness to intrigue with Soviets. He has also been dilatory in bringing to fruition plans for reform, though neither can it be said Shah has shown any effective interest this phase Iranian national life.
It is our belief that personal feud between Shah and his PriMin intolerable and dangerous for preservation Iranian national interests. Shah and PriMin working together can, we believe, unite all elements Iranian nation including peasants, labor and tribes. Your influence with both Shah and PriMin might at this time be used to bring about this desirable internal situation so closely related to Iran’s freedom from Soviet domination, without risk of criticism from political leaders, responsible press, or general public in either Iran or U.S. To the extent to which Shah and PriMin each demonstrates sincere and effective desire to act in Iranian national interest, we feel you should use your influence to keep them working harmoniously together. If Shah displays cooperative attitude and despite this Qavam so conducts himself that distrust cannot be dispelled, and if Shah should therefore consider new PriMin desirable, it is hoped that change of govt could be brought about in manner not to create wide rift in Iranian body-politic.
It would be highly desirable if new spirit of teamwork between Shah and PriMin could be demonstrated at once by termination petty political attacks on latter by Shah’s Majlis deputies, and by immediate implementation by Qavam and Majlis of practical program of reforms similar to those proposed by PM during period of autonomous Azerbaijan Govt, such as provincial councils and real land reforms.
In such disposition as might be made of Iranian Army in conjunction with the gendarmerie to combat infiltration hostile elements or to meet local disturbances, it is hoped military forces will behave such [Page 962] manner they will receive whole-hearted cooperation local populations. This may call for change of Army command particularly in regions where tribal groups, presently peaceful but hitherto unpredictable, might welcome opportunity prove themselves loyal supporters Iranian Govt.
We repeat our approval Emb efforts encourage tribes use peaceful and parliamentary means to attain what they consider just ends (Deptel 476 Aug 143). We are particularly anxious every encouragement be given Kurds who will very possibly be first target Soviet penetration following rejection oil concession, and who, if alienated from Iran Govt by Army policy of recrimination, might well become Soviet weapon against not only Iran but Turkey and Iraq as well. It seems to us if Kurds were given some recognition by central govt comparable that accorded Bakhtiaris and Qashqais by Qavam, there would be smaller risk of Kurdish disloyalty in eventualities mentioned.
Dept has observed Majlis President Hekmat’s seemingly statesmanlike behavior recent weeks and hopes his influence in Majlis can be used accelerate action on reforms Qavam might initiate.
In conclusion we feel our position in UN would be much stronger and morally more tenable if: a) Shah-Qavam feud is terminated, b) loyalty of Iran’s minorities to their Govt is assured, and c) certain long-overdue economic and social reforms are initiated immediately by Iran Govt.
Rptd London as 41684 and Moscow as 1781.