891.6363/9–1947: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
897. For a clear understanding of Soviet and Iranian positions on one particular aspect of oil question, I suggest that officers of Dept review exact text of exchange of letters between Qavam and Sadchikoff on April 4, 1946 (see Embassy’s telegram 485, April 9, 19461).
The letters contained the following statement (translation):
“The Iranian Govt agrees that the Iranian and Soviet Govts should establish a joint Iran-Soviet company to explore and exploit oil producing, territories in northern Iran under the following fundamental conditions”. After enumerating seven conditions relating to ownership, duration, area covered, etc, letters conclude: “the agreement to be concluded later for the establishment of the said joint Iran-Soviet oil company, according to the text of this note, will be presented for ratification by the new Iranian Majlis …”.2
It is significant to note that the exchange of letters envisaged the conclusion, some time subsequent to April 4, 1946 but presumably prior to submission of Soviet proposal to the Majlis, of an agreement for the establishment of the mixed company. Neither Soviet nor Iranian Govts took any action towards negotiating the agreement in question until last month when Sadchikoff upon his return from Moscow presented Qavam with a draft agreement and insisted that Qavam sign it immediately and present it to Majlis promptly for ratification (Embassy’s telegram 752, August 14). Qavam pointed out that the Soviet draft would not be acceptable to Majlis and suggested further negotiations. Sadchikoff refused, on the grounds that his draft contained the exact provisions Iran had already agreed to, subject to ratification, and that Qavam could not properly refuse to sign. Qavam then said he could not sign because of legal difficulties, but that he would report the entire question to Majlis, present the draft agreement, without his signature, and leave the entire decision to the Majlis.
(The “legal difficulties” Qavam had in mind result from an act of the Majlis of Dec 2, 1944, Embassy’s telegram 895, Dec 3, 19443 forbidding any Iranian official, inter alia, to “sign any agreement regarding a petroleum concession” with foreigners).
Sadchikoff’s position that Qavam is unjustified in refusing to “conclude” (i.e. sign) an agreement based on the terms of the 1946 letter has some merit since Qavam committed himself and the Iranian Govt, in principle, to such an agreement when he signed the letter. Moreover, [Page 956] Qavam’s declared willingness to negotiate other terms with Sadchikoff presupposes his willingness to enter into some kind of oil agreement for presentation to Majlis. Consequently the legal difficulties to which Qavam refers would not appear to have been regarded by Qavam as an insuperable barrier if the USSR had agreed to negotiate.
On the other hand, Qavam can well argue that he is not obligated under the 1946 letter to sign anything more, and that his expressed willingness to submit Sadchikoff’s own draft to Majlis and await Majlis instructions should satisfy the USSR.
Several instructions which British Embassy here has received from Bevin have emphasized the latter’s anxiety that Iran should take no action which would justify the USSR in accusing Iran, before UN or elsewhere, of having violated any of its obligations or undertakings. It seems probable that Bevin is impressed with the strength of the Soviet position as described above and that this impression has been in some part responsible for the British advice to Iran not to close the door if the 1946 terms are refused.
I am inclined to believe, however, that Qavam’s position, while perhaps not free from any legalistic attack, is sound enough in principle and I think he is both wise in practice and justified in theory in refusing to give Sadchikoff a new signature before presenting the case to the Majlis.
I give the foregoing detailed discussion since the point might come under consideration if the Iranian case should again be referred to UN.
- Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 413.↩
- Omission indicated in the original.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, p. 479.↩