Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

501.BB Balkan/12–1747

[Extract]

Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 22, 1947.

Subject: Willingness of United States Government in Certain Circumstances to Despatch United States Forces to Greece

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The argument has been made that it would be better to lose Greece than to send armed forces there since Greece would be strategically difficult to defend and since, if serious fighting should develop, American forces might be defeated. Our answer is that the despatch of American forces to Greece would not be for the purpose of turning Greece into the chief battlefield between the forces of the West and those of international communism. The despatch of these forces would be a political gesture made for the purpose of showing that we are so determined that we will, if necessary, resort to force to meet aggression. In case international communism responds by sending even stronger forces to combat us in Greece, then we shall know that the Soviet Union prefers war to the abandonment of its aggressive policies, and we can take the appropriate measures on a world-wide scale.

It has also been argued that it is impossible for the United States, with the small number of combat divisions in our Army, to send forces to Greece unless we resort to partial mobilization, and that Congress and the American public would oppose such action. We, of course, are not able to judge whether or not it would be necessary to call for partial mobilization in order to be able to send to Greece and maintain there two or three American combat divisions. We are convinced, however, that if it should become clear that Greece will be lost unless troops are sent, we should, in accordance with procedures outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, send troops even though their despatch might necessitate drastic changes in the size and organization of our whole military establishment.^*

Recommendations:

In view of the above, it is our earnest recommendation:

1. That the decision be taken now that if it becomes clear that Greece will succumb to direct or indirect aggression unless American forces are despatched to Greece, the United States will be prepared, preferably with other like-minded nations, to send such forces in accordance with the procedures indicated in the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In the event of recognition by Albania, Bulgaria, or Yugoslavia of any government of Greece other than the government represented in the United Nations, the United States would take the position that such recognition is contrary to the resolution of the General Assembly in the Greek case and makes it clear beyond any doubt that the country extending such recognition has committed itself to aggression. In such an event, the United States would support the immediate convening of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the measures to be taken. The United States would likewise regard as aggression an act of recognition by any power other than the three mentioned in the General Assembly resolution if such recognition were followed by the provision of material aid to the Greek guerrillas.

The United States should immediately inform all members of the United Nations that it would take the position stated above in the event of recognition of a rebel government in Greece. This communication, which should be made public, might contain a statement that we would regard the matter as so serious as to warrant the use of every resource available to the United Nations for the defense of Greece and that the United States would be prepared, in accordance with its responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, together with other like-minded nations, to take interim steps which might be necessary to protect Greece pending action by the United Nations.

3. If recognition of a rebel government should not be accompanied by the introduction of foreign armed forces in support of the rebels, the United States should call upon the General Assembly to recommend:

(a) That the governments extending recognition withdraw such recognition within a designated period, perhaps ten days.

(b) That failing such withdrawal of recognition, the member states of the United Nations, if requested by the Government of Greece, should be prepared to render to Greece all requisite assistance, including, in case of need, the despatch of troops to assist in defending the integrity of that country.

Consideration might also be given, if developments at the time would make it appear that such a procedure might be advantageous, to calling a meeting of representatives of the five Great Powers under Article 106 of the Charter to consider steps either to implement the resolution of the General Assembly or to be taken independently in the event that Assembly action is delayed or cannot be obtained.

4. If recognition of the rebel Greek government is accompanied by the introduction of foreign armed forces, or if such armed forces are introduced without recognition of the “government”, the United States should call upon all members of the United Nations to respond to a Greek appeal under Article 51 by sending troops to Greece in order to restore international peace and security. As required by the Charter, the nations concerned should notify the Security Council of their action and should request the Council to take appropriate measures for the protection of Greece under Chapter 7 of the Charter.

5. The United States, in any case, should be prepared, in accordance with the procedures indicated in the Charter of the United Nations, to send troops under the conditions set forth in paragraphs numbered 3 or 4 above even though other powers should not consider themselves to be in a position also to send troops.

6. Whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, events occur which warrant the taking of action under the Charter outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, he should consult with the National Security Council before setting in motion the governmental machinery for the taking of such action.

1. Addressed to the Secretary of State and to Messrs. Lovett and Armour. The draft memorandum bears the notation: “not sent.”
2. This memorandum does not attempt to deal with contingencies involving the despatch by the Soviet Union or its satellites into Greece of military forces of such magnitude that they could be halted only by the use of large armies. Such contingencies would probably mean a new world war and would have to be dealt with accordingly. [Footnote in the source text.]