It is hoped that this appraisal of the situation, which represents the
considered opinion of those officers of the Embassy who have been
closely following developments in recent months, may be helpful to the
Department in shaping United States policy in Greece to serve our
interests.
The situation in Greece is fraught with such evident peril to the
maintenance of fundamental democratic freedom not only in Greece,
Europe, and Asia but even in the United States itself, that one can only
assume that those whose responsibility it is in our Government to make
plans for our national defense are giving careful thought not only to
the current situation as it develops but also to the potentialities of
the situation, to the extent to which it may be possible to predict what
might happen in the foreseeable future. The crux of the matter would
seem to be “Is the United States in Greece to see the job through, i.e.
to preserve Greek independence from Communist (Soviet) domination, or
not?” Those who have collaborated on the
[Page 439]
enclosed memorandum feel that in our own best
interests our answer can only be in the affirmative. If so, our
provision for the future must not be limited by the original aid to
Greece program or our effectiveness be hampered by any narrow limitation
on what we as a nation can do, and promptly, as the developing situation
may demand. Whether we like it or not, or are yet prepared to admit it
publicly, we must recognize that in Greece we are faced with war, not
alone a propaganda war on a large scale but a shooting war, sponsored by
those whose way of life is inimical to ours and whose intensified
efforts in recent months give evidence of an intent to checkmate our
combined efforts to overcome it. While it is the part of wisdom to
endeavor to win this contest with the least outlay as long as such a
program does not seriously endanger victory, we should not, and must
not, handicap ourselves improvidently. For our own national safety we
must not rely upon piecemeal action. Economic forces can defeat us as
readily as other forces. We should have authorized and available such
additional funds and facilities as prudence demands without the costly
delay entailed in obtaining, after the fact, more funds from the
Congress tardily to meet new situations as they arise. If we are not to
lose the war we must not lose too many of the battles for the want of
immediate means to win them. The timely availability of a few millions
of dollars when needed might well mean the difference between success
and failure, victory and defeat.
As a result of views exchanged with the members of the various
Congressional groups that visited Greece in recent months, the Embassy
is convinced that Congress will grant the necessary authority and funds
to protect the vital interests of the United States if the situation is
clearly and frankly explained to it. It is suggested that less funds
might be required in the long run if the secrecy concerning our
intentions were raised so that not only the Congress and the American
people may fully appreciate the threat to our way of life and how we
intend to combat it but, also, so that those who are threatening that
way of life may be left in no doubt as to our intentions and the
steadfastness of our purpose in defending it, both at home and in the
territory of our friends abroad who share our attachment to the
democratic freedoms and are prepared, with our assistance, to defend
them.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Political Section of the Embassy
in Greece3
secret
[Athens,] December 6, 1947.
Subject: Suggestions for United States Policy in
Greece
I. Need for Realistic Decisions on High Policy
Level
The Greek situation has now reached an exceedingly delicat balance
point. On the one hand there is the possibility of gradually inching
forward towards the reestablishment of order and economic recovery.
On the other, there is the possibility of total military and
economic collapse. To the extent that adequate provision has not
already been made to cope with the developing situation, high policy
decisions should be taken by the United States with the least
possible delay.
Decisions on particular Greek problems should be taken only after
each problem is considered in the light of all other related Greek
problems. For example, a decision on the one hand that the needs of
the refugees (estimated at more than 400,000 as of this date) should
be covered in the Greek budget is wholly unrealistic when on the
other hand those responsible for balancing the budget simultaneously
state emphatically that such needs cannot be met in the budget
without immediate probability of runaway inflation dangerous to the
entire Aid Program. Temporary provision for a nine-months’ period of
minimum needs for shelter, clothing and food for only 284,000
refugees as of October 1 amounted to 266,654,100,000 drachmas, or
one-tenth of the total budget of the Greek State.
In arriving at decisions on Greek problems, thinking must transcend Greece. For example, it has
been suggested that it might be cheaper in the long run to bring
into Greece sufficient American troops promptly to restore order,
but as such a move might well precipitate war with Soviet Russia and
her satellites, the final decision must weigh this as well as other
possibilities.
The important thing is that the Greek situation and all that depends
upon it with respect to preserving genuine democratic freedoms in
Europe and Asia, and eventually in the Western Hemisphere, requires
that constant vigilance be exercised to the end that nothing be done
that will detract, and nothing left undone that will contribute to
the accomplishment of this end objective.
II. Factors in the Situation
- a.
-
Economic situation: Because of elements
that were not, and in some cases could not be, foreseen when the
appraisal was made upon
[Page 441]
which the funds for the American Aid to Greece Program were
voted, and because of the deterioration that took place before
that aid could be made effective, those funds and the facilities
based thereon have proved insufficient to hold the line, let
alone effect the reconstruction of the country. Although there
have been marked improvements in certain respects, such as in
the establishment of a Foreign Trade Organization to bring order
out of chaos in that field, there has been deterioration in
other respects, so that on balance the economic situation within
Greece remains at least as critical as it was a year ago.
- The delay involved in the implementation of the Aid Bill, the
poor harvest of last year, rising international prices, and
close to a half million unforeseen refugees—all of these
aggravated and exploited by Communist sabotage and
propaganda—have slowed progress to a dangerous pace. The refugee
problem alone is a major calamity which, if unrelieved, is such
as would threaten the political organization and economy of a
stronger nation. To have over five percent of the total
population of Greece (over 15 percent of Northern Greece where
the problem is particularly serious) homeless, destitute and
terrorized is a situation in the face of which no Greek
Government can long exist, particularly as the refugee problem
is merely an acute manifestation of a generally perilous
situation. The memorandum prepared by First Secretary Horace
Smith goes into greater detail on the economic aspects of our
policy and makes certain recommendations. A copy of that
memorandum, which was submitted to the Department under cover of
despatch no. 5650 of November 24, 1947,4 is appended
hereto.
- b.
-
Military situation: The insurrection is
intensifying. Even under the most advantageous conditions,
military observers do not foresee the containing of the rebels
until the end of 1948. On the contrary, the guerrillas appear to
be gaining in strength and boldness while, reports of
satisfactory morale on the part of the National forces
notwithstanding, the efforts of the Greek Government and its
forces to control the situation seem to be increasingly less
effective. Further, while winter conditions will impede both
sides, it is unquestionable that in mountainous terrain largely
controlled by the guerrillas the lack of mobility which such
conditions impose will favor the guerrillas over the Greek
National Army. Were other things equal, the giving of
operational advice by American officers might serve to turn the
tide. There is, however, no assurance that other factors will
not intervene.
- Our own transcending interests demand that the military
situation be reviewed not in relation to Greece alone but in
relation to the world problem. By July 1, 1948, if not sooner,
the Greek Army will have consumed all the rations provided for
it within the Aid Program.
[Page 442]
Whence will come its rations thereafter?
Is it realistic, on the grounds of inadequate aid funds, to
continue to deny Greece the additional military effectives she
contends she needs to end the rebellion? To do so in the face of
the deteriorating situation is to give the Greeks and their
(our) opponents the impression that it is immaterial to us
whether the rebellion ends or not, which surely cannot be the
case. If we are not convinced of the need for more effectives,
at least we must be prepared immediately to provide more funds
and equipment if our military planning staff so recommends, and
their judgment should be free, that is, not restricted by the
limits of the Aid to Greece Program. That Staff should not only
feel free, but be instructed, to report what in their opinion
the true military situation is and what is needed to cope with
it in the light of United States interests in maintaining
Greece’s freedom from Communist domination. Whatever is required
should promptly be given.
- c.
-
Political situation: Politically,
Greece’s world position has perhaps improved over what it was a
year ago in that the justice of her cause has been recognized by
the majority of the United Nations, and Greece has been able to
enlist the sympathetic support of the United States in most
respects. Greece is, however, still severely criticized by her
friends who have, perhaps unwittingly, allowed themselves to be
put on the defensive by Communist allegations of
“monarcho-faseism”, and have themselves weakened Greece’s
position by all too frequent criticisms that seem to ignore the
fact that Greece is at war. This publicly evidenced lack of
confidence in the Greek Government is extremely important in the
general feeling of confusion and uncertainty which has impeded
the Greeks’ own efforts to save their country. Meanwhile,
Greece’s enemies have become more and more open in their designs
against her, and recent developments give reason to fear that an
even more flagrant offensive is imminent. Thus the formation and
location of the Cominform at Belgrade, the increasingly overt
assistance and support offered the guerrillas by the satellite
countries and by international organizations such as the WFTU, and the conclusion of the
Yugoslav-Bulgarian alliance not only are useful weapons in the
“war of nerves” but also are potential weapons in any larger
developments which may be forthcoming. The war psychosis which
is being openly and officially fomented in the satellite
countries is a disquieting development.
-
If no further adverse factors were to
enter the picture, and if Greece could confidently count upon
adequate ERP aid to replace
AMAG when the latter ends,
time might swing the balance in favor of
the realization of American aims in Greece. The influence of
AMAG is just now beginning
to be felt, American military advisers are about to
[Page 443]
arrive, and the UNSCOB
may prove a deterring factor to the
despatch of arms and supplies across the border. Thus, were the
Communists to surrender the initiative to us, it might be
possible to envisage a slow and gradual improvement in the
situation within the framework of a democratic Greece. All
evidences, however, support the expectation that the USSR and
her satellites will not give up the initiative, but will on the
contrary resort to any means necessary to thwart us and to give
the balance the push necessary to swing it in their favor. Once
swung in that direction, the balance will not return short of
war.
III. Indications of Further
Communist Action
The Communist rebels and their foreign supporters have repeatedly
threatened to take, and have it within their power at any time to
take, a simple decision, which would completely upset the delicate
balance in Greece: to wit, the formation of a so-called “Free
Democratic Government” in rebel-held territory or even in exile. If
this has not yet been done, Mr. Johnson’s warning before the
Security Council may have been the deterrent factor, but the
situation has evolved since August 12.
Such a step would presumably include the severance of official
relations with the Athens government and the granting of belligerent
status to the rebels. Soviet Russia and her satellites would then be
freer to give assistance to the rebels and would probably do so in
greater degree than we are giving it to the legitimate Government of
Greece. Materially the simple formation of a rebel government would
probably change the actual situation very little, if at all.
Psychologically its effect would be extremely bad in Greece and,
propaganda-wise, abroad. Recognition and open assistance would,
however, radically alter the whole picture and, incidentally,
completely nullify the efforts of UNSCOB, which would find itself, if it could continue
to operate at all, in the position of “discovering” that which would
by that time be openly acknowledged.
Indications that the Communists are aware of the advantages of such
action are not lacking. In addition to evidences of preparedness on
the part of the northern countries, the Communists within Greece
itself are known to be preparing for general action the moment the
word is given. It has recently been confirmed that the guerrillas
have at their disposal, and are now utilizing, mountain artillery, a
weapon which the United States and Great Britain have so far failed
to provide the Greek Army despite repeated requests for such
matériel by the Greek Government. Guerrilla propaganda last week
asserted that the “Democratic Army” is repairing the several
aircraft which have fallen into its hands. While the repair of these
aircraft cannot yield
[Page 444]
a
significant number of serviceable machines, their existence would
allow a “Free Greek Government”, when and if formed, an opportunity
clandestinely to utilize air support from the neighboring countries
to the north while alleging that the planes used against the GNA were those very same craft which
had been repaired from GNA losses.
There is, moreover, strong reason to believe that the Communist
Party of Greece (KKE) is
designating, training and despatching to the hills an administrative
cadre which is destined to be the backbone of a “Free Government”.
Moreover, many KKE leaders have
recently disappeared from Athens and the party rank and file have
been led to expect that a “Free Government” will be formed “when
General Marcos and old Man Winter have secured enough terrain”.
These should give us sufficient warning of further dynamic attempts
on the part of the KKE and its
supporters to achieve the Communist goal in Greece.
IV. The Problem
Pending settlement of basic issues between Washington and the
Kremlin, the line must at least be held in Greece. Whether or not,
and how, that line is held will play an important part in the final
solution of the overall problem. A dynamic policy effectively
administered will not only safeguard our vital interests in Greece,
but might also serve as a spearhead aimed directly at a vulnerable
spot on the Communist periphery.
The problem facing us at the present juncture is to determine how far
we are willing to go and what specific steps may be necessary to
prevent one more democratic country from undeservedly and
irretrievably falling behind the Iron Curtain, and more immediately
to forestall, or failing this to counter, the establishment and
possible recognition of a rebel “government”. The following
recommendations are submitted with these objectives in view.
V. Recommendations
- A.
- To meet the specific threat of the formation of a rebel
“government” the United States should immediately issue an
unequivocal statement reaffirming and strengthening the remarks
made by Mr. Herschel Johnson before the Security Council on
August 12, 1947.5 Paraphrasing his
declaration in the light of subsequent developments, it should
be stated that since effective action by the Security Council
was repeatedly prevented by the veto of the Soviet Union, and
since Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have continued to refuse
to follow the recommendations of the General Assembly, the
United States Government does not consider that individual or
collective action by
[Page 445]
states willing to act is precluded, so long as they act in
accordance with the general purposes and principles of the
United Nations. We should reiterate that the United States is
prepared and willing to cooperate with like-minded members of
the United Nations in taking any step which might become
necessary to afford Greece the protection to which she is
entitled. More specifically, it should be declared that the
forcible establishment, throughout Greece or in any part of her
territory, of a minority, totalitarian “government” subservient
to the Communist-controlled countries, would be considered an
act of aggression which would justify Greece’s invoking article
51 of the Charter. It should be asserted that in such an event
Greece can count on the whole-hearted support of the United
States.
- B.
- Among other things, it might not be inappropriate to reexamine
the question of our diplomatic relations with the hostile
satellite neighbors of Greece, giving careful consideration to
the practicability of recognizing, in concert with the other
Western democracies, democratic governments-in-exile of these
states. It might even be appropriate to include in the
declaration recommended in (A) above, a statement that the
United States will feel compelled to reconsider its relations
with any state which recognizes such a rebel
“government”.
- C.
- Apart from the question of a rebel “government” we must now
prepare and execute a plan of action measuring up to the urgency
of the existing situation. Already Communist propaganda in the
Balkans plays the theme that the United States and Britain are
“more likely to engage in the ‘literary activity’ of writing
diplomatic notes than in vigorous direct counter-action”. Such a
program should be applicable in the eventuality that United
States action to forestall the formation of a Free Government be
either too late or too little. It must be a broad program and
envisage action in the political, psychological, military,
economic, and informational fields. The following broad
recommendations are made to reinforce the already substantial
efforts being made under AMAG’s
present program.
- i.
-
Political anal psychological. Our
political and psychological approach must be positive
and dynamic. We must not only adopt, but must convince
our allies and the rest of the world that the United
States has assumed, a determination to “see this
through”. We have morally committed ourselves to the
support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Greece. However, this moral commitment has not yet been
made explicit, which leads our allies, as well as our
enemies, to question our determination. We must
realistically support the present coalition Government,
or any broadly based government that may succeed it.
Similarly we must cease unrealistically asking Greece to
make unilateral sacrifices, for example in regard to
reparations and
[Page 446]
territorial claims, which embarrass and weaken the
Greek Government and undermine the confidence of the
Greeks in our support of them when contrasted with
Soviet support of her satellite states which
concurrently have designs and less justifiable claims
against Greece.
- The United States must be prepared, should a rebel
Government be formed either before or in spite of an
announcement of American policy as recommended above, to
take effective action. Such action would presumably be
initiated by (but not limited to) a formal complaint in
the United Nations against the satellite nations, should
these nations recognize the “Free Government”.
- It is likewise high time that the United States
Government forsook the defensive and stopped apologizing
for the present, allegedly “monarcho-fascist” Greek
Government. Its shortcomings are multitudinous, but it
is by no means as bad as international public opinion
has been led by repeated and insidious Communist
propaganda to believe. We should not hesitate whenever
occasion demands to remind the world that it is a
government freely elected by the people under
international supervision (Amfoge). It is, to say the least,
cooperative and well-intentioned. While it falls short
of ideal democracy (as we
understand the word), we should stress that this is
largely because of conditions intentionally created by
its Communist enemies. In the face of fantastic
obstacles, political, economic and military, the present
rulers of Greece are unquestionably making a sincere
effort to remain democratic, and occasional deviations
are understandable. The present coalition has many
weaknesses, but there is no immediate alternative and
with firm support and advice it can be reinforced.
Fundamental reforms can be effected through this
Government if patience, persistence, and an
understanding of the limits imposed by the stage of
development of the country itself are exercised.
American political and psychological policy towards
Greece must not lose sight of the fact that there is
very little in Greece that cannot stand the light of
impartial publicity, which Greece herself has always
welcomed, and that we have the advantage of the
ascertainable truth on our side. In summary, our failure
to give Greece unqualified political and psychological
support has considerably impaired the ability of the
Greeks to help themselves.
- ii.
-
Military. In a military sense our
decision to send to Greece a group of American officers
to give operational advice to the Greek Army has had a
salutary effect on Greek morale. But this far-sighted
action must be implemented with the least possible delay
if it is to have the maximum effect. Too often in the
military, as in other fields, our day to day actions,
dictated frequently by overriding factors such as
shortages of appropriated funds, have had a cumulatively
negative
[Page 447]
effect which tends to defeat our over-all objective. (As
examples; delay in arrival of aircraft, mules, munitions
and military equipment, resistance on necessary
budgetary grounds to Greek desires for increases in the
Army and National Guard and our present objection to the
request of the Greek Army for mountain artillery.) Each
factor in itself is small but the cumulative effect is
to discourage the Greeks from getting along with the
guerrilla fighting, to beat down their will to resist
and to give credence to their fear that the United
States does not seriously intend to see this thing
through. These are military matters in which the
Political Section is not endeavoring to pass judgment
but merely indicating the negative effects in the sum
total. No criticism is intended of AMAG or USAGG, which have
accomplished the maximum within the limits of inadequate
funds.
- Similarly we do not feel competent to make a final
recommendation with regard to the wisdom of sending
American forces to Greece either alone or together with
other United Nations forces since we are not able, from
our limited viewpoint, to see the problem in the
over-all context of our relations with the Soviet Union,
nor are we informed as to the considerations of grand
strategy involved. What alone is clear from the
political viewpoint here is that the situation may at
any time develop to a point where a decision for or
against the sending of troops would be immediately
necessary. This possibility must be faced at once by
those competent to do so, if it has not already been
faced and decided.
- iii.
-
Economic. American political
exigencies aside, it is unrealistic to expect to save
Greece on a piecemeal or year to year basis. Our policy
must be long range and must be announced as such.
Otherwise skeptical Greeks will tend to withhold their
cooperation, as they already have, for the purpose of
laying aside a reserve against the day that American
assistance is withdrawn. The Porter recommendations on
which the AMAG program
was based were drawn up on the basis of observations
made approximately one year ago, since which time the
situation has changed considerably for the worse. Until
over-riding political problems are solved, economic
theory and sound business principles cannot be
controlling considerations. The existing appropriation
for Greece is inadequate and additional funds must be
provided. The present situation must be presented to
Congress and to the American people as transcending mere
considerations of economy.
- As already recommended, the designated powers of the
Chief of AMAG should be
broadened to permit him to make on-the-spot decisions
and questions necessarily referred to Washington for
decision should receive the promptest consideration. It
is of the utmost importance
[Page 448]
that individual decisions be made
with due regard to all other elements of the internal
situation and in the light of our overall objectives.
- iv.
-
Information and propaganda. The
most immediate Soviet response to the Truman Doctrine
was in the field of propaganda, the United States being
prompted [promoted?] from no. 3
whipping-boy in the Greek arena (viz, after the Greek
and British Governments) to the distinction of public
enemy no. 1. Expansion of the Truman Doctrine into the
Marshall Plan was answered with a formal declaration of
psychological warfare, the Cominform.
- Instead of meeting this propaganda attack, we have
actually retreated in the main target area, reducing by
half the already inadequate local budget of the USIS in Greece and
obliging the Greeks to trim by 17 percent the budget of
the Greek Under Secretariat for Press and
Information.
- The value of propaganda as a weapon of war and
politics should need no argument, and the consequences
of our own and the Greek’s relative neglect of this
weapon are apparent in the apathy of the Greek people
and army, in the widespread confusion of world opinion
as to the facts of the situation and American objectives
in Greece, and in the feeling among opposition (genuine
democratic) elements in the satellite countries that
they have been abandoned.
- It is recommended, therefore, that in cooperation with
the Greeks we launch a concerted campaign designed
frankly to arouse the people within Greece and to break
guerrilla morale, to counteract the Soviet campaign of
lies and vilification throughout the world, and to
stimulate resistance activities in the Soviet satellite
countries. The set of assumptions in the Department’s
circular telegram of December 4,6 just received
here, is excellent and might well be made a world-wide
directive. The Greek Information Service, at present a
neglected political plum, should be raised to a full
ministry, adequately staffed both at home and abroad,
and aided by the advice of outstanding American public
relations experts. Greek affairs should receive more
extensive and more positive treatment in OIE propaganda throughout
the world, the maximum possible publicity being given to
hitherto secret information on subversive,
Soviet-sponsored activities, and our diplomatic agents
should be instructed to keep all friendly governments
consistently and thoroughly informed on the Greek
situation. This is particularly important in order to
prepare other members of the UN for whatever further
international action may be required in defense of
Greece. Finally, the current plan to set up a combined
Hellenic-American radio station in Greece should be
carried through promptly and
[Page 449]
there should be no hesitancy about
directing some of the programs to the guerrillas
themselves and to listeners in the satellite states.
