The committee recognizes, however, that this may be only part of a much
broader problem arising for this country in consequence of Britain’s
economic and political situation.
It also recognizes the possibility that it may not be possible to
organize action by this Government on a sufficient scale and in
sufficient time to prevent a sweeping deterioration of the Greek
situation with profound repercussions in other parts of the Near East
and Europe.
For these reasons, it recommends that a small State–War–Navy committee be
appointed at once to prepare at once an estimate:
Analysis of the Proposals Contained in British
Notes of February 244
Relating to Greece and Turkey (for Discussion Purposes Only)
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
obligations or commitments which british
propose that the united states undertake
1. With reference to Greece:
The British propose that as of April 1, 1947 the United States
Government assume financial responsibilities hitherto borne by
Britain with regard to Greece. The British estimate that during the
last nine months of 1947 Greece will require between $240,000,000
and
[Page 49]
$280,000,000 from abroad
for its civilian and military needs in addition to that already
furnished by the British. Since the British Government is unable to
spend more on Greece, it expresses the hope that the United States
Government will find itself in a position to afford this
assistance.
The note, with its enclosures,5 also points out that the
conclusion is inescapable that for several years subsequent to 1947
Greece “will not have anything even remotely approaching minimum
financial resources needed to preserve its integrity and
independence as such”,6 and makes
it clear that unless the United States continues after 1947 to give
Greece financial aid and help in the form of military equipment,
Greece can not survive as an independent country.
In this connection the note expresses the hope that “if a joint
policy of effective and practical support for Greece is to be
maintained, the United States Government will agree to bear as from
the first of April 1947 the financial burden of which the major part
has hitherto been borne by His Majesty’s Government”.
It is suggested in the note that the State Department and the United
States Chiefs of Staff examine papers now in the possession of the
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington which have full details of
the present organization of the Greek armed forces and of the
reorganization proposed by the British military authorities; and
that, in addition, the various military questions relating to Greece
should be given urgent consideration by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
The note further suggests that if the United States Government should
find itself able to offer economic aid to Greece, it would probably
desire to send to Greece a United States economic mission. It would
appear that the role of this United States economic mission would be
to supervise the utilization of funds made available to the Greek
Government and to give the Greeks advice in the field of economic
reconstruction.
2. With regard to Turkey:
With regard to Turkey, the British Government takes the position that
in order to bring the armed forces of Turkey into a reasonable state
of preparedness a large measure of re-equipment and considerable
training will be necessary. It indicates that the British Government
is not prepared financially to re-equip the Turkish armed forces.
The British Government, however, is prepared to look after the needs
of the Navy and the air forces, provided satisfactory financial
arrangements can be made (apparently by the United States), and to
furnish
[Page 50]
to Turkey additional
military, naval and air advisers amounting to some sixty officers
for whom the Turkish Government has asked.
It is pointed out that if Turkey is to be able to carry out any plan
of extensive military reorganization and also a plan of a kind of
economic development which would strengthen the ability of the Turks
to defend themselves, Turkey must obtain financial assistance from
abroad. It is emphasized that the British Government, in the
existing financial situation of Great Britain, cannot make further
credits available to Turkey and that, therefore, Turkey must look
either to the United States Government or some American lending
agency, such as the Eximbank, or to the International Bank or the
International Monetary Fund. The British Government makes it clear
that it has come to the conclusion that economic and financial
assistance from abroad should be given to Turkey. It does not,
however, indicate how much financial assistance will be necessary.
The specific suggestion is made that a study of the strategic and
military position of Turkey should be made by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. The British ask whether the United States Government has any
suggestions as to how a program of military reorganization that may
be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be
financed.
discussion
The argument might be advanced that the British are not entirely
sincere in presenting the proposals contained in these notes; that
the world situation will compel them to continue to extend
assistance to Turkey and Greece regardless of what we might or might
not contribute; and that the notes have been presented with the idea
of pushing the United States Government out in front in the Near
East and of prevailing upon the United States to assume the
financial and other economic burdens which otherwise must be borne
primarily by Great Britain. It might also be suggested that Great
Britain has already decided to change its basic policies towards the
Soviet Union and is now planning, instead of continuing to try to
resist Soviet pressure, to endeavor to come to terms with the Soviet
Union on a basis involving respective spheres of influence in
various parts of the world, including Europe and the Near East, and
the conclusion of a close military alliance extending perhaps beyond
the framework of the United Nations. Persons following this line of
reasoning might further argue that the notes have been sent in the
belief that the United States will refuse to bear what the British
Government considers to be an appropriate share of the financial and
economic burdens and that this refusal would justify the British
Government, in the eyes
[Page 51]
of
the British people and before the whole world, in making such a
change of policy.
After examining carefully the notes in the light of the present
international situation and of the economic conditions in Great
Britain, we are inclined to believe that the British Government is
really convinced that it is unable any longer to expend funds,
supplies and manpower in the Near East in the future as it has in
the past; that it hopes that the United States, realizing how
important it is that the independence of Turkey and Greece be
maintained, will undertake to relieve Great Britain of these
financial responsibilities and that the two Governments will be able
in cooperation to resist Soviet pressure in the Near East. We feel,
however, that if the United States finds itself unable to render
assistance to an extent which promises successfully to resist Soviet
pressure, the British Government may well find that it will be
compelled to approach the Soviet Government in an effort to work out
some arrangement which would have the effect of at least slowing up
the Russian advance in the Middle East and elsewhere. Such an
arrangement would undoubtedly mean widespread concessions to Russia
in one or several areas.
We do not believe that the British Government has any present plans
to enter into an arrangement of this kind, particularly since the
effect of it would be certain to weaken the authority of the United
Nations, on which the British Government gives every indication of
basing its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that
if Great Britain finds that the United States is unwilling to
finance and otherwise back up the avowed policies of the American
Government it may come to the conclusion that it has no other course
open to it than to seek a breathing spell by coming to terms with
the Soviet Union.
In the event that we should refuse to assume the type of
responsibility for Greece and Turkey which the British are asking us
to undertake, a number of consequences are possible, among which
might be mentioned the following:
- (1)
- Greece and Turkey, without financial and other aid from
either the United States or Great Britain, may become Soviet
puppets in the near future. Their loss to the western world
would undoubtedly be followed by further Soviet territorial
and other gains in Europe and in the Near and Middle East.
The resulting chaos would be accompanied by an immediate
weakening of the strategic and economic position of the
whole western world, particularly of Great Britain, and the
very security of the United States would be
threatened.
- (2)
- The British Government might decide that, in order to
avert the immediate Soviet conquest of Greece it must come
to an arrangement with the Soviet Union, including a
military alliance and the setting up of spheres of
influence. Such an arrangement would greatly
[Page 52]
strengthen the Soviet Union,
would weaken Great Britain and would tend to isolate the
United States, The restoration of spheres of influence would
furthermore undermine the foundations of the United
Nations.
In our opinion, either of these two consequences would bring us
closer to a third world war in which we would find ourselves in a
much more disadvantageous position than that in which we are at
present. In case an arrangement should be effected between Great
Britain and the Soviet Union of the character referred to above, we
might become eventually involved in a world conflict, possibly
without the effective military support of Great Britain. We feel,
therefore, that it would be in the interest of the United States for
this Government to relieve the British Government of the major share
of the financial burden which it has been bearing on behalf of
Greece and Turkey. We realize, however, that grave difficulties are
involved since certain responsible officials of the Administration
and members of Congress, as well as large sections of the general
public, are not as yet fully cognizant of the seriousness of the
situation and would not like for the United States to expend large
sums of money in the Near East or for it to undertake to play a
leading role in that part of the world. It is not yet generally
realized that the future of the Near East is no less important to
the security and welfare of the United States than is that of the
Far East and Europe.
An accompanying document sets forth the Department of State’s
position and recommendations on this problem.7
