Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.20 Missions/11–447

Memorandum by Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the National Security Council

top secret

Washington, October 30, 1947.

Subject: Extension of Operational Advice to the Greek Armed Forces

At an informal meeting on Monday, October 27, 1947, attended by various members of the National Security Council, the report by Major General S. J. Chamberlin on the situation in Greece was considered. The Executive Secretary was directed to prepare a statement of the Council’s agreement that US military assistance to Greece should be expanded to furnish operational advice in addition to matériel and instruction in its use, subject to certain provisions.

Accordingly, the enclosed draft statement¹ (Enclosure A) of an agreement by the Council, which has been prepared in collaboration with representatives of the Departments of State and of the Army, is submitted for approval.

It is requested that each individual member of the National Security Council indicate his approval of the statement in Enclosure A, as a matter of urgency, by filling in the return memorandum in Enclosure B.²

Sidney W. Souers

[Annex]

As presented by the President to the Congress, one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. In order to realize our objectives and in the interests of international peace and hence our national security, the United States has committed itself to help the free peoples of Greece and Turkey to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.

In furtherance of our objectives and in consideration of our commitment, the National Security Council has considered the deteriorating military situation in Greece and what immediate steps might be taken to assist and improve the operations of the Greek armed forces against the Communist guerrilla forces. Although the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) is achieving some progress of an economic nature in areas secure from Communist guerrilla operations and is delivering military supplies and equipment to the Greek National Army, the failure of the Greek armed forces to defeat the guerrillas during the summer months has required the diversion for military purposes of a portion of American aid previously allocated to economic projects.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, recently dispatched Major General S. J. Chamberlin to Greece to make an estimate of the military situation there and to recommend corrective measures which might be taken to improve the situation. One of the measures recommended by General Chamberlin and approved by General Eisenhower subject to certain contingencies, is that of furnishing operational advice to the Greek armed forces, in addition to the current program of furnishing supplies and equipment and instruction in its use. Such a measure would require initially the addition of approximately 90 additional U.S. officers and a slightly lower number of enlisted men, in order to form an Advisory and Planning Group to provide high staff advice to the Greek forces, and to place observers with Greek military units down to and including divisions. This would not involve the use of U.S. armed forces in combat.

The National Security Council has agreed that such an Advisory and Planning Group to the Greek armed forces should be established, subject to the following provisions:

a. The Secretary of the Army, as the representative of the National Military Establishment, should advise the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the proposed action and the fact that it will involve initially the addition of approximately 90 officers and a slightly lower number of enlisted men to AMAG and an extension of assistance beyond that previously presented to the Congressional Committees to include giving operational advice to the Greek Army.

b. The Advisory and Planning Group should be a part of AMAG, but with direct communication to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on matters concerning military operations. In the field of operational advice to the Greek forces, the Chief of AMAG will be expected to leave to the head of the Advisory and Planning Group military decisions which do not affect over-all AMAG policies or other AMAG activities. Military decisions involving high policy, as defined in supplemental instructions, which are attached,³ to be issued to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece and the Chief of AMAG, will be brought to the attention of the Ambassador by the head of the Advisory and Planning Group, through the Chief of AMAG, and no such decisions will be taken without the Ambassador’s authority, which he will extend only in accordance with instructions already received or to be promptly sought by him from the Department of State.

c. Subject to the approval of the President, the Secretary of State at an appropriate time will initiate a strong recommendation to the Congress that assistance to Greece be continued beyond the expiration of the present program, which expires on June 30, 1948. All members of the Council have agreed to support such a recommendation.⁴

[Sub-Annex]

Statement of Department’s Position on Organization of American Activities in Greece⁵

top secret

[Washington,] October 23, 1947.

(The following statement is proposed as a supplement to the existing instructions of the Ambassador and the Chief of AMAG, and is based upon the assumption that American military activity in Greece will continue to be on a restricted and advisory basis, as envisaged in General Chamberlin’s telegram from Athens. In the event that any major change in the scope or type of military operations by the United States should be decided upon, this position should be immediately reconsidered.)

1. The Ambassador is and should be universally recognized as the American representative in Greece charged with dealing with the Greek Government on matters of high policy as defined in Paragraph 4 below. The Embassy should be the sole channel for dealing with the Greek Government or other foreign officials on such matters, except when the Ambassador may approve or request a direct approach by one of the other American officials.

2. Any matter of concern to other American officials in Greece and requiring a high policy decision should be immediately brought to the attention of the Ambassador through appropriate channels and no action taken without his authority, which he will extend only in accordance with instructions already received or to be promptly sought by him from the Department. On the other hand, the Ambassador will bring to the attention of other American officials in Greece any major questions on which he proposes to take action insofar as such question may affect their operations. In particular, the Chief of AMAG and his principal military and naval subordinates in Greece will be consulted and at all times be given every opportunity to present their views to the Ambassador on major questions, and will be kept closely informed by him of all developments of policy.

3. If discussion of a question involving a high policy decision affecting the operations of AMAG reveals that there is a fundamental difference of views between the Ambassador and the Chief of AMAG or his principal military or naval subordinates, these views shall be jointly brought to the attention of the Department before any action is taken.

4. By “high policy decision” is meant one which involves major political factors or repercussions apart from the technical desirability or undesirability of the action proposed. Among the matters on which such high policy decisions would be required are:

a) Any action by United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek Cabinet;

b) Any action by United States representatives to bring about or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed forces;

c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces;

d) Any disagreement arising with the Greek or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials;

e) Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the United States;

f) Any major question involving the policies of the Greek Government toward Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc., including questions of punishment, amnesties, and the like;

g) Any question involving the holding of elections in Greece.

The foregoing list is not intended to be inclusive but rather to give examples.

5. In matters affecting AMAG in which high policy is not involved, the responsibility for decision rests with the Chief of AMAG, who is the sole director of AMAG operations. If any decision on a high policy matter should involve a new expenditure or a reallocation of AMAG funds, such expenditure or reallocation could, of course, be made only with the approval of the Chief of AMAG, or on the basis of decisions reached in Washington.

6. All military and naval assistance to Greece, whether in the form of supplies or in the form of advice on logistics, training or operations, should be handled by the military and naval units of AMAG. High policy decisions in this field should be dealt with in accordance with Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above. Other questions should normally be handled by the Chief of AMAG in consultation with his principal military and naval subordinates. However, in the field of operational advice to the Greek forces, the Chief of AMAG would be expected to leave to his principal military and naval subordinates military decisions which do not affect overall AMAG policies or other AMAG activities. Military decisions involving high policy should be brought to the attention of the Ambassador by the Chief of AMAG in accordance with Paragraph 2 above.

7. The Greek Government and the British authorities should be informed in general terms of the relative responsibilities set forth in this paper, and it should be made clear to them that the Ambassador is the sole channel for handling high policy questions.

1. Infra.
2. Not found attached.
3. Infra.
4. In a memorandum of November 4, Admiral Souers informed the National Security Council that President Truman “has approved the program recommended by the National Security Council … and has directed that it be implemented under the coordination of the Secretary of State.” The President’s approval was given on November 3.

   On November 7, Secretary Marshall informed Secretary of the Army Roy all that “The Department of State is anxious to proceed immediately with the implementation of the program approved by the President … and I have been informed that the Department of the Army is in fact proceeding with preparations to this end. The first step would appear to be communication of our intention to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, which it was agreed you would undertake. It would be very much appreciated, therefore, if you would transmit the necessary information to those Committees at the earliest possible moment. As soon as this has been accomplished, I propose to send the necessary instructions to the American Ambassador in Greece and the Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece in accordance with the agreed statement of October 23.”

   In a letter to Secretary of Defense Forrestal the same day, Secretary Marshall covered much the same ground and then added: “It would be very much appreciated if you would take the necessary steps for the formation and dispatch to Greece of the joint Army, Navy, and Air group of officers and enlisted men … in order to provide the desired operational advice, and to establish American observers with the appropriate units of the Greek armed forces.” (868.20 Missions/11–447)

5. This statement is on the stationery of the Under Secretary of State.